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U.S. AND SOVIET START PROPOSALS, 1982-1983
INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents an overview of U.S. and Soviet
START proposals from 1982 to 1983. It is important that
this history be reviewed prior to examining sources of
Soviet disinterest in strategic arms reductions for several
reasons. First, Soviet START proposals reveal Soviet
negotiating priorities. Second, Soviet reactions to U.S.
START proposals shed valuable light on Soviet strategic
threat perceptions and objectives. Third, changes and
modifications in Soviet START proposals can be tracked over
time. Comparing these changes with changes in U.S. START
policy may suggest which side made the most movement from
its original position and hence was prepared to be the most
flexible. This should give one indication of relative U.S.
and Soviet interests in a strategic arms reduction agreement
for the period under consideration. Fourth, reviewing the
- 1 -
U.S. AND SOVIET START PROPOSALS, 1982-1983
overall negotiating record will provide the basis and
context for examining leadership, threat perception, foreign
policy, military, and domestic sources of Soviet disinterest
in agreeing to reduce strategic arms to be discussed in the
chapters that follow. Furthermore, this history will show
that considerable domestic pressure on the U.S. side
undermined whatever incentives the Soviets may have had to
make compromises in the negotiations to achieve a START
agreement. This theme is taken up in greater detail in
Chapter Five on bargaining leverage. Finally, it should be
noted that no thorough and publicly available history of
U.S. and Soviet START proposals exists, although there is a
lengthy journalistic account of the domestic U.S. inter-
agency bargaining process that treats the evolution of the
U.S. START position. Brief descriptions of basic U.S. and
Soviet START positions exist but do not track their
evolution and development.
1 Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan
administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control ,
updated version, (New York: Vintage Books, 1985) . While this
book has been the source for some material used in this
chapter, its focus is heavily on the U.S. side of the START
(and INF) negotiations. Soviet proposals and policy are
treated by Talbott only incidentally, and then
superficially.
9 . . .
In particular, see National Academy of Sciences,
Committee on International Security and Arms Control,
Nuclear Arms Control: Background and Issues , (Washington,
D.C.: National Academy Press, 1985), pp. 58-80; Coit D.
Blacker and Gloria Duffy, eds., International Arms Control:
Issues and Agreements , 2nd ed., (Stanford: Stanford
- 2 -
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A certain school of thought in the United States has
held that the principal source of Soviet disinterest in
consummating a strategic arms reduction agreement between
1981 and 1983 was the non-negotiability of the U.S. START
approach. The following history of U.S. and Soviet START
proposals invalidates this thesis. A comparison of U.S. and
Soviet START positions supports the notion that the main
reasons for the failure to achieve a strategic arms
reduction agreement during this period have to do with the
Soviet Union, not the United States' negotiating posture.
That posture was in flux for much of the time the talks were
in session and the Soviet Union never gave the U.S. START
position a chance to settle. There was considerable
movement in the U.S. START position during the 18 month
course of the negotiations, and while much of it was
obviously motivated by strictly domestic political
considerations, there were non-trivial concessions to
University Press, 1984), pp. 272-276; Congressional Budget
Office, An Analysis of Administration Strategic Arms
Reduction and Modernization Proposals , (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Budget Office, March 1984) ; Charles R.
Gellner, U.S. and Soviet Proposals in Negotiations to Reduce
Strategic Armaments (START) — Brief Outlines , (Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1 Jan. 1984); Robert
Kennedy, "START: Problems and Prospects," in Robert Kennedy
and John M. Weinstein, eds., The Defense of the West:
Strategic and European Security Issues Reappraised ,
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 185-222; U.S.
Department of State, "Evolution of the U.S. START Approach,"
Current Policy , No. 436, 1983; and Michael Krepon, "Assessing
Strategic Arms Reduction Proposals," World Politics , 35
(Jan. 1983) : 216-44.
- 3 -
U.S. AND SOVIET START PROPOSALS, 198 2-198 3




Furthermore, the Soviet Union placed a subordinate
priority on START, as will be shown here and in later
chapters, and held movement in its START policy hostage to
demanded Western concessions in the INF negotiations. In
this sense, one might ascribe the failure to achieve a START
agreement to the West's refusal to grant nuclear hegemony in
Europe to the Soviet Union.
I. EARLY POSTURING
The Soviets had expressed desires to commence
discussions on strategic arms limitations and reductions as
soon as President Reagan assumed office in 1981. The
United States determined the moment for accepting this
invitation. Although candidate Reagan had promised to
3 Leslie Gelb of the New York Times noted late in the
START negotiations that both Rowny and ACDA chief Kenneth
Adelman felt that the U.S. had lost negotiating credibility
due to the many proposal changes made under domestic
pressure. See "Arms Talks: Shift by U.S.," New York Times .
5 October 1983.
See the Pravda claim that Moscow had proposed talks
on "limiting and reducing strategic arms" in January 1981,
in Soviet Broadcast in English to North America, 3 July 1982
(citing a Pravda article of the same date) , in Soviet Union:
Daily Report
. FBIS, 6 July 1982, p. AA2 . Also see Alexander
M. Haig, Jr. , Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy ,
(New York: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 102-109, 228; and Raymond
L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet
Relations From Nixon to Reagan
,
(Washington, D.C.:
Brookings, 1985), p. 1022.
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"immediately open negotiations on a SALT II treaty," 5 the
administration was deliberately reluctant to begin
negotiations right away. As Alexander Haig put it in his
memoirs, "The time was not right to give the Soviets
something they wanted as passionately as they wanted a
treaty on strategic arms. Their international behavior did
not warrant it." 6
President Reagan chose the occasion of a commencement
address on 9 May 1982 at his alma mater to publicly set
forth the U.S. Administration's proposal for strategic arms
reductions. Quoting the President's address:
For the immediate future, I'm asking my START — and
START really means, we've given up on SALT, START means
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks — negotiating team to
propose to their Soviet counterparts a practical, phased
reduction plan. The focus of our efforts will be to
reduce significantly the most destabilizing systems —
the ballistic missiles, the number of warheads they
carry, and their overall destructive potential.
At the first phase, or the end of the first phase of
START, I expect ballistic missile warheads, the most
serious threat we face, to be reduced to equal levels,
equal ceilings, at least a third below the current
levels. To enhance stability, I would ask that no more
than half of those warheads be land-based. I hope that
these warhead reductions in missiles themselves could be
achieved as rapidly as possible.
5 Haig, Caveat , p. 46.
Ibid . . p. 46. Later in the same volume Haig notes:
"at this early stage there was nothing substantive to talk
about, nothing to negotiate, until the U.S.S.R. began to
demonstrate its willingness to behave like a responsible
power. That was the basis of our early policy toward
Moscow." Ibid . , p. 105.
- 5 -
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In a second phase, we'll seek to achieve an equal
ceiling on other elements of our strategic nuclear
forces including limits on the ballistic missile throw-
weight at less than current American levels. In both
phases, we shall insist on verification procedures to
insure compliance with the agreement.
Specific elements of the Administration's prcposal
were leaked to the press several weeks before the
negotiations opened. One such account gave the following
details, according to "a key Administration official": 8
In Phase One ;
Each side would be limited to 5,000 missile
warheads on no more than 8 50 intercontinental
land-based and sea-based missiles.
Within the limit of 5,000 missile warheads,
neither side could have more than 2,500 warheads
on land-based missiles.
Reductions would take place over 5 to 10 years.
In Phase Two;
At some indefinite future time Washington would
try to equalize missile 'throw-weight, ' or the
weight a missile can carry onto target, and to
deal with long-range bombers, of which the United
7 President Reagan, "Arms Control and the Future of
East-West Relations," Eureka College Commencement, Peoria, 9
May 1982, reprinted in U.S. Department of State, Bureau of
Public Affairs, Realism. Strength. Negotiation: Key Foreign
Policy Statements of the Reagan administration . Washington,
D.C., May 1984, pp. 27-30.
8 Leslie H. Gelb, "Arms Accord: Stony Path," New York
Times
. 11 May 1982; See also, Leslie H. Gelb, "U.S. to
Propose Sublimit on Missile Warheads," New York Times . 9 May
1982.
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States has about 4 00 and the Soviet union somewhat
fewer.
The Administration made clear that the 850 "deployed
ballistic missile" limit was based on the principle of
achieving at least a 30 percent cut in the numbers of land-
based missiles.
President Reagan's speech was delivered on a Sunday.
The Soviets apparently were briefed on the new proposals the
day before and their public reactions were immediate. 10
There are three interesting aspects of the Soviet reactions
to President Reagan's START proposal. They were:
(1) criticism of the substance of the proposals;
(2) indications of interest in retaining "some
fundamental things" from the SALT II Treaty; and,
(3) use of criticisms and arguments put forth by
American opponents of the Administration.
Soviet reactions came in two stages. First Brezhnev
established the themes and rationale to be employed in
criticizing the President's proposals. These themes were
then repeated and elaborated by the Soviet media. Brezhnev
made his substantive reply to Reagan's START proposals in a
speech at the Ail-Union Komsomol Congress on 18 May 1982. 11
9 Gelb, "Arms Accord: Stony Path,"
10 Dusko Doder, "Soviets Hit U.S. Plan On Arms,"
Washington Post
. 11 May 1982.
11
"Brezhnev: USSR Is Ready for Arms Talks," Current
Digest of the Soviet Press , 34, 20 (16 June 1982): 1-3, 23.
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He began the section of his speech concerning arms control
by arousing anti-American sentiment:
What awaits the peoples — peaceful construction and
difficult but noble work to ensure happier and more
suitable living conditions, or the madness and nightmare
of nuclear destruction?
The answer to [this question] depends on how active
and consistent the peace-loving countries' policy is and
how resolutely and concertedly the masses, many
millions strong, come out against the course followed by
the instigators of a new world war and in defense of
peace on earth.
The use of the phrase "the course followed by the
instigators of a new world war" is a veiled Soviet reference
to U.S. policy. It indicates the innate hostility of the
Soviet leadership toward the United States at that time.
This was probably also symptomatic of Soviet recognition
that detente had by then outlived its (unilateral)
usefulness. The "masses" Brezhnev referred to are primarily
the populations of western Europe.
It should be noted that Brezhnev used the term
"limitation and reduction of strategic arms" in his speech
to indicate Soviet interests in perpetuating the SALT
process with its emphasis on limitations (the preferred
Soviet emphasis) as opposed to reductions (the preferred
American emphasis) . While START was referred to as the
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the INF negotiations were not referred to as talks en
reductions , but rather only as talks on limitations --
implying that: (1) the Soviet Union placed emphasis in START
on preserving the SALT II framework of limitations with
modest reductions; and, (2) that the Soviets would prefer
perpetuating through limits the then-existing status quo in
Europe, rather than changing it through reductions. This
would be standard Soviet usage throughout the negotiations.
The Soviet Union wanted to portray itself as setting
no preconditions for negotiations on strategic arms
reductions. In his 18 May 1982 speech to the Ail-Union
Komsomol Congress, Brezhnev professed Soviet interest in
reaching "an honest and fair accord that doesn't infringe
anyone's interests," and indicated that the Soviet Union was
ready to begin talks "with the aim of working out such an
accord without delay and with no strings attached." The
Soviet Union is on record as having resisted numerous past
attempts at strategic arms reductions in other negotiating
forums, notably SALT II, yet on this occasion Brezhnev
added; "we have always been in favor of substantial
reductions in strategic arms — there's no need to persuade
us on this score." 13
Brezhnev then proceeded to make criticisms of
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the terms of the American position, played up internal U.S
opposition to the Reagan administration's arms control
policies, and set the theme for Soviet commentaries to
follow throughout the course of the START negotiations.
There was even a hint of accusing the United States of
deception. To quote Brezhnev:
" 1) the American position is absolutely one-sided,
primarily because the US would like, in general, to
exclude from the talks those types of strategic arms
that it is most intensively developing at present.
"2) knowledgeable people in the United States itself
stated at once that this is an unrealistic
position, one that is divorced from life, and
perhaps is simply insincere.
"3) It directly prejudices the USSR's security, and at
the same time leaves Washington a free hand in the
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Brezhnev added:
It's hard not to draw the conclusion that the position
announced by the US President is aimed not at searching
for an agreement but at ensuring conditions for the
continuation of Washington's attempts to achieve
military superiority over the Soviet Union.
^
He then set forth Soviet conditions for
"successfully" concluding a strategic arms limitation and
reduction agreement, enumerated as follows:
(1) "talks should "actually pursue the goal of limiting
and reducing strategic arms, not serve as a cover
for a continued arms race and the breakdown of the
existing parity.
(2) "it's necessary that both sides conduct the talks
with consideration for each other's legitimate
security interests and in strict accordance with the
principle of equality and equal security.
(3) "we must preserve everything positive that was
achieved earlier. After all, the talks aren't
starting from scratch; a great deal of by no means
superfluous work has already been done. This
should not be forgotten.
(4) "It's also extremely important to effectively close
all channels for the continuation of the strategic
arms race in any form. This means that the creation
of new types of strategic weapons should be either




Brezhnev continued by making proposals that gave
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existing strategic "equilibrium" via a nuclear weapons
"freeze" rather than reductions in strategic arms:
We would be prepared to reach an agreement to freeze
the strategic weapons of the USSR and the US right now,
as soon as the talks begin, to freeze them
quantitatively, and to place maximum restrictions on
their modernization.
It's also as necessary that neither the US nor the
Soviet Union take actions that would upset the stability
of the strategic situation. Such a freeze, important in
itself would also facilitate progress toward the radical
limitation and reduction of strategic arms. This, in
brief, is our position on the question of strategic
weapons. 17
The Brezhnev speech, as reported in TASS, was well
covered by Western news media. 18 A Pravda editorial
published by TASS on 3 June 1982 picked up on and refined
the party line set forth in Brezhnev's speech. The
following statement is extracted from that editorial:
Outwardly it might seem [that Reagan's START
proposals] sound attractive — the reductions are
substantial and cover really formidable systems, but if
one looks just a bit deeper, one will discover a
striking lopsidedness in the U.S. position.
17 Ibid
.
, pp. 20, 23.
1ft A representative example of Western media coverage
can be found in Dusko Doder, "Soviets Call U.S. Plan
'Unfair, Unrealistic'," Washington Post , 19 May 1982. An
analysis of Brezhnev's speech can be found in Sallie Wise,
"Brezhnev Announces Soviet Position on Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks," Radio Liberty Research . RL 206/82, 18 May
1982.
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Consequently, the so-called radical reductions
favored by the U.S. President would be such only for the
Soviet side. They in Washington would like to reduce by
more than half the Soviet ICBMs while foregoing
practically nothing themselves.
Should the U.S. administration's plan be realize-.
the Soviet strategic nuclear potential (by the number zz.
warheads) would be three times smaller than that of the
United States. 19
The Pravda editorial noted that 70 percent of the USSR's
nuclear warheads were on land-based ICBMs while only 28
percent of America's warheads were on ICBMs. It also
repeated the charge that the Soviet Union would never allow
the United States to achieve nuclear superiority over the
USSR. 21
This charge carries an interesting connotation in
this particular context. It indicates that one major Soviet
concern in START was that the United States not be allowed
to use arms control to gain nuclear superiority over the
Soviet Union. That the Soviets would consider arms control
a potential avenue of approach for gaining military
superiority, even by their adversaries, is telling. It
1 Q
, ,Pravda editorial quoted in Washington Times , 4 June
1982, p. 1. See also John Burns, "Moscow Rebuts American
Plan for Arms Cuts," New York Times . 4 June 1982, p. 1;
Associated Press in Boston Globe
. 4 June 1982; The Arms
Control Reporter , June 1982, pp. 611. B. 30 - 611. B. 31; and,
Soviet Aerospace , Vol. 35, No. 6 (7 June 1982): 41-42.
These figures were generally consistent with
information publicly available in the West at the time.
Washington Times , 4 June 1982, p. 1.
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suggests that the Soviets have at least considered the idea
that arms control could be applied to such purposes as
achieving unilateral advantages. By way of contrast, the
United States has not suffered from an official
preoccupation the concern that the Soviet Union may be
seeking strategic superiority through asymmetrical arms
limitations.
Perhaps more importantly, this Soviet criticism
demonstrates conclusively that the Soviets perceived U.S.
START proposals as having the effect of shifting the
direction of strategic developments away from the advantages
they had gained during the course of the SALT decade and
toward restoration of a credible U.S. deterrent posture,
precisely the Reagan administration's stated goal. In fact,
it could be said that for the first time since SALT I, U.S.
arms control policy was consistent with overall U.S.
strategic deterrence policy.
The Soviet warning that it would never allow the
United States to achieve nuclear superiority has two other
interesting implications. First, the Soviets recognized the
political advantages nuclear superiority may confer on a
nation willing to exploit those advantages. If superiority
were meaningless, why would they care so much about
preventing the U.S. from achieving it? Second, by repeating
this theme in the context of the START negotiations (as well
as in the INF negotiations) , the Soviet Union demonstrated
- 14 -
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that it believed the combined effect of SALT I and II had
been to deny the U.S. meaningful strategic advantages, and
it aimed to perpetuate that condition.
The Pravda editorial also urged that strategic
nuclear weapons be frozen guantitatively as a preliminary
step to the Geneva talks, and that maximum limits on
modernization of new systems be incorporated into any accord
that should be produced. 22 It further represented the
official Soviet position by stressing that the negotiations
should be aimed toward "a renunciation of efforts to gain
military superiority," and that "strict observance of the
principle of eguality and egual security" be the basis for
agreement:
The task of the talks, in the opinion of the Soviet
Union, should be to find, in spite of different
structures of strategic arms on both sides, mutually
acceptable long-term solutions with due account for
political, geographic and other factors that would
greatly reduce the level of military confrontation
between the U.S.S.R. and the United States without
damaging their security. 2 -^
Soviet commentaries clearly aimed to make the United
States position appear hypocritical. In this regard, they
bitterly criticized the U.S. administration's avowed policy





~K Burns, "Moscow Rebuts American Plan for Arms Cuts,"
cited in footnote 17.
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negotiating strategic arms agreements. 24 The Pravda
editorial quoted above stated:
To propose that the Soviet Union remove the shield that
protects it and its friends from imperialist nuclear
threats, and to implement at the same time a rearmament
program, the most comprehensive in United States
history, is too much even for bourgeois public opinion,
which is used to political sensation. 25
The principal Soviet criticism regarding the
substance of President Reagan's Eureka College proposals was
that they were, in Brezhnev's phrase, "absolutely unilateral
in nature." Other Soviet officials were quoted as calling
the proposals "unfair and unrealistic."" Soviet criticisms
of the U.S. START proposals involved the following points:
24 It is important to note that the Soviets may derive
considerable satisfaction from at least two points regarding
Reagan's "build-up." First, the U.S. entered the START
negotiations long before there were any prospects of
Reagan's military program actually materializing. Since the
Administration had first portrayed such a restoration of
American nuclear strength as a prerequisite to negotiations,
the Soviets could view the U.S. presence at the negotiating
table prior to this as a concession. Second, from the
perspective of 1986, the Soviets might also take
satisfaction in realizing that Reagan's strategic
modernization program never did materialize in the quantity
he originally called for. This issue will be taken up in
the chapter on bargaining leverage factors influencing
Soviet interests in strategic arms reductions.
Burns, "Moscow Rebuts American Plan for Arms Cuts.
See "Brezhnev's Nuclear Response," Baltimore Sun , 19
27 Dusko Doder, "Soviets Call U.S. Plan 'Unfair,
May 1982.
C
Unrealistic'," Washington Post . 18 May 1982
- 16 -
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(1) they would require greater reductions in Soviet
land-based missiles than in American land-based
missiles
;
(2) they would involve 'troublesome' verification
problems;
(3) the U.S. was using START to compensate for faulty
American force decisions of the 1960s;
(4) implementation of the U.S. START proposals would
upset the then-existing strategic balance;
(5) U.S. START proposals excluded limits on strategic
nuclear systems the U.S. was then developing; and,
(6) Reagan's START proposals were largely propaganda,
motivated by the need to mollify the antinuclear
peace movement both in Europe and the U.S.
On the first point, the U.S. had been trying since
SALT I to "move the Russians out to sea. IK This meant
urging the Soviets to shift a larger proportion of their
warheads to submarine-launched ballistic missiles on the
grounds that a sea-based force was more survivable, and
hence more stabilizing.
The second point regarding "troublesome" verification
problems is curious, since it was most often the Americans
who complained about verif iability. It can only be
concluded that the Soviets were picking up this objection to
Reagan's START proposals from U.S. critics who had asserted
that verification difficulties would impede effectiveness of
5 p The phrase quoted is from Strobe Talbott, Endgame:
The Inside Story of SALT II . (New York: Harper & Row, 1979)
,
pp. 163, 207-208. See also John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The
Story of SALT , (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973),
pp. 177-78.
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the kinds of reductions Reagan had envisioned. The third
point, that the U.S. was using START to compensate for
faulty nuclear force decisions of the 1960s, warrants
clarification. According to Soviet arguments cited in the
U.S. press, Americans were "trying to change the rules of
the game to correct a decision made two decades ago: to opt
for the smaller but accurate Minuteman apparently on the
assumption that the Soviets would not be capable of
improving their huge SS-11 rocket." 29
The fourth point, that U.S. nuclear weapon
modernization plans would upset the existing strategic
balance, was to be a consistent theme throughout START. It
is especially interesting because this was also a key Soviet
criticism of NATO's Intermediate-range Nuclear Force
modernization efforts in the INF negotiations, and it would
later form the basis of much Soviet criticism of the U.S.
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) . This theme in Soviet
commentaries on INF, START, and SDI suggests two points.
One, the Soviets were satisfied with the status of the
strategic "equilibrium" (to use the common Soviet term for
"balance") as it was perceived by them prior to the
beginning of NATO INF deployments in the Fall of 1983. Two,
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the Soviets perceived NATO's INF deployments as upsetting
that "equilibrium." 30
The balance of strategic nuclear power in place at
the beginning of START was, in part, the product of the SALT
process. This may partially explain Soviet interests in
retaining basic elements of the SALT framework, with its
emphasis on launchers as the principal unit of limitation,
its ceilings on MIRVed systems, and its allowance for Soviet
"heavy" ICBMs.
In connection with the criticism that implementing
U.S. START proposals would upset the existing strategic
balance, the Soviets also charged that these proposals did
not meet the requirement of "equality and equal security." 31
One Soviet commentator expanded on this theme:
So far, neither the president nor his close advisers
have been able to come up with valid arguments and facts
confirming that parity in strategic forces does not
exist and that the balance is in favor of the Soviet
Union.
Of course, if one weapons system of the strategic
triad is singled out, one can find disparity. But
there is ample and effective compensation for such
disparity in the triad's other components. 32
30 Soviet perceptions of NATO INF deployments will be
treated more fully in Chapter Four.
31 Ibid .
Vladimir Alexeev of the Novosti Press Agency Moscow
in a letter to New York Times , 24 May 1982.
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The fifth element of Soviet criticisms of the
substance of Reagan's Eureka START proposals was that they
intentionally excluded "those types of strategic weapons
that [the U.S.] at present is developing most intensively."
Brezhnev was specifically referring to submarine-launched
ballistic missiles and strategic bombers. 3 Attention might
be called to two implications of this particular criticism.
First, it is profoundly typical of Soviet negotiating
practice to exclude or minimize limitations on systems they
are currently developing, especially when those systems are
designed to play key roles in the accomplishment of Soviet
war-fighting objectives. Second, the Soviets may in fact be
revealing genuine concern with certain U.S. systems they
consider particularly "de-stabilizing" from their point of
view. 34
On the sixth aspect of Soviet criticisms, Novosti
commentator Gennady Gerasimov referred to the alleged
propaganda intent of Reagan's Eureka START proposals when he
said: "What also makes one wary is the opinion voiced by
political analysts to the effect that underlying the
president's need for an impressive speech were tactical
motives of current policy rather than principles of peace
i ? ...See Wise, "Brezhnev Announces Soviet Position," p.
2.
This falls under the category of 'threat
perceptions' and will also be treated at greater length in a
later chapter.
- 20 -
U.S. AND SOVIET START PROPOSALS, 1982-1983
considerations." He also noted that President Reagan
planned a visit to Europe soon after his Eureka speech,
implying that Europeans may have been as much the intended
audience for Reagan's proposals as the Soviets. 5
In criticizing Reagan's proposals, Soviet leader
Brezhnev also made several points that gave clear
indications of Soviet priorities and objectives in START.
These points represented three elements "needed for the
talks to proceed successfully and bring about an agreement."
They are given in press reports as follows:
1) "The talks should 'actually pursue' the goal of
reducing arms rather than serving as a 'cover' for
the continuing arms race 'and the breakdown of the
existing parity'.
2) "Both sides should show 'due regard' for each
other's 'legitimate security interests' on the
'principle of equality and equal security'.
3) "The framework should 'preserve everything positive
that has been achieved earlier' .... A great and
by no means superfluous work has already been
accomplished [and] this should not be forgotten."
35 Doder, "Soviets Hit U.S. Plan." This same article
contains the following interesting comment: "Soviet sources
said privately that the plan may have a 'psychological
effect' in the struggle for popular opinion. It makes it
almost impossible for Moscow to reject it outright." Note
that, once again, a Soviet criticism reveals Soviet
intentions as much as it indicts American policies. The
principal audience for much of Soviet arms control policy in
this period was the West European public.
36 Doder, "Soviets Call U.S. Plan 'Unfair,
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It should have been clear at the very outset of these
negotiations that the Soviets were operating on the basis of
entirely different strategic rationales than those
underlying U.S. objectives. This meant that the Soviets
evaluated the ostensibly 'stabilizing' or 'destabilizing'
effects of given nuclear weapon systems differently than did
the U.S. The Soviets even rejected the long-standing U.S.
contention that sea-based missiles were inherently
stabilizing.
In these early public revelations of proposals and
criticisms, an important objective of Soviet START policy
began to emerge — to inhibit U.S. efforts to embark on a
strategic modernization program that would undo the Soviet
gains in SALT. By portraying the U.S. modernization program
as hypocritical and diametrically opposed to the spirit and
objectives of further efforts to limit and constrain the
superpower 'arms race' the Soviet Union sought to develop
one dimension of an overall foreign policy offensive against
the Reagan administration.
This points up a critical asymmetry in U.S. -Soviet
arms negotiations. Because of the highly public nature of
U.S. political and military decisionmaking, U.S. weapon
programs and policies can be made the subject of arms
negotiations long before they are actually fielded, while
Soviet systems — deployed in public silence — may not
become the subject of negotiations until long after they are
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operational. Note that the Soviet SS-20 Intermediate-range
Ballistic Missile [IRBM] was first fielded in 1976, but not
made the subject of U.S. -Soviet arms negotiations until the
INF talks commenced in the Fall of 1981, five years later.
On the other hand, NATO systems developed as a response to
the SS-20 (Pershing lis and Ground-launched Cruise Missiles
[GLCMs]) were subjected to negotiations fully two years
prior to their deployment.
II. THE INITIAL U.S. AND SOVIET
START POSITIONS
Despite Soviet criticisms of Reagan's Eureka speech
with its call for two-phased reductions, a statement issued
simultaneously in Washington and Moscow only weeks later on
31 May 1982 announced that START negotiations would commence
on 29 June 1982. It read:
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics have agreed to begin formal
negotiations on the limitation and reduction of
strategic arms on June 29, 1982, in Geneva, Switzerland.
The US delegation will be led by Ambassador Edward Rowny
and the Soviet delegation will be led by Ambassador V.P.
Karpov. Both sides attach great importance to these
negotiations. 37
"Joint Announcement by the United States and the
Soviet Union: Strategic Arms Reductions Talks, May 31,
1982," in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Documents on Disarmament, 1982 , (Washington, D.C.: 1985),
332.
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Note that, in accordance with the Soviet formulation . the
subject of the negotiations was to be on limitations as well
as reductions according to this mutual statement.
In a Memorial Day speech at Arlington National
Cemetery on the same day, President Reagan gave a r.ar.e tc
the new negotiations, announced their objectives, and
committed the United States to abide by existing arms
control agreements:
In the guest for peace, the United States has
proposed to the Soviet Union that we reduce the threat
of nuclear weapons by negotiating a stable balance at
far lower levels of strategic forces. This is a fitting
occasion to announce that START, as we call it,
strategic arms reductions, that the negotiations between
our country and the Soviet Union will begin the 29th of
June.
As for existing strategic arms agreements, we will
refrain from actions which undercut them so long as the
Soviet Union shows equal restraint. With good will and
dedication on both sides, I pray that we will achieve a
safer world. 38
On Tuesday, 29 June 1982, formal negotiations on
strategic arms reduction began in Geneva, Switzerland. The
U.S. delegation was led by Edward L. Rowny, a retired
lieutenant general who for six years had been a member of
the Carter SALT II team but had resigned from the delegation
saying the treaty it had negotiated was unverifiable and
"Remark by President Reagan: Strategic Arms
Reduction [Extract], 31 May 1982," in Ibid .
- 24 -
U.S. AND SOVIET START PROPOSALS, 1982-1983
unequal. 39 The Soviet delegation was headed by Viktor P.
Karpov, a veteran of both the SALT I and SALT II
negotiations who had assumed the position of chief Soviet
negotiator late in the SALT II talks. 40
Rowny indicated at a press conference following the
first session that he had read a letter from Reagan to
Karpov blaming the Soviet strategic weapons buildup for the
present instability, but declaring the talks were an
historic opportunity. The delegations met again the next
day (Wednesday) for the first working session of the talks,
and which then began meeting every Tuesday and Thursday. 41
A chronology of START negotiating rounds is given in Table
1.1 below.
An important element of early Soviet START positions
was given by East European sources. They indicated that if
ICBMs were to be cut in the first phase the Soviet Union
would insist on guarantees to cut bombers in the second
phase of the talks. 42
See "Dogged Determination Marks Rowny's Style,"
Washington Times . 29 June 1982.
40 See "Top Soviet Negotiator Veteran of Arms Talks,"
Washington Times , 29 June 1982.
41
"U.S. Gives Details of Arms Plan to Soviet," New
York Times
. 1 July 1982.
42 Ibid.
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Table 1.1
CHRONOLOGY OF START ROUNDS
Round One: 29 June 1982 - 12 Aug. 1982
Round Two: 7 Oct. 1982 - 2 Dec. 1982
Round Three: 2 Feb. 1983 - 31 Mar. 1983
Round Four: 8 June 1983 - 2 Aug. 1983
Round Five: 5 Oct. 1983 - 7 Dec. 1983
The U.S. position was set out during the first
several working sessions of the talks. As in SALT II, the
U.S. proposed a series of ceilings and sub-ceilings to be
equally applied to U.S. and Soviet forces as follows: 43
See, inter alia, Charles R. Gellner, U.S. and Soviet
Proposals in Negotiations to Reduce Strategic Armaments
(START) — Brief Outlines . Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Research Service, 1 Jan. 1984; "U.S. Explains Nuclear Arms
Reduction Proposal to Soviets," Los Angeles Times , 1 July
1982; and "U.S. Gives Details of Arms Plan to Soviet," New
York Times , 1 July 1982. For the cruise missile and bomber
limits, see Leslie H. Gelb, "U.S. and Soviet Views Far Apart
At Opening of Arms Talks Today," New York Times , 29 June
1982.
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A. Warheads
— a total of 5000 ballistic missile warheads
— no more than 2500 on ICBMs
— remaining warheads would be for SLBMs
B. "Deployed" Missiles
— a total of 850 ICBMs and SLBMs would be allowed
— of the 850, up to 210 could be "heavy" or
"medium"
— of the 210 "heavy" and "medium" missiles, up to
110 could be "heavy" ICBMs
C. Other Provisions
-- long-range bombers would be limited to 400 for
the U.S. and 350 for the Soviet Union, reductions
would be agreed upon in the second phase
— cruise missile limits could be discussed in
phase one, but would not be limited until phase
two
It was proposed that in Phase II throw-weight
reductions be made to 1.8 mkg each side, or about the then-
current US level. At the time, the Soviet Union had about
5.6 million kilograms. It was further proposed that the
SALT II limits on ALCMs be continued (20 ALCMs per bomber)
,
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and that limits on other systems, such as bombers (to
include Backfire), be established. 44
In April 1983, nearly ten months after the first
round of the START talks began, it was revealed that a 210
sublimit on "heavy" and "medium" missiles had been part of
the U.S. START proposal early on, and would apply to the
Soviet SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 multiple-warhead land-based
missiles, and that of the 210 missiles, a maximum of 110
could be SS-18s. All of these missiles are much larger than
the U.S. Minuteman missile and are somewhat more comparable
in size to the American MX missile. The idea was to allow
the United States to deploy a similar number (i.e. 210) of
comparable missiles. Apparently, the remaining 640
missiles allowed under the overall ceiling of 850 would be
composed of Minuteman (or SICBM) missiles for the United
States, and a comparable force of "light" ICBMs for the
Soviet Union.
The 1983-84 edition of The Military Balance gave
Soviet missile strengths as follows: 46
44 Gellner, "U.S. and Soviet Proposals."
45 Michael Getler, "U.S. Arms Reduction Plan Contains
More Missile Cuts Than Announced," Washington Post . 13 April
1983; and, "U.S. Reportedly Proposes Much Bigger Reduction
in ICBMs," Los Angeles Times , 14 April 1983. The 210
"heavy" and "medium" and 110 "heavy" ICBM sublimits had
apparently not been made public prior to April 1983.
4 The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
The Military Balance 1983-1984 , (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), p. 119.
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150 SS-17 (Mod 3=4 warheads)
308 SS-18 (Mod 4 = 10 warheads)
330 SS-19 (Mod 3=6 warheads)
This added up to a total of 788 in this category of weapon.
U.S. START proposals would have required an approximately
two thirds cut in the numbers of these missiles, and a 70
percent cut in the number of Soviet MIRVed missiles
i t 47overall
.
In May 1982, the U.S. had indicated that it wanted to
leave the number of weapons on bombers unlimited, but would
be willing to have equal numbers of bombers. Backfire was
to be included in any case. The U.S. response to the Soviet
argument that U.S. bombers carry more payload was that the
A ftSoviets have a much better air defense system. This
linking of offensive and defensive systems was one feature
that distinguished START from SALT I and II.
On the eve of the negotiations, Washington cabled a
detailed set of instructions to Ambassador Rowny with last
minute modifications and clarifications in the U.S.
position. Apparently, these instructions included "the
original Presidential negotiation position, the amendments
Getler, "U.S. Arms Reduction Plan Contains More
Missile Cuts Than Announced."
48 Charles Corddry in Baltimore Sun , 21 May 1982, cited
in The Arms Control Reporter , June 1982, p. 611. B. 27.
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made to it in another decision memorandum . . . and
interpretations of these decisions by experts in the
departments and agencies." 49
According to these new instructions, proportional
reductions were to be made in SS-18s (Reagan had termed SALT
II 'fatally flawed' precisely because of its failure to
reduce Soviet SS-18s) , although the President reportedly
refused a Pentagon request to make elimination of all SS-18s
part of the U.S. negotiating position. Elements of Phases
One and Two were to be established in a single negotiation,
and a final decision on verification and the counting of
missile reloads was put off until the fall. It was also
reported that Reagan would be willing to discuss limits (but
not total bans) on MX and Trident II in exchange for Soviet
agreement to reductions. The U.S. would submit a draft
treaty later in the negotiations, and would meanwhile resort
to a typical Soviet tactic and discuss only general
principles. 50
One week into the negotiations, Michael Getler
reported in the Washington Post that:
American officials suggest privately that there is a
little give in the American proposals, but they are
talking about allowing a few extra missile warheads or
being a little bit flexible on how bombers and cruise
missiles figure in the talks.
49 Gelb, "U.S. and Soviet Views Far Apart."
50 Ibid.
- 30 -
U.S. AND SOVIET START PROPOSALS, 1982-1983
There is no hint of a major fall-back oosition even
sihaving been developed.
Upon arriving in Geneva for the beginning of the
START negotiations, Soviet ambassador Karpov issued a
statement reflecting the principal facets of the Soviet
position on arms control, of which START was but one. It is
clear from the statement, given below, that the Soviet Union
hoped START would be in the image of a SALT-type agreement,
perhaps a SALT III:
The USSR delegation has arrived in Geneva in order
to hold talks with the U.S. delegation on the limitation
and reduction of strategic arms and to continue that
process which is vitally important to the cause of peace
which was begun with the SALT-I and SALT-II agreements.
The USSR is striving to de everything it should in order
to rid people of the nuclear threat, to ensure a
peaceful future for all people on earth. Indeed, the
pledge adopted by the Soviet Union not to be first to
use nuclear weapons which was announced in Leonid Ilich
Brezhnev's message to the second special session of the
UN General Assembly on disarmament is of historic
significance.
If the other nuclear powers were to follow the
Soviet Union's example, then the likelihood of the
occurrence of nuclear war will be virtually reduced to
nothing.
This action by the Soviet state should be a great
and positive incentive also at the talks on the
limitation and reduction of strategic arms. *
Michael Getler, "Lesson From the Moneyed: Shoot for
Prudent Risks in Arms Talks," Washington Post , 11 July 1982,
52 Moscow Domestic Service, "Karpov Statement on START
at Geneva Airport," in Daily Report: Soviet Union , FBIS, 28
June 1982, p. AA1
.
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Karpov then presented several Soviet objectives in
the form of general principles and asserted the need for
both Moscow and Washington to go beyond words:
The USSR delegation is entrusted with the mission of
trying to achieve at the talks the elaboration of such a
decision as would serve the strengthening of
international stability and the interests of peace. The
Soviet Union favors a Soviet-American agreement which
would provide for a significant quantitative reduction
of strategic arms and which would, at the same time,
establish effective limitations upon their qualitative
improvement. Of course, the efforts of both sides are
required for the success of the talks. It is therefore
extremely important to give them a correct tone at the
outset. It is insufficient merely to proclaim a
readiness for talks. The main thing is to conduct the
matter in practice to the attainment of the most
significant mutually acceptable agreements.
The USSR delegation is ready for constructive and
purposeful work. And we are sure that, if a true
aspiration is shown also on the American side for the
elaboration of an agreement which would be to the full
extent based on the principle of equality and equal
security and take into account the legitimate interests
of both sides, then talks on the limitation and
reduction of strategic weapons justify the hopes
connected with them by the world public. 53
Detailed elements of the Soviet counterproposal were
publicly revealed during the weeks following the opening of
the first round. They included the following: 54
Ibid . Karpov was, of course, alluding to the Soviet
nuclear freeze proposal.
54 For accounts of the Soviet START opening positions,
see Gellner, "U.S. and Soviet Proposals."; Leslie H. Gelb,
"Offer by Moscow to Curb Bombers and Missiles Cited," New
York Times
. 1 Aug. 1982; Michael Getler, "Officials Cite
Options Offered in Missile Talks," Washington Post , 1 Aug.
1982; and Robert C. Toth, "U.S. Weighs Surprising Soviet
Offer on A-Arms," Los Angeles Times , 13 Sept. 1982. It
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reduce to a common ceiling of 1800 long-range
missiles and bombers by 1990
limit of 4 to 6 on numbers of Typhoon and Trident
class submarines (with a maximum of 16 tubes on each
SSBN)
ban or limit cruise missiles with ranges exceeding
600 km (or 360mi)
extension of confidence-building measures (such as
advance warning of missile test flights)
a freeze on development and deployment of new
systems during the negotiations
a 25 percent reduction across the board in arsenals
of both sides
retention of SALT II counting rules and precedents
(such as SALT II provisions for ICBM modernization)
a moratorium on all untested systems
an overall ceiling on the number of long-range
missile and bomber-carried warheads
verification by National Technical Means (NTM)
The Soviet proposal for a nuclear weapons freeze was
elaborated by Colonel General Nikolay Chervov during the
course of the START negotiations in the following manner:
First, it implies a ban on quantitative increases of
existing nuclear weapons (including carriers and
warheads) ; second, it implies a ban on the production of
new types of arms [
—
] weapons systems that have become
unusable or damaged can be replaced only by similar
should be noted that on 3 Aug. 1982, administration
officials said that public reports of the Soviet's
negotiating position were "fundamentally in error" but did
not elaborate, citing the confidential nature of the talks;
see Reuter news bulletin in Boston Globe , 4 Aug. 1982, as
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ones, just as it is the case with replacing normal
losses; third, the plan also implies that modernizing
existing carriers and nuclear warheads should be banned
as well. 55
Such a freeze on strategic weapons systems would, in
Chervov's view, contribute to the political objective of
detente:
The implementation of the Soviet proposal on freezing
nuclear arsenals, based on the principle of equality and
equal security is likely to alleviate tension and to
normalize international relations. 5
Chervov incorporated the Soviet theme that a condition of
strategic parity existed, and that therefore the U.S. could
safely participate in such a freeze:
It is obvious that in view of the existing military-
strategic balance between the USSR and the United
States, an agreement on banning increases of nuclear
weapons is not likely to affect the security of any
country whatsoever. 5
Those aspects of SALT II the Soviets desired to
retain were a curious assortment of limits, and included
bans on developing more than one "new type" ICBM; placing
into earth orbit nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass
destruction; ocean floor basing of ballistic or cruise
V. Morozov, "Interview with Colonel General Nikolay
Chervov," Trud [Sofia, Bulgaria], 3 Aug. 1983, p. 3, in
Soviet Union: Daily Report . FBIS, 5 Aug. 1983, p. AA4
.
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missiles or launchers; basing ballistic missiles on
waterborne vehicles other than submarines; and development
of maneuverable, self-guided and penetrating warheads for
ballistic missiles.
The Soviets further proposed certain conditions for
reaching a START accord. Progress in START was explicitly
linked to U.S. forthcomingness in the INF negotiations.
This meant cancelling the planned Pershing II and GLCM
deployments as a precondition to making strategic arms
reductions. ° In essence, the Soviets were asking the
United States to forego the planned INF deployments and
accept stringent restrictions on cruise missiles — all in
return for both sides assuming an equal ceiling of 1,800
ICBMs and bombers and few limitations on corresponding
Soviet INF deployments.
The Soviets had originally made cancelling NATO INF
modernization a precondition for beginning negotiations.
Now, after having agreed to begin negotiations without such
a commitment, the Soviets were making it a precondition for
reaching a START agreement. It should be noted that in
November 1983, when the U.S. began INF deployments, the
Soviets reverted back to their original position, and made
cancellation and withdrawal of Pershing II and GLCM
58 Gelb, "Offer by Moscow."
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deployments a precondition for resuming arms control
negotiations.
With regard to perpetuating the SALT II framework,
the Soviets indicated a willingness to consider
modifications to the treaty, but did not state what changes
they might find acceptable. This was interpreted as an
encouraging sign of flexibility by Western journalists. 59
At the opening of the START negotiations, the Soviets
also warned that U.S. plans to modernize the American
strategic nuclear arsenal could jeopardize the arms talks. 60
This warning was no doubt linked to the Soviet proposal for
freezing development and deployment of new strategic systems
at the outset of the negotiations.
Fundamental disagreements over the nature of
"strategic stability" were evident in comparing the opening
U.S. and Soviet START proposals, although this fact per se
received scant attention in the U.S. To illustrate, the
Soviets claimed that it was destabilizing for the U.S. to
have over half of its nuclear missiles on hard-to-locate
submarines. 61 This is a remarkable concept, given that the
United States thought it had successfully convinced the
59 Ibid .
60
"Soviet Says U.S. Moves Threaten Arms Accord," New
York Times . 29 June 1982, citing TASS.
This Soviet claim is reported in an Associated Press
news bulletin dated 12 Aug. 1982.
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Soviets in SALT I and II that "moving to sea" was inherently
stabilizing. Such Soviet views indicate that, for the
Soviets, stability is a function of being able to target
(i.e. render vulnerable) the adversary's nuclear assets —
precisely the opposite of the traditional American view that
invulnerable nuclear weapons are the sine quo non of
strategic stability. These disagreements were to have
significant implications for the failure to achieve in START
a redefinition of the basis for "parity" and "stability" as
was achieved (albeit in flawed terms) in the SALT
negotiations.
Round One of START ended with only some clarification
of these differences to show for progress. Public reports
of this round convey the impression that the two sides'
positions were not fully presented during this period. For
example, not until Round Three would some detail emerge in
the Soviet START position.
During the recess between Rounds One and Two Soviet
spokesmen went to work making the case for their position to
the Western media. Ma j . Gen. Viktor Starodubov, the General
Staff representative on the Soviet START delegation, gave a
three hour "interview" to members of the Western press in
which he stressed the several principal themes the Soviets
- 37 -
U.S. AND SOVIET START PROPOSALS, 1982-1983
had been pursuing in Geneva. 2 Starodubov made Soviet
strategic objectives in START very explicit. They were:
(1) to place limits on U.S. cruise missile developments;
(2) to insure that British and French independent
nuclear forces were counted against the U.S.
strategic total
;
(3) to impose limits on other U.S. strategic
developments of concern to the Soviet Union, namely
the Ohio-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine;
and,
(4) to stress the Soviet Union's commitment to "equality
and equal security" as the basis of agreement.
Apparently in response to U.S. reluctance to accept
Soviet proposals on cruise missiles, Starodubov emphasized
the importance of limiting them as a quid pro quo for
reductions in heavy missiles. The newspaper account of this
talk quotes him as saying that "no arms control agreement
'will be of any value' if the United States starts a cruise
missile race while seeking reduction in the number of heavy
missiles." Cruise missiles were cited as a new weapon
technology where the U.S. was seeking to gain unilateral
advantages. Starodubov stated:
Security is our highest interest. We think it is
dangerous if the United States is superior in some types
of arms. The Americans could exploit superiority for
political purposes, and from that, it would not be a
long way to conflict.
Flora Lewis, "Soviet Arms-Control Expert Asks
Nuclear Balance," New York Times , 2 Sept. 1982.
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We have always been following the United States on
the arms issue. History shows that the Soviet Union has




Here again, the Soviets were trying to emphasize the
importance of preventing the United States from breaching
the existing strategic 'equilibrium' and seeking strategic
superiority.
Certain U.S. analysts felt that the Soviet Union
would try to eliminate ground-launched cruise missiles
intended for deployment in Europe altogether, while banning
or severely limiting sea-launched cruise missiles, and
placing restrictions on air-launched cruise missiles.
Apparently Moscow's proposed warhead limit in START would
count 3,800 prospective U.S. air- and sea-launched cruise
• i 64missiles
.
With regard to nuclear ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs) , Starodubov indicated that the Soviets had proposed
a ban on Ohio and Typhoon class submarines, but that the
United States had rejected it. It is not clear whether he
was referring to a proposal made during the course of the
63 Ibid .
Leslie Gelb, "The Cruise Missile: Preventing New
Arms Race With U.S. Is Seen as Key Soviet Goal in Geneva,"
New York Times , 2 Sept. 1982. This article is a 'news
analysis' based largely on the same presentation by Ma j
.
Gen. Viktor Starodubov 's remarks reported in Flora Lewis,
"Soviet Arms-Control Expert . . .," New York Times , 2 Sept
1982.
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SALT II negotiations, or to a proposal made in START, but it
was most probably a reference linked to a SALT II proposal
to include submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in
the "new type" restriction. The Soviets rejected including
SLBMs in that restriction and ultimately proposed exempting
SLBMs from modernization limits altogether. 65
Starodubov, according to this report, "said the basic
Soviet policy was peace and a stable balance," and "he
repeatedly insisted that the Soviet Union sought only a
balance in strategic weapons." The report ends with this
guote from Starodubov's interview: "If a state has a policy
of peace, it will never seek superiority. It is a dangerous
madness to count on victory."
When the negotiators arrived for the second round,
Viktor P. Karpov, head of the Soviet delegation, reiterated
the charge that the United States was using the START
negotiations to obtain superiority over the USSR, and placed
responsibility on the United States to "open the road toward
a mutually acceptable agreement." He also emphasized that
the Soviet Union was interested in "radical reductions" and
that progress could be achieved if Soviet START proposals
were "treated in an objective manner." 67
65 See Strobe Talbott, Endgame , pp. 161-163.
Flora Lewis, "Soviet Arms-Control Expert . . . ."
67
"U.S. and Soviet Set to Renew Arms Talks," New York
Times
. 5 October 1982.
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Obviously, the Soviet Union at this point would
clearly have liked to see the U.S. make concessions leading
to an agreement on the basis of the Soviet's opening
position. Soviet public statements were intended strictly
to put pressure on the United States to be more flexible in
the negotiations, and the second round began with Soviet
criticisms of the U.S. position, which forced U.S. officials
to adopt a defensive stance.
Following the traditional meeting of the delegation
heads at the commencement of Round Two, Karpov told a Soviet
correspondent
:
As for the U.S. proposals, they are one-sided in
nature. The U.S. approach to the negotiations as
spelled out in President Reagan's speech of 9 May this
year cannot, as the Soviet side has repeatedly said,
serve as the basis for agreement. One hopes that the
U.S. side, from the outcome of the discussions already
held, will make the necessary amendments in its position
toward a mutually acceptable agreement. 69
Round Two of START is notable for Soviet criticisms
of U.S. efforts to suggest progress was occurring in the
negotiations, a theme the Soviets were to press with vigor
throughout the negotiations. The Soviets kept up their
propaganda offensive, hoping to portray the U.S. as making
calculated attempts to block progress in the talks and
"Soviet Negotiator Assails U.S. for Arms Stance,"
Washington Post . 5 October 1982.
Moscow Domestic Service , 6 October 1982, in Daily
Report: Soviet Union , FBIS , 7 October 1982, p. AA1.
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trying to force a "deadlock. " The following citation frci?.
the press gives some indication of the propaganda offensive:
Col. Gen. Nikolai Chervov, who is head of the general
staff department on strategic weapons and a member of
the inner leadership of the armed forces, accused the
Reagan administration of deliberately seeking to create
an impression that some progress was being made at the
two sets of negotiations in Geneva.
'Actually, nothing of the sort has happened,' the
general said in an interview distributed by the official
news agency Novosti. °
Chervov is further guoted as saying:
If the United States stand does not develop in a
constructive direction, then naturally the Soviet Union
will have no grounds to develop its stand. As a result,
the negotiations will become deadlocked.
I would say that they are already approaching this
condition. 71
Note that once again, it is a Soviet military officer who is
acting as a spokesman for the Soviet START position.
Interestingly, Brezhnev reportedly did not mention
the START negotiations in either of his two speeches dealing
with foreign policy before and during the second round of
START. 72 This may reflect his preoccupation with the INF
70 Dusko Doder, "Soviet General Says U.S. Is Blocking
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negotiations or the low priority with which he viewed START,
or both.
On 5 November 1982, the Washington Post reported that
the Reagan administration was preparing a major presidential
speech on arms control that would involve those "confidence-
building measures" the President had promised to offer the
Soviet Union in a June 1982 speech in Berlin. These
confidence-building measures were reportedly to include
notification of strategic exercises, notification of missile
launches, and expanded exchange of strategic forces data. J
The administration may have intended this speech to give the
impression of Presidential seriousness regarding strategic
arms reductions. At least this was the speculation in the
American press. U.S. press reports making this inference
undercut American efforts to manage the environment within
which it was conducting negotiations with the Soviet Union
at Geneva.
Part way through the second round of START, on 10
November 1982, Leonid Brezhnev died. Yuri Andropov took
over the top post in a surprisingly rapid succession.
Western analysts guickly predicted that the new Soviet
leadership "would begin an immediate campaign calling for a
70 George C. Wilson and Michael Getler, "U.S. Drafting
Major Arms Control Speech," Washington Post , 5 November
1982.
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freeze and reduction of armaments, with the aim of gaining
political advantage over the United States."
Soon after this change in leadership, Soviet
spokesmen moved to convey the impression that the USSR
desired closer ties and normalization of relations with the
United States, and began urging the U.S. to make "concrete"
actions for the purpose of "easing tensions." They
buttressed these themes with both brandishings and
inticements, as indicated in a report of a speech by Georgy
Arbatov to an audience of 250 American businessmen. 75 The
brandishings consisted of a warning that the Soviet Union
was considering increasing its weapons programs:
Arbatov suggested that the Soviets were on the threshold
of a decision to escalate the arms race to counter what
he called an 'unprecedented' American arms buildup. He
quoted Leonid Brezhnev as saying "shortly before his
death that 'We are at a crossroads and we have to decide
which way to go'." 76
The inticement consisted of a claim that this
rearmament program as well as a propaganda counteroffensive
were being postponed, apparently to give the U.S. time to
display "concrete" actions:
74 Charles W. Corddry, "Arms Reduction Push Expected
from Moscow," Baltimore Sun
. 12 November 1982, p. 14. The
implications of this succession for Soviet START policy will
be treated in Chapter Six.
75 Dusko Doder, "Soviet Asks U.S. For Specific Moves,"
Washington Post , 18 November 1982.
76 Ibid.
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Well-informed Soviet sources said the new leadership
has suspended for the next couple of months what was
forecast by Brezhnev as a major counterof fensive in the
fields of propaganda and weapons development, one that
would undoubtedly have pushed Soviet-American relations
into an even sharper confrontation.
The second round of START recessed on 2 December
1982. During this recess, a source "close to the US
delegation" met in an of f-the-record discussion with
academic experts. Among the points made by this source the
following are instructive regarding U.S. interpretations of
... . TOthe Soviet position and expectations of the negotiations: °
— Although the Soviets have proposed a reduction to
1800 launchers, they say they have some room to maneuver
on the number.
— But, the USSR says, the US cannot dictate its force
structure. On the American argument for stability in
land systems, 'in all honesty the Soviets are not
impressed. They do not argue theories of deterrence and
strategic planning 7 .
— The Americans count the Backfire as a heavy bomber;
the Soviets have not tried to include the FB-111 because
that would require including the Backfire.
— The USSR is worried about the Stealth bomber; if it
can't see it, then it is the equivalent of a first
77 Ibid .
78 The Arms Control Reporter , December 1982, p
611. B. 58.
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strike weapon, even though it goes slowly. The source
said one US delegate handed her counterpart a blank page
as the US statement on Stealth; he was very disturbed.
— Launcher limits will be kept as the best way to
verify, but launcher limits will be used to count
missiles and warheads. The Minuteman and the SS-18 will
not count equally.
— US cancellation of MX production would bring no
concession from the Soviets.
— The Soviets would probably phase out the SS-16 if an
agreement were reached. 9
— No progress in the talks may be expected for six
months to a year, while the USSR watches the US go
through the appropriations process and watches Europe
decide about missile deployment there.
A number of developments occurred in the days and
weeks following the close of Round Two relevant to our
examination of Soviet interests and/or disinterests in
reducing strategic arms. First, on 8 December 1982, the
U.S. House of Representatives voted to delete funds for MX
missile production from the fiscal 1983 defense
appropriation bill. 80 This move forced President Reagan to
compromise with the Senate over its impending vote,
79 The SS-16 is outlawed by SALT.
80 Charles W. Corddry, "House Rebuffs Reagan, Cuts MX
Start-up Funds," Baltimore Sun , 8 December 1982.
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proposing that funds be approved, but not spent until after
a basing mode had been settled. The Senate subseguently
voted to permit MX production, but only on the condition
that both houses of Congress approved a basing plan first.
A joint House-Senate conference committee ultimately
rejected approving funds for MX production.
Second, the Soviets announced a major INF initiative
that focused Western media attention away from the
apparently deadlocked START negotiations and attempted to
portray Soviet flexibility on the European strategic
situation.
On 21 December 1982 Soviet leader Yuri Andropov gave
a speech to the Central Committee on the occasion of the
60th anniversary of the establishment of the Soviet state in
which he advocated reducing the numbers of nuclear warheads
while establishing strict limitations on nuclear weapon
modernization, saying:
We are prepared to reduce our strategic arms by more
than 2 5 percent. U.S. arms, too, must be reduced
accordingly, so that the two states have the same number
of strategic delivery vehicles. We also propose that
the number of nuclear warheads should be substantially
81
"Production Money for MX Deleted," Baltimore Sun
. 20
December 1982. See also, Margot Hornblower, "$232 Billion
Voted for Defense: Reagan Rebuffed on MX Funds," Washington
Post
. 21 December 1982. The impact of the MX program
difficulties will be treated at greater length in the
chapter on bargaining leverage.
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lowered and that improvement of nuclear weapons should
be maximally restricted. 82
Andropov also endorsed confidence-building measures,
and warned that the Soviet Union would counter new U.S.
weapons (the MX and cruise missiles in particular)
.
The Soviets used the recess between Rounds Two and
Three to restate their START position, while declining to
elaborate, modify, or otherwise alter that position. An
important Pravda article, distributed to the Western press
prior to its publication in the Soviet Union, harshly
accused the United States of "hampering and actually
obstructing the talks." 83 According to multiple Western and
Soviet sources, the Soviet START position, as of the end of
Round Two, included the following elements: 84
82
"Excerpts From Speech by Andropov On Medium-Range
Nuclear Missiles," New York Times . 22 December 1982. See
also U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on
Disarmament. 1982 . "Report by Soviet General Secretary
Andropov: Nuclear Arms Reduction Proposals and Confidence-
Building Measures [Extracts], December 21, 1982," pp. 917-
922; and which notes that: "The report was delivered at the
joint meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR, and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian
Federation devoted to celebrating the 60th anniversary of
the USSR."
83 Dusko Doder, "Soviets Assail U.S. For Talks Impasse
On Strategic Arms," Washington Post . 2 Jan. 1983.
84 TASS in press release of USSR United Nations
mission, 1 Jan. 1983, cited in The Arms Control Reporter .
Jan. 1983, p. 611. B. 65; "The Peoples' Will Must be Reckoned
With," Pravda, 25 November 1982, p. 6, in Daily Report:
Soviet Union . FBIS, 26 November 1982, pp. AA1-AA5; Robert
Gillette, "Soviets Add New Twist to Talk Demands," Los
Angeles Times . 2 Jan. 1983; Dusko Doder, "Soviets Assail
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(1) a freeze on strategic weapons development and
deployment;
(2) phased reductions in land- and submarine-based
ballistic missiles and strategic bombers to a total
of 1800 launchers for each side by the year 1990;
(3) a reduction in the number of warheads on each side
to egual levels;
(4) U.S. agreement not to deploy Pershing II and GLCM in
Europe
;
(5) a prohibition on cruise missiles with ranges in
excess of 600 kilometers;
(6) establishment of agreed restrictions on
modernization of existing weapons; and,
(7) agreement to certain confidence-building measures.
The Soviets proposed several specific confidence-
building measures, of which three were made public. These
included a restriction banning heavy bombers and aircraft
carriers from operating in "zones adjoining the territory of
the other side;" advance notification of "mass takeoffs" of
strategic and 'forward-based' aircraft; and, establishment
of exclusionary zones in which "antisubmarine activities of
the other side would be banned" but in which missile-
carrying submarines would be able to operate. 85 Several
U.S. For Talks Impasse."; Steven Strasser, Robert B.
Cullen, and John Walcott, "Andropov Aims At the Zero
Option," Newsweek
. 3 Jan. 1983, pp. 20-21; and John Kohan
and Erik Amf itheatrof , "Point and Counterpoint: Andropov
Formalizes Proposals While U.S. and Its Allies Say No,"
Time , 3 Jan. 1983, p. 56.
85 Doder, "Soviets Assail U.S. For Talks Impasse On
Strategic Arms,"
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weeks after these proposals were made, a Soviet military
official endorsed the concept of "notification in good time
about any launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles,"
but this did not appear to fully satisfy the U.S. desire for
prior notification of individual launchings. 86
Pressures on both the U.S. and the Soviet Union for
substantial achievements in arms control at this point
appeared to result in mutual interest in forms of
confidence-building measures. In November of 1982 President
Reagan had proposed advance notification of ICBM and MRBM
test launches as well as advance notice of major global
military maneuvers. U.S. officials indicated prior to the
beginning of Round Three that agreement on such measures
could be achieved quickly. 8 Updating the U.S. -Soviet "Hot
Line" would later become part of this effort to rapidly
formalize some form of agreement on confidence-building
measures. 88 However, a Soviet commentator would later
86 Moscow television "Studio 9" 29 Jan. 1983, in Daily
Report: Soviet Union . FBIS, 31 Jan. 1983, cited in The Arms
Control Reporter , Feb. 1983, p. 611. B. 72.
8 For President Reagan's November 1982 Confidence-
Building Measures proposal, see "White House Fact Sheet on
Confidence-Building Measures, November 22, 1982," in U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on
Disarmament 1982
.
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1985), pp. 829-
832. For American hopes that confidence-building measures
could be agreed upon quickly, see William Beecher, "US
Planning to Counter Move by Soviets On Arms Control," Boston
Globe . 13 Jan. 1983.
88 See Walter S. Mossberg, "U.S. Seeks Better Hotline
Links to Soviets To Curb Risk of Accidental Nuclear War,"
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criticize the U.S. confidence-building measure proposals as
aimed at domestic critics who questioned the
Q Q
administration's commitment to arms control.'
In addition to restating their START and INF
positions, the Soviets used the 60th anniversary celebration
of the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
to make an appeal addressed to "the Parliaments,
Governments, Political Parties, and Peoples of the World,"
(continuing a long and recognized Soviet tradition of
appealing to the 'masses' over the heads of Western
governments and attempting to appear as the 'champions' of
peace) . The following extracts shed light on Soviet START
and INF priorities, and on the Soviet view of detente in the
1970s. They also show the remarkable continuity between
Brezhnev's and Andropov's arms control policies:'
The need for peace takes on special significance
today, when States possess weapons capable of destroying
human civilization and all life on earth and when the
threat of war, which had been made appreciably more
remote in the 1970s, has again begun to intensify and
international tension is growing visibly more severe.
Wall Street Journal . 13 April 1983; and, Storer Rowley,
"Updated U.S. -Soviet 'Hot Line' Urged," Chicago Tribune . 13
April 1983.
89 Vladimir Bogachev of TASS, 13 April 1983 in Soviet
Union: Daily Report
. FBIS, 14 April 1983, cited in The Arms
Control Reporter
. May 1983, p. 611. B. 89.
"Soviet Appeal Addressed 'To the Parliaments,
Governments, Political Parties, and Peoples of the World,'
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All the efforts of States, the activities of
Governments, organized political forces and all citizens
of every country should now be addressed to preventing a
nuclear catastrophe. Nothing is or can be more
important than this. 91
This statement then reiterated the basic principles
elaborated by the Soviets in earlier rounds of START:
We, the authorized representatives of the Soviet
people, solemnly declare that, in keeping with the
Leninist policy of peace and international co-operation,
the Soviet will do all in its power to avert war. We
reaffirm that, in accordance with the commitment it has
undertaken, the Soviet Union will not be the first to
use nuclear weapons, and we call once again upon the
other nuclear Powers to undertake a similar commitment.
We declare that the Soviet Union is prepared, on a
basis of reciprocity with the United States of America,
to freeze its arsenal of nuclear weapons. We urge the
speedy and productive completion of the Soviet-United
States talks on the limitation and reduction of
strategic arms and on the limitation of nuclear arms in
Europe, and we urge the early conclusion of an agreement
on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in
Central Europe. 92
Other aspects of Soviet START policy were expressed
at this time. Either during the first or second rounds, the
Soviet Union proposed limits on the numbers and missile
loadings of Ohio and Typhoon class SSBNs. 93 Also, at some
point during Round Two of START the United States proposed
reducing by two-thirds the numbers of SS-18 and SS-19
91 TASS, 19 Jan. 1983, cited in The Arms Control
Reporter
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launchers as an indirect effort to limit Soviet throw-
weight. 94
III. FIRST MAJOR CHANGES
IN NEGOTIATING POSITIONS
The first major changes in both U.S. and Soviet
negotiating positions at START occurred in the third round.
However, several major events occurred prior to the
beginning of Round Three of START that were to have an
impact on the negotiations.
In January 1983 Soviet officials began making threats
to "reassess" their INF negotiating position if GLCM and
Pershing II deployments proceeded as NATO planned. Ending
the START negotiations was considered a possible element of
the Soviet reassessment. 5 These blandishments began
emerging before the INF or START negotiators had much chance
to explore the feasibility of reasonable compromises,
suggesting an unyielding Soviet position on cancellation of
the NATO INF modernization plans. Also, these Soviet
threats emerged at the same time the U.S. was signaling
renewed flexibility in its INF negotiating position. 96
94 Strobe Talbott in Time . 7 Feb. 1983, cited in The
Arms Control Reporter . Feb. 1983, p. 611. B. 71; and, Strobe
Talbott, "A Tougher Stand for START," Time , 7 Feb. 1983, p.
28.
Bernard Gwertzman, "Reagan Is Hopeful On Missile
Accord With the Russians," New York Times , 21 Jan. 1983.
96 See the Associated Press article "U.S. Open to
Options, Nitze Says," 20 Jan. 1983; and, Daniel Southerland,
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Another initiative was forthcoming, not directly
related to the negotiations but which would have a profound
impact in the post-START era on Soviet interests in
strategic arms reductions. On 23 March 1983 President
Reagan declared:
Tonight, consistent with our obligations of the ABM
Treaty and recognizing the need for closer consultation
with our allies, I'm taking an important first step. I
am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to
define a long-term research and development program to
begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the
threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles. This could
pave the way for arms control measures to eliminate the
weapons themselves. We seek neither military
superiority nor political advantage. Our only purpose -
- one all people share — is to search for ways to
reduce the danger of nuclear war. '
President Reagan's inauguration of the Strategic
Defense Initiative brought immediate criticism from the
Soviet Union, but did not have an early impact on U.S. or
Soviet positions in the START negotiations. The Soviet
Union declined to incorporate their opposition to the U.S.
SDI program into their START proposals. Even though this
initiative was announced by the President during the course
of an on-going U.S. -Soviet strategic arms negotiation, the
"Nitze Optimistic About Arms Talks," Christian Science
Monitor . 20 Jan. 1983.
9 President Reagan's speech announcing renewed
emphasis on strategic defenses has been reprinted and
excerpted in numerous sources. The citation given is taken
from Ronald Reagan, "Launching the SDI," in Zbigniew
Brzezinski, ed., Promise or Peril: The Strategic Defense
Initiative
.
(Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy
Center, 1986), pp. 49-50.
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Soviet Union waited until mid-1984, months after walking out
of START, to begin a major campaign to subject SDI to arms
control. Soviet reasons for failing to take advantage of
the START or INF forums to do so may have reflected Soviet
expectations that SDI would remain a minor research effort,
or that it would eventually be defeated by domestic
opposition.
Two days before the START negotiations resumed in
Geneva, Switzerland, President Reagan proposed a summit
between himself and Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov.
Directly countering the Soviet propaganda effort aimed at
the people of Western Europe, President Reagan made the
offer in a letter addressed to this same audience. It was
read in a speech by Vice President George Bush in West
Berlin. The President said in part:
Just as our allies can count on the United States to
defend Europe at all cost, you can count on us to spare
no effort to reach a fair and meaningful agreement that
will reduce the Soviet nuclear threat.
In this spirit, I have asked Vice President Bush, in
the city where East meets West, to propose to Soviet
General Secretary Andropov that he and I meet wherever
and whenever he wants in order to sign an agreement
banning U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range land-based
nuclear missile weapons from the face of the earth. 98
no
"Reagan's Letter to Europeans," New York Times , 1
Feb. 1983. See also John Vinocur, "Reagan Suggests Session
on Arms With Andropov," Ibid .
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Andropov subsequently rejected Reagan's offer in
harsh terms, saying the President's position was simply a
restatement of his earlier "zero option" INF proposal, ar.d
that the President's invitation was "a propaganda game." He
further accused the United States of being solely to blame
for the lack of progress and apparent deadlock in Geneva.
However, news reports noted that "Andropov's tone was
restrained and he did not repeat rhetorical charges made by
other Soviet officials earlier in the day that Reagan *'s
proposals were a tactical ploy to deceive West Europeans and
lend support to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in the
March 6 elections." 99
In a meeting with the Press on January 14 , President
Reagan declared his determination to achieve progress in
arms control negotiations. At the same time it was reported
that U.S. negotiators "be empowered to listen to and explore
new Soviet proposals . . . but not to offer any new American
proposals." Secretary of State George Shultz was reportedly
resisting changes in the U.S. position for fear of appearing
to be "stampeded" by the Soviets. 100
99 Dusko Doder, "Soviets Bar U.S. Terms For Summit,"
Washington Post . 2 Feb. 1983.
100 Bernard Gwertzman, "President Pledges To Make
Progress On Arms Control," New York Times . 15 Jan. 1983;
and, Oswald Johnston, "White House Seeks Initiative on
Arms," Los Angeles Times . 17 Jan. 1983.
- 56 -
U.S. AND SOVIET START PROPOSALS, 1982-1983
It was prior to Round Three that the U.S. began
considering adopting Congressional-sponsored proposals for
an "arms build-down" whereby the superpowers would be
obligated to decommission two older warheads for every new
one deployed. 101 The idea was to provide for American
modernization plans (MX and Trident) while also mandating
substantial reductions in strategic nuclear warheads.
The Soviet Union began 1983 with conciliatory
rhetoric. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, in a
public relations visit to West Germany in January, hinted
that the Soviets might be willing to seek progress in all
sets of negotiations then underway between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union, including the INF, START, and MBFR
negotiations. 102 This assumed, of course, that progress in
INF would receive the same priority in the West that it did
in Moscow.
Round Three (2 Feb. 1983 to 31 March 1983)
The U.S. and Soviet delegations arrived in Geneva for
the beginning of Round Three stating that progress would
depend on the degree of interest and flexibility of the
other side. Viktor P. Karpov, the Soviet START ambassador,
101 Michael Getler, "Proposal for 'Arms Build-Down'
Being Weighed by White House," Washington Post , 19 Jan.
1983.
102 Hal Piper, "Soviet's Hints for Negotiation on All
Arms Blur Geneva Focus," Baltimore Sun , 20 Jan. 1983.
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stated that in the "interests of global security" the United
States should "respond constructively" to the Soviet
proposals for a twenty- five percent cut in all strategic
delivery vehicles (including intercontinental missiles and
long-range bombers) and a freeze in the development of new
strategic weapons. 103 On 4 February 1983 U.S. Vice
President George Bush met separately in one hour meetings
with the Soviet INF and START delegations, assuring them
that the United States was "deadly serious" about reaching
an INF agreement.
Mid-way through Round Three intense pressure began to
build within the U.S. for American flexibility to break the
deadlock in Geneva. Senator Charles Percy urged the
President to send Secretary of State George Shultz or his
deputy to the talks to find a solution to the impasse. 05
In a symposium on improving U.S. -Soviet relations
attended by several members of Congress as well as members
of the Soviet Embassy staff, Vadim Kuznetsov, a first
secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, said: "I must
103
"Arms Negotiators Return to Geneva," New York
Times . 1 Feb. 1983.
104 Michael Getler, "U.S. Is 'Deadly Serious' On Arms
REduction, Bush Tells Soviets," Washington Post , 5 Feb.
1983.
105 John McLean in Chicago Tribune , 16 March 1983,
cited in The Arms Control Reporter . March 1983, p. 611. B. 83
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tell you frankly, candidly, there is no progress —
deadlock." 106
At some point during Round Three the Soviet Union
presented a draft treaty, but details were not made public
until after Round Four had begun. Round Three ended on 31
March 1983. Round Four would begin 8 June 1983.
Just after the third round of START recessed on 31
March 1983, an event transpired that would have a profound
and immediate impact on the U.S. negotiating position. On 6
April 1983, the so-called Scowcroft Commission Report was
submitted to President Reagan. u The Scowcroft Commission
had essentially been charged with rationalizing the
Administration's determination to proceed with MX missile
development. Its findings placed a great deal of emphasis
106
"Arms Talks Deadlocked, Soviets Tell Congress,"
Chicago Tribune . 11 March 1983.
x Report of the President's Commission on Strategic
Forces. April 1983 , Reprinted by the Library of Congress,
Congressional Research Service, November 1983. For a Soviet
reaction to the Scowcroft Commission's report, calling it "a
dangerous new step to whip up the arms race and exacerbate
the threat of nuclear war," see Tomas Kolesnichenko,
"Sinister Farce," Pravda , 23 April 1983, p. 5, translated in
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on arms . control
.
108 There were four principal arms control
implications of the Commission's report:
(1) arms control could and should be a major element of
U.S. strategy and defense policy;
(2) MX deployment and Small ICBM development were seen
primarily in terms of providing arms control
bargaining leverage;
(3) the argument for throw-weight as a unit of
limitation was weakened by down-grading the
importance of throw-weight as a measure of the
strategic balance; and,
(4) the Commission chose to go with a near-term increase
in capability (by recommending the deployment of MX
in existing Minuteman silos) rather than a longer-
term more expensive increase in survivability (by
postponing MX deployment until a new basing mode
could be developed)
.
The Scowcroft Commission had a choice between
survivability and capability (i.e. a mobile SICBM or
hardened MX versus a near-term increase in destructive
potential via more warheads in less survivable basing
modes) . By choosing to forego greater survivability, it
placed increased pressure on arms control to solve problems
of U.S. nuclear force survivability. Ironically this
1 Oftxuo For an analysis of the Report of the President's
Commission on Strategic Forces , including its arms control
implications, see Harry L. Wrenn, "Strategic Force
Modernization: The Scowcroft Commission Recommendations and
Alternatives," Issue Brief No. IB83080, (Washington, D.C.:
The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service,
updated 9 Jan. 1984); and U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Review of Arms Control
Implications of the Report of the President's Commission on
Strategic Forces: Hearings , 17, 19, and 24 May 1983,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1983).
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deprived the Soviets of incentives for resorting to arms
control by making U.S. strategic nuclear forces more
vulnerable to a Soviet surprise attack without having to
give up anything in a negotiating forum.
In effect, the Russians should have interpreted the
Scowcroft Commission as a sign of healthy U.S. interest in
arms control accords. The Scowcroft Commission had
essentially recommended a Presidential decision to pursue
American security primarily through arms control. The
Reagan administration began almost immediately to consider
revising its START proposals along lines compatible with the
Commission recommendations.
Brent Scowcroft later indicated that certain Soviet
officials, among them Georgi Arbatov, head of the Institute
for the Study of the U.S.A. and Canada, responded positively
to the idea of strategic and arms control emphasis on small
ICBMs. 110
The fact that this re-consideration of U.S. START
policy was made public at this time could not have helped
but signal a softening of the American position to the
Soviet Union and provided incentives for the Soviets to
withhold any contemplated concessions while waiting to see
109 See William Beecher, "US Considers Altering Plan in
Arms Talks," Boston Globe . 16 April 1983.
110 Charles W. Corddry, "Moscow Called Receptive On
Arms," Baltimore Sun , 24 May 1983.
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what concessions the U.S. would make on its own. Public
congressional pressures on the Administration to alter its
position, and linking support for the MX program to progress
in arms talks, further reinforced this undermining of the
U.S. bargaining position in START. 111
'
In letters sent to nine members of the U.S. House of
Representatives and three Senators in early May 1983
President Reagan endorsed the 'build-down' concept and
promised other changes in the U.S. START position. 112
Changes that would place greater emphasis on limiting
warheads versus missile launchers were endorsed by a
National Security Council meeting that same month, a White
111 The following press articles give an indication of
the public nature of the pressures on the Reagan
administration as well as the publicity surrounding the
Administration's consideration of changes in its START
proposals: William Beecher, "US Considers Altering Plan In
Arms Talks," Boston Globe . 16 April 1983; "U.S. Studies
Shift in Stand at Strategic Arms Talks, New York Times . 30
April 1983; Charles W. Corddry, "Senators Urge Reagan To
Revise Strategy for START, Stressing Arms 'Build-Down',"
Baltimore Sun . 3 May 1983; Charles W. Corddry, "'Build-Down'
Concept May Lead to Compromise On Nuclear Arms," Baltimore
Sun . 9 May 1983; Lou Cannon, "President Considering Revised
Arms Proposal," Washington Post
. 11 May 198 3; and, Steven V.
Roberts, "U.S. Said To Move Toward New Plan On Strategic
Arms," New York Times . 11 May 1983.
112 »<pext f President's Letter on Arms Control
Policy," New York Times
. 12 May 1983; Steven V. Roberts,
"President Pledges To Shift Approach On Arms Control,"
Ibid . ; Lou Cannon and George C. Wilson, "President Backs
Arms Build-Down," Washington Post
. 13 May 1983; Michael
Getler and Walter Pincus, "Reagan Arms Control Actions Move
MX Missile Closer to Reality," Washington Post , 13 May 1983;
and Hedrick Smith, "Reagan Is Reportedly Easing His Stand on
Strategic Arms," New York Times . 14 May 1983.
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House official indicated that the main issue under
consideration with regard to the administration's proposal
for a limit of 850 missiles on each side was whether to
raise the number or do away with a ceiling on numbers of
launchers altogether. 113
While the U.S. side placed emphasis on limiting the
numbers of warheads, the Soviets continued to stress missile
numbers as the basic unit of account in START. 114 There were
other themes that remained unchanged in Soviet views of the
U.S. START position. In an interview published in a West
German periodical, Andropov criticized the basis of the U.S.
approach to START in the following terms:
. . . the United States is a sea power. We are a
land power and most of our nuclear weapons were deployed
on land. Now the Americans suggest reductions in land-
based nuclear weapons, leaving sea-based missiles aside.
We, naturally, take exception to this approach. We for
our part take account of all the types of nuclear
weapons available to both sides and suggest even
reductions in them on both sides, reductions to the
• • • lispoint of their eventual complete elimination.
113 Steven V. Roberts, "U.S. Said To Move Toward New
Plan On Strategic Arms," New York Times, 11 May 1983; and,
Hedrick Smith, "Reagan Calls Meeting on Arms Talks," New
York Times, 10 May 1983.
114 Willia- Beecher, "US to Alter Arms-Limit Proposal,"
Boston Globe . 2j May 1983.
115 Rudolf Augstein in Per Spiegel, cited by TASS , 24
April 1983 in USSR UN press release dated 26 April 1983,
reprinted in The Arms Control Reporter, May 1983, pp.
611. B. 92-93.
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Andropov was, of course, casting the Soviet position in the
most reasonable light possible, while distorting the
contents of the U.S. START proposals.
Soviet leaders issued major restatements of Soviet
positions in the START and INF talks in April 1983, during
the recess between rounds III and IV, but none of these
commentaries presented any new sign of Soviet flexibility or
compromise and all reflected themes that had been repeated
countless times before. 16 On 28 May 1982, Pravda published
a statement saying the U.S. intends "to retain virtually
intact the mainstays of its nuclear arsenal" while
compelling the Soviets to "reduce the most modern type of
armaments." In an obvious response to trends in United
States thinking on START, it further reiterated that the
Soviet Union sought reductions in both warheads and
missiles. 11
United States START policy was in a state of flux as
Round Four (8 June 1983 to 2 August 1983) began. It seems
reasonable to speculate that had the Soviet Union placed
high priority on obtaining a strategic arms reduction
116 See Gromyko in Pravda, 3 April 1983, pp. 4-5, and
in Izvestia , 4 April 1983, pp. 2-3, translated in Current
Digest of the Soviet Press , vol. 35, no. 14 (4 May 1983),
pp. 1-7; and, Andropov in Pravda and Izvestia . 2 5 April
1983, translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press , vol
35, no. 17 (25 May 1983), pp. 1-6.
117 Pravda
. 28 May 1983, cited in The Arms Control
Reporter
. June 1983, p. 611. B. 100.
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agreement it would have exploited this obvious transition
period in U.S. policy, perhaps by making a major initiative
of its own. Instead, it responded with threats of "creating
a counterpart of its own" to the MX, support for which had
been barely won by the President's agreeing to modify his
START proposals. 118
In any event, President Reagan instructed his chief
negotiator "to examine all Soviet proposals seriously and to
be flexible in our responses wherever this would be
consistent with our overall objectives." A senior
administration official noted: "Everything is on the table.
We are prepared to negotiate everything." 12
Upon arriving for this new round of START, the acting
head of the Soviet delegation (Karpov remained in Moscow
apparently for medical reasons) remarked that the Soviet
118
"Soviet Union Vows to Build A Missile Equivalent to
MX," Washington Post , 27 May 1983. The Soviet Union was, of
course, in the process of building several new types of
missiles, all of which were either comparable to, or larger
than the American MX. See U.S. Department of Defense,





"Reagan Urges Flexibility in Arms Talks," San
Francisco Chronicle , 2 June 1983; "Reagan Will Study
Strategy On Arms Talks," Peninsula Times Tribune , 2 June
1983; Lou Cannon and Margot Hornblower, "Reagan Vows U.S.
Flexibility at New Round of Arms Cut Talks," Washington
Post
, 8 June 1983; and Michael Getler, "Arms Proposal
Indicates More Flexibility," Washington Post , 9 June 1983.
120 nNew u.S. Stance On Arms Control: Reagan Stresses
Flexibility," San Francisco Chronicle , 9 June 1983.
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Union favored mutual substantial cuts in long-range nuclear
weapons:
We proceed from the assumption that such agreement is
both possible and necessary. Both sides must be equally
interested in it. . . . We do not favor competition in
the military field.
Progress in the negotiations will be assured if the
other side demonstrates its political will and
willingness to engage in a businesslike search for
agreement in strict conformity with the principle of
equality and equal security. 21
On 8 June 198 3 when START resumed, the United States
government put forth new proposals incorporating many of the
Scowcroft Commission recommendations and bowing to heavy
pressure from Congress. 122 These modifications to the early
U.S. START position were tabled in draft treaty form in July
1983. These changes included:
— merging Phase I and II
— relaxing the ceiling of 850 deployed missiles
(for a new ceiling between 1,100 and 1,200)
— some softening on the 2,500 ICBM warhead limit, but
retaining the overall 5,000 warhead ceiling
— agreeing to ALCM limits at the start of an agreement
"Soviets Say They Are Prepared To Negotiate Deep
Missile Cuts," Baltimore Sun , 7 June 1983.
122 Lou Cannon, "Reagan Reveals New Plan on Arms Cut
Talks," Washington Post , 9 June 1983; Karen Elliott House,
"Reagan's Revisions of Arms-Control Plan Stress Flexibility,
Seek a Soviet Response," Wall Street Journal , 9 June 1983;
see also, "New U.S. Stance On Arms Control."
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-- agreeing to. fix ALCM bomber leadings below the SALT
II limits
— agreeing to flexibility on ways to redress the U.S.-
Soviet throw-weight disparity
Moscow responded to these obviously major concessions
with predictable skepticism. The government press agency
TASS commented that by raising his proposed limit of 850
missiles, Reagan sought both to facilitate deployment of the
MX and Small ICBM while still forcing the Soviet Union to
reduce its land-based missiles. The Soviet commentary also
reiterated the charge that the United States was
unrelentingly seeking "military superiority and pressing the
Soviet Union into unilateral disarmament." The President's
proposals were summarily dismissed as "mere words, and
nothing more: "no desire to achieve a mutually acceptable
accord, which the President talked about, is in sight. On
the contrary, his statement reveals something quite
different — and endeavor to undermine in every way the
principle of equality and equal security of the sides which
was the basis of the SALT-I and SALT-II talks." 123
Yet, no similar concessions in the Soviet position
were forthcoming. While the U.S. position evidenced a clear
softening of its own original proposal and began movement
123 Pravda , 10 June 1983, p. 5, and Izvestia , 11 June
1983, p. 4, translated in Current Digest of the Soviet
Press , vol. 35, no. 23 (6 July 1983), p. 14.
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toward the original Soviet proposal, the Soviet Union made
no change in its 1,800 missile limit.
However, the Soviet position at this point falls
short of being blatantly hypocritical for one reason. The
Soviets saw through the President's need to respond to
domestic Congressional pressures for the sake of keeping his
strategic modernization program reasonably intact. The New
York Times report of the Soviet reaction notes that "TASS
said the President's latest offer was the result of a
commitment to Congress to intensify efforts at Geneva in
return for support for his plan to deploy 100 MX
missiles." 124 The Soviet Union continued to stick by its
draft treaty, submitted earlier.
Here, then, is further evidence that lack of American
unity behind the President's strategic modernization program
and his compatible arms control proposals was a source of
Soviet disinterest in a strategic arms reduction agreement
during the START negotiations.
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, gave a
speech to the Supreme Soviet on 16 June 1983. He stressed
the following themes:
(1) previous U.S. -Soviet arms agreements had "special
importance" to the Soviet Union, and SALT II "could
have become a serious accomplishment;"
TASS commentary cited by John F. Burns, "Moscow
Says Shift In U.S. Arms Stand Is No Basic Change," New York
Times
. 10 June 1983.
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(2) the Soviet Union is determined to proceed "on the
basis of the existing parity, along the road of arms
limitation and reduction so that at any given moment
the balance is preserved but on an increasingly
lower level;"
(3) a "militarist intoxication" pervades U.S. politics
which discounts the horrifying character of nuclear
war and pronounces it "permissable and even
feasible;
"
(4) the United States is bent on achieving strategic
nuclear superiority, and the Soviet Union is equally
determined to prevent it;
(5) U.S. -Soviet agreements "must be based on the
principle of equality and equal security;"
(6) the current U.S. administration has "derailed the
SALT II treaty and broken off a whole set of
negotiations that were gathering momentum or were
close to achieving practical results," and "is
pursuing an obstructionist line at the Soviet-
American talks on these questions that are going on
in Geneva;" and,
(7) while the United States 7 current approach to the
Geneva negotiations has the appearance of
flexibility, this is purely for show, and is
intended "to lull ... to deceive public opinion,
[and] to neutralize the mounting opposition to
Washington's militaristic preparations." 125
Following his harsh criticism of the Reagan
administration's arms control proposals and defense
programs, Gromyko added that "We want smoother relations
with the United States in the knowledge that this is
important to prevent war." 126
"Excerpts From Gromyko Speech Reviewing Soviet
Union's Foreign Policy," New York Times , 17 June 1983.
126 Ibid .
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Gromyko also mentioned Soviet concerns regarding the
militarization of space, and urged concluding "an
international treaty on the nondeployment of weapons of any
kind in space, as proposed by the Soviet Union." 127 This
was an early Soviet arms control response to the President's
strategic defense initiative.
Late in June 1983 it was disclosed that the Reagan
administration was prepared to offer a "fair trade" for the
MX missile. The United States would forego deploying the
planned 100 MX missiles if the Soviet Union agreed to
dismantle all its SS-18 and SS-19 missiles. 128 Here was an
example of the United States attempting to bargain with an
undeployed system against deployed Soviet systems, and whose
total planned deployment would still be dwarfed by the size
of the Soviet force. (The Soviets then had approximately
638 SS-18S and 19s.
)
Several weeks into Round Four a report surfaced in
the American media that U.S. officials had detected Soviet
signs of flexibility and serious bargaining. These
indications included:
— withdrawing the demand that the United States deploy
no more than four to six Trident-equipped submarines;
127 Ibid.
128
"u.s. Proposes 'Fair Trade' With Russia to Abandon
MX," San Francisco Chronicle , 22 June 1983.
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-- dropping the proposal that Trident missile loading be
reduced from 2 4 to 16;
— softening the demand for a ban on all cruise missiles
with ranges greater than 360 miles; and,
— apparent hints at Soviet willingness to seriously
consider U.S. proposals for confidence-building measures
by agreeing to participate in a special working group129
These reports also gave the first indication that the
politics associated with the 1984 American presidential
campaign may have a bearing on Soviet interests or
disinterests in a strategic arms reduction agreement. The
speculation was that the Soviets would be more likely to
seek agreement in the summer of 1984 if President Reagan's
prospects for re-election appeared good. As William Beecher
explained in the Boston Globe :
From a Soviet perspective, it might be a lot easier to
get an agreement with a first-term President eager to
improve his re-election prospects with a foreign triumph
than with a second-term President with a new mandate and
no need to face the voters again.
Beecher also reported that the United States was then
preparing a draft strategic arms reduction treaty. Several
Michael Getler, "Soviets Modify Part of Position on
Missile Cuts," Washington Post , 28 June 1983; William
Beecher, "Soviets Hint at Some Flexibility in Arms Talks, US
Officials Say," Boston Globe , 26 June 1983; and "Arms-Talk
Softening Reported," Associated Press in Denver Post , 26
June 1983.
130
"Soviets Hint at Some Flexibility.."
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elements of that draft treaty, as reported, appeared to make
significant concessions to the Soviets. For example,
Beecher noted that the United States would probably concede
to the Soviet demand for including bomber limits in START by
proposing a limit of 400 bombers carrying anywhere from 20
to 28 air-launched cruise missiles. The American draft
treaty also appeared to offer room for flexibility on the
issue of throw-weight. The president was expected to
relax his call for an 850 ceiling on ICBMs as well. 132
On 7 July 1983 the United States submitted a draft
treaty at the START negotiations designed to meet certain
principal Soviet objections to earlier American stances. It
had the following limits: 133
1,250 land- and sea-based missiles
of which no more than 850 could be land-based
a sublimit of 210 on SS-17, 18, and 19 missiles
a sublimit of 110 on SS-18 missiles
a total of 5,000 strategic nuclear warheads
of which no more than 2,500 could be on land-based
missiles
an unspecified ceiling on throw-weight
131 Ibid.
132 Michael Getler, "U.S. Arms Control Changes Fail to
Impress Moscow, Experts Say," Washington Post , 27 June 1983
133 Charles W. Corddry, "U.S. Offers Soviets Draft of
Arms Treaty," Baltimore Sun , 8 July 1983.
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a limit of 400 bombers with an unspecified limit on
the numbers of bomber-carried cruise missiles
The U.S. proposal also reportedly called for tough
verification provisions that went beyond those provided for
in SALT II; namely, no interference with National Technical
Means (NTM) of verification, no concealment of missile
development and test sights, and no encryption of flight
test telemetry. 134 SALT II had stipulated only no
encryption of telemetry deemed vital to a determination of
compliance.
On 17 July 1983 Pravda published an editorial
criticizing the U.S. for "attempts at legalizing its
unprecedented arms race under the cover of the talks" and
denied that the U.S. position in the talks had undergone any
change. It sought to distinguish the Soviet approach to
START from the U.S. approach by saying that Washington had
adopted "selective" reduction policy, singling out certain
groups of strategic weapons for reduction while leaving
others unlimited:
The USSR stands for a comprehensive approach — all
strategic delivery vehicles would be subject to
restrictions and reductions in their aggregate, not in
some artificially singled out groups or portions.
Likewise, all nuclear warheads would be taken into
account within the framework of the agreed-upon ceiling
The Soviet Union concretely proposes that the total
aggregate level of nuclear warheads on strategic
134 William Beecher, "Arms Talks: A Hint of
Flexibility," Boston Globe . 14 July 1983.
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delivery vehicles of the sides should be below the
number of nuclear warheads which the United States now
has. Exactly this approach is the basis of the draft
treaty which was submitted by the Soviet delegation in
Geneva. It opens the way to a fair accord. But the
United States obviously does not want such an accord.
Its conduct at the negotiations and outside the
negotiations provides evidence of that. 35
Soon after the United States submitted its draft
START treaty, the Soviet Union offered a "new" set of
proposals, probably intended to offset the impression of
greater American flexibility. It retained the 1,800 overall
ceiling on "strategic nuclear delivery vehicles" (SNDV)
while dividing this into three categories for long-range,
cruise missile-equipped bombers, submarine- and land-based
ballistic missiles, and land-based MIRVed missiles. The
limits were to be achieved in phases by 1990. Table 1.2
gives specific elements of the Soviet proposal along with
the corresponding SALT II limits. 136
135
"Stuck Fast," Pravda, 17 July 1983, p. 5,
translated and reprinted in Daily Report: Soviet Union .
FBIS, 18 July 1983, p. AA2
.
For details on the Soviet July 1983 proposal, see:
Michael Getler, "Soviets Advance Revised Proposal On Arms
Limits," Washington Post , 13 July 1983; Hedrick Smith,
"Soviet Broadens Arms Proposals; Hope Seen By U.S.," New
York Times , 14 July 1983; Charles W. Corddry, "Soviet Arms
Offer Said to Keep Rockets," Baltimore Sun . 14 July 1983;
William Beecher, "Arms Talks: A Hint of Flexibility,"
Boston Globe , 14 July 1983; and, William Beecher, "Soviet
Hinting Thaw?" Boston Globe , 15 July 1983.
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Table 1.2
SOVIET JULY 198 3 START PROPOSAL AND SALT II LIMITS
July 1983 Proposal SALT II
Total SNDV = 1,800 2,500/2,250
MIRVed ICBMs,
SLBMs,
and bombers = 1,200 1,320
MIRVed ICBMs
and SLBMs 8 1,080 1, 200
MIRVed ICBMs = 680 820
The comparison with SALT II serves at least two
purposes here. First, it demonstrates the explicit Soviet
objective of retaining the basic SALT II framework. Second,
setting forth a START proposal so close to the SALT II
limits may have been a calculated Soviet move to play on the
differences over SALT II within the Reagan administration,
chronicled in Strobe Talbott's book Deadly Gambits . 137
The phased reductions envisioned by the Soviet
proposal would have occurred over a seven year period and
involved three phases, as given in Table 1.3 below. 138 The
Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan
administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control
(New York: Knopf, 1984)
.
138 Beecher, "Arms Talks: A Hint of Flexibility,"
Boston Globe , 14 July 1983.
- 75 -
U.S. AND SOVIET START PROPOSALS, 1982-1983
difference of 600 SNDVs between the 1,800 overall limit and
1,200 MIRVed subceiling would presumably involve bombers
without ALCMs and single warhead ballistic missiles.
Other aspects of the July 1983 Soviet proposal
included the withdrawal of a proposed ban on ALCMs with
ranges over 600 km (reported earlier) , and the introduction
of a new proposal permitting 120 cruise missile-equipped
bombers. It also dropped the earlier Soviet proposal for
banning or strictly limiting additional missile submarines
of the U.S. Ohio (Trident) class and equivalent Soviet
submarines, and the proposed total ban on deploying Trident
II missiles then being developed by the United States.
Table 1.3
SOVIET PROPOSED START REDUCTION TIMETABLE
1985 1987 1990
SNDV = 2,250 2,000 1,800
MIRVed missiles = 1,320 1,250 1,200
MIRVed ICBMs = 820 750 680
The Soviet proposal continued to make no mention of
warhead limits, although the U.S. side had been emphasizing
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placing limits on the numbers of warheads for some time,
rather than simply limits on the number of launchers — a
major U.S. criticism of SALT I and II.
There are three important points to be made regarding
the July 198 3 Soviet proposals. They concern the substance,
the timing, and the U.S. assessment of the Soviet proposals.
First, they represented absolutely no significant change
from the original Soviet START proposals which called for an
overall ceiling of 1,800 on SNDVs. While the U.S. exhibited
considerable movement in its proposed launcher and warhead
limits, the latest Soviet proposals represented nothing more
than an elaboration on what sublimits would be included
within the overall 1,800 number, and the timetable for
achieving these reductions. In fact, they may have
represented a preplanned refinement -- held back when the
initial Soviet proposals were presented — to be put forth
at a later date in the negotiations when the image of Soviet
flexibility and sincerity needed bolstering.
Second, it does not appear that these proposals were
put forth immediately at the beginning of Round Four, but
were only presented after the U.S. had submitted its draft
treaty. This suggests that perhaps the Soviets held out to
see how much flexibility they could get from the U.S., or
that their proposals were offered in response to a
perception that American concessions had scored points for
the U.S. in the global public relations contest.
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Third, whatever signs of flexibility or compromise
existed in the Soviet July 1983 proposals were attributed by
U.S. analysts to three factors. They shed light on how the
U.S. perceives Soviet interests in strategic arms
reductions. The three factors credited with providing
incentives for serious Soviet bargaining in START were: (1)
congressional support for the strategic modernization
program outlined by the Scowcroft Commission; (2) the
flexibility represented in the U.S. administration's June
1983 START proposals; and, (3) the continuing — albeit
fragile — congressional support for modernization of the
U.S. strategic triad. 139
As Round Four recessed Soviet ambassador Viktor M.
Karpov told members of the press that there had been no
progress during that round and that the United States was
•'marking time." The Soviet delegation was apparently
determined to dispel any impression that the new American
draft treaty, incorporating provisions compatible with the
Scowcroft Commission report and yielding to key Soviet
criticisms, had put pressure on the Soviets to make similar
concessions.
On 1 September 1983, just days before the scheduled
beginning of a new round of the INF negotiations, news of
Charles W. Corddry, "Administration Fears an MX
Loss Just As Geneva Talks Show Hope," Baltimore Sun , 20 July
1983.
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the Korean airliner shot down by the Soviets appeared in
headlines. 140 While this incident increased U.S. -Soviet
tensions considerably, it had little or no impact on
Washington's desire for continuing earnest arms reduction
negotiations. If there was any discernible fall-out for the
START or INF talks, it was in a hardening of the Soviet
position. In any case, the first set of negotiations to
resume after this tragic event were the INF talks.
The INF negotiations resumed a month earlier than the
START negotiations (on 6 Sept. as opposed to 5 October for
START) , and it was in the INF forum that the two sides
signaled their arms control reactions to the crisis. Both
in Washington and in Geneva at the INF talks, the U.S.
strongly indicated that it would not hold current arms
negotiations hostage to the political fall-out of the Korean
airliner tragedy. 141 "Any thought of cancelling the
resumption of INF or START was promptly dismissed." 142 The
140
"Korean Jet Reported Downed in U.S.S.R." Baltimore
Sun . 1 Sept. 1983; and, Michael Dobbs, "Moscow Admits
Shooting Down Korean Plane," Washington Post . 7 Sept. 1983.
141 Henry Trewhitt, "Nitze Is Told to Be Flexible In
Arms Talks," Baltimore Sun , 4 Sept. 1983; Robert C. Toth,
"Geneva Talks Hinge on 162 Missiles: Jetliner Issue Likely
to Fade as U.S., Soviet Focus on Arms," Los Angeles Times , 6
Sept. 1983; Bruce Vandervort, "U.S.: Geneva Arms Talks to
Proceed Despite Plane Incident," Washington Post , 6 Sept.
1983; Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Said to Weigh Arms
Concessions," New York Times , 21 Sept. 1983; and Vinny
Kuntz, "Airline Disaster Won't Hinder Arms Talks, Federal
Official Says," Tallahassee Democrat , 21 Sept. 1983.
142 Talbott, Deadly Gambits , p. 193.
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possibility of cancelling the non-nuclear MBFR talks was
also rejected. With regard to the START negotiations,
President Reagan said:
[W]e can not, we must not, give up our effort to reduce
the arsenals of destructive weapons threatening the
world.
Ambassador Nitze has returned to Geneva to resume
the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons
in Europe. Equally, we will continue to press for arms
reductions in the Start talks that resume in October.
We are more determined than ever to reduce and if
possible eliminate the threat hanging over mankind. We
know it will be hard to make a nation that rules its own
people through force to cease using force against the
rest of the world, but we must try. 143
This line was reiterated by the U.S. Secretary of State,
George P. Shultz, at an East-West foreign ministers
conference following the Korean airliner massacre. While
castigating the Soviets for callous human rights abuses, the
Secretary of State urged a "serious dialogue" on arms
control issues: 144
Despite the repeated conciliatory signals from the
United States, the Kremlin, with convoluted logic, used the
furor over the incident to blame the United States for
exploiting the crisis to block progress in START, and some
143
"Transcript of President Reagan's Address on
Downing of Korean Airliner," New York Times , 6 Sept. 1983.
144 Bernard Gwertzman, "Shultz Assails the Russians But
Asks 'Serious Dialogue'," New York Times , 10 Sept. 1983.
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U.S. officials even detected signs that the Soviet
negotiating position hardened in the weeks following the
shooting down of flight KAL-007. 145
IV. START'S FINAL ROUND: FALL 1983 CHANGES IN
U.S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS
As Round Five — START'S final round (5 October 1983
to 7 December 198 3) — approached, key American senators
urged the United States to adopt a new START position that
could not have helped but further reinforce the Soviet
perception of a divided and unsettled negotiating partner.
The senators sought to forge a bipartisan approach to arms
control and proposed the following elements for inclusion in
a future U.S. START position: 146
(1) an immediate ceiling on the number of ballistic
missile warheads;
(2) an immediate ceiling on the overall destructive
capacity of the strategic forces of both sides at
existing levels;
145 Antero Pietila, "TASS Ties Crash to Arms Talks:
U.S. Using Controversy As Obstacle, It Says," Baltimore Sun
.
6 Sept. 1983; and Leslie H. Gelb, "Arms Talks: Shift by
U.S.," New York Times . 5 October 1983.
146 Press release from the office of Senator Sam Nunn,
12 Sept 1983; Letter to General Brent Scowcroft on the
letterhead of the United States Senate, Committee on Armed
Services, dated 9 Sept 1983, and signed by Senators Sam
Nunn, Bill Cohen, and Chuck Percy. See also, Martin
Tolchin, "Three Senators Propose New Nuclear Arms Reduction
Plan," New York Times , 12 Sept. 1983; Vernon A. Guidry,
Jr., "3 Senators Say U.S. Should Seek 'Double Build-Down'
Arms Pact," Baltimore Sun
. 12 Sept. 1983; and, "Senators
Urge 2-Stage Nuclear Arms Cutback," Los Angeles Times . 12
Sept. 1983.
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(3) a guaranteed annual build-down in the number of
ballistic missile warheads;
(4) creation of incentives favoring stabilizing systems
(e.g. small, single-warhead ICBMS) and penalizing
destabilizing systems (e.g. MIRVed ICBMs)
;
(5) establishment of a second guaranteed annual build-
down in the overall destructive capacity of the
strategic forces, including missiles and bombers, of
both sides;
(6) avoidance of provisions that would prohibit or
discourage survivability; and,
(7) an immediate agreement with the USSR on a build-down
as a framework and precursor for a detailed START
treaty.
But even this attempt at congressional-sponsored
bipartisan arms control produced division, and presented yet
another debate, rather than any incipient consensus. 147
In a public White House ceremony on 4 October 1983
President Reagan gave his START negotiators new instructions
incorporating the 'build-down' concept. 148 In connection
147 Walter Pincus, "'Build-Down' Plan Divides Arms
Experts," Washington Post . 2 October 1983.
148 On the announcement of new U.S. START proposals
incorporating 'build-down' see, Robert C. Toth, "President
Will Make New Proposal on Strategic Arms," Los Angeles
Times
. 4 October 1983; Walter Pincus, "U.S. to Ask Arms
Talks Task Force," Washington Post . 4 October 1983; Steven
R. Weisman, "Reagan Promotes New Arms Offers," New York
Times . 5 October 1983; Lou Cannon, "Reagan Sends Team Back
to Arms Talks With New Proposals," Washington Post . 5
October 1983; Benjamin Taylor, "Reagan Proposes a 'Build-
Down' of Long-Range Nuclear Missiles," Boston Globe , 5
October 1983; Gerald F. Seib, "Reagan Offers Arms-Reduction
Proposal For Destruction of Old Nuclear Warheads," Wall
Street Journal . 5 October 1983; and, Leslie H. Gelb, "Arms
Talks: Shift by U.S.
"
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with this new stance, the U.S. proposed establishment of a
special working group to promote an agreement using the
'build-down' concept. Again, while much of the new U.S.
proposal can be attributed to domestic pressures, there were
also important concessions to Soviet demands. For example,
the United States expressed a willingness to consider trade-
offs in areas of U.S. advantage — namely bombers and cruise
missiles — for trade-offs in areas of Soviet advantage —
large land-based ICBMs. As the President said:
On another front, and in our effort, again, to be
absolutely as flexible as possible, we will be willing
to explore ways to further limit the size and capability
of air-launched cruise missile forces, in exchange for
reciprocal Soviet flexibility on items of concern to us.
We seek limits on the destructive capability of missiles
and recognize that the Soviet Union would seek limits on
bombers in return. There will have to be trade-offs and
the United States is prepared to make them, so long as
they result in a more stable balance of forces. 149
Specific elements of the new U.S. START position, as
reported at the time, included three build-down ratios for
different systems as follows: 150
149
• / Trie Soviet Government Must Start Negotiating in
Good Faith 7 " (excerpts of President Reagan's 4 October 1983
speech), Washington Post , 5 October 1983.
150 Details of this new U.S. START proposal can be
found in: Gelb, "Arms Talks: Shift by U.S.;" and Taylor,
"Reagan Proposes a 'Build- Down'."; "White House Urges
Unity on START," Washington Times , 6 October 1983; and,
Robert C. Toth, "Reagan Offers 'Build-Down' of A-Weapons,"
Los Angeles Times , 15 October 1983.
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two MIRVed ICBM warheads to be withdrawn for every
new one deployed (2:1)
three SLBM warheads to be withdrawn for every two
deployed (3:2)
one warhead on a single-warhead ICBM to be withdrawn
for every new single-warhead ICBM deployed (1:1)
Other features included a special 'build-down'
working group; annual reductions by 'building down' until
reaching 5000 warheads, or a minimum 5 percent reduction of
original total per year until reaching the overall 5000
warhead limit; a concurrent build-down of bombers; and,
negotiation of additional air-launched cruise missile
limits.
The United States stressed the conciliatory nature of
these proposals. In his speech announcing that new
positions would be forwarded at the talks, President Reagan
noted that "the Soviet Union has yet to give any significant
response" to previous U.S. initiatives in START. He
continued by listing U.S. concessions to Soviet concerns and
pointing out that "the Soviet Union has yet to give any
significant response:"
Throughout the negotiating process, it is the United
States who has had to push, pull, probe and prod in the
effort to achieve any progress. The heartfelt desire
shared by people everywhere for a historic agreement
dramatically reducing nuclear weapons could, and indeed,
will be achieved, provided one condition changes: the
Soviet government must start negotiating in good faith.
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Let me emphasize that the United States has gone the
extra mile. We have removed the dividing line between
the two phases of our original proposal. Everything is
on the table. We are still most concerned about limits
on the fast-flying, most dangerous systems. But we are
also prepared to negotiate limits on bomber and air-
launched cruise missile limits below SALT II levels. We
have shown great flexibility in dealing with the
destructive capability of ballistic missiles, including
their throw weight. We have also relaxed our limits on
the number of ballistic missiles. We have gone a very
long way to address Soviet concerns. But the Soviets
have yet to take their first meaningful step to address
ours. 51
The Soviet government news agency TASS responded by
accusing the President of "deceiving public opinion"
regarding U.S. flexibility, and charging that U.S. proposals
were intended "to continue the race along the channels of
improving the quality of missiles and bombers." The Soviet
rejoinder stressed that there had been no basic change in
the American position, and tediously reiterated the charge
that U.S. proposals were a mask to cover American intentions
of achieving nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. The
concept of 'build-down' was criticized: "What is meant by
this is that the sides will get the right to deploy new,
upgraded systems of mass annihilation as they phase out old,
less effective ones." The Soviet commentary also repeated
the claim that Reagan's START position was intended to
protect and leave intact the President's strategic
1 CI
"'The Soviet Government Must Start Negotiating in
Good Faith'" (excerpts of President Reagan's 4 October 1983
speech), Washington Post , 5 October 1983.
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modernization program, including the MX missile, B-l bomber
and Trident II missile. 152
A few weeks later, the Soviet Communist Party
newspaper Pravda commented on the new U.S. initiative,
essentially repeating the themes found in the earlier TASS
commentary. Pravda particularly stressed the notion that
the new U.S. proposals were "false and fraudulent." It also
referred to them as "gimmickry," saying:
At hand is a fresh propaganda invention designed to
mislead people by ostentatious flexibility, to conceal
the inconsistency and unacceptability of the American
stand. One should not be of such a low opinion,
reaching the point of vicious mockery, about the ability
of people to find out the real sense of these maneuvers
and fraudulent steps.
The Pravda commentary also stressed other themes that by
then had become unvaryingly typical of Soviet reactions to
new U.S. initiatives in the START negotiations. Among these
were:
(1) the U.S. proposals violated the principle of
"equality and equal security;"
(2) the U.S. proposals sought sharp cuts in the most
important Soviet ICBMs while also seeking to protect
new American nuclear weapon programs;
"I CO
TASS commentary reported in Dusko Doder, "Soviets:
Arms Offer 'Nothing but Words'," Washington Post , 6 October
1983.
153 See 23 October 1983 Pravda article reported in
"Reagan's Latest Arms Proposal Just 'Gimmickry,' Pravda
Says," Chicago Tribune . 24 October 1983.
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(3) the United States was seeking to use START as a
means of gaining nuclear superiority over the Soviet
Union; and,
(4) the latest U.S. proposals show no evidence of real
or substantive flexibility or movement from the
original U.S. position. 154
Curiously, some Western diplomats reportedly saw
encouraging signs in the fact that the Pravda article failed
to mention U.S. suggestions that a separate working group be
set up to discuss implementing an agreement on 'build-
down.' 155
On arriving in Geneva for the commencement of Round
Five, chief Soviet negotiator Victor Karpov kept up the
Soviet attitude that progress depended completely upon the
United States, saying "all depends on Mr. Rowny. If he
shows real flexibility, then everything will be OK, there
will be results and progress." 156 Nothing could better
illustrate the Soviet definition of "progress" mutual
accession to its own proposals than these comments as
START'S final round began.
A week after Round Five opened, on Wednesday 12
October 1983, the Soviets offered to set up a joint working
154 Ibid .
"Reagan's Latest Arms Proposal Just 'Gimmickry,'
Pravda Says," Chicago Tribune , 24 October 1983.
156 See, "START Sessions Reopen in Geneva," Washington
Times , 6 October 1983; and, Don Cook, "U.S., Soviets Begin
New Talks on Arms," Los Angeles Times , 7 October 1983.
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group to discuss possible draft treaty language. The move
was heralded as signally progress in START. However, at
about the same time, the Soviet Union declined the earlier
American offers to set up joint working groups on
confidence-building measures and implementing the 'build-
down' approach, despite earlier hopeful sentiments on the
part of Western diplomats. 5
Some U.S. analysts continued to believe that the
Soviets might be positioning themselves for a limited
agreement the following year if they determined that
President Reagan's chances for reelection appeared good, and
the fact that the Soviets were "asking serious questions to
try to flesh out the new Administration proposals" was
interpreted as supporting this theory. 5 °
During Round Five the Soviets offered some
refinements on their START position, but these amounted to
little more than elaborations on their previous positions.
The Soviet START proposals at the end of Round Five included
the following: 159
an interim freeze on strategic nuclear weapons while
negotiations were underway;
157 William Beecher, "Move May Signal START Progress,"
Boston Globe . 18 October 1983.
158 Ibid .
1 CO
National Academy of Sciences, Nuclear Arms Control
Background and Issues , p. 67.
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an aggregate limit of 1,800 on ICBM launchers, SLBM
launchers, and heavy bombers (representing a 20
percent reduction from the SALT II limit of 2,250);
— a sublimit of 1,200 on MIRVed ICBMs, SLBMs, and
bombers equipped with cruise missiles;
— a sublimit of 1,030 on MIRVed ICBM and SLBM
launchers
;
a sublimit of 680 land-based ICBM launchers;
unspecified equal limits on missile warheads and
bomber weapons;
modernization constraints on the size and types of
new SLBM and ICBM missiles, including SALT II-type
limits on MIRV fractionation; and,
a ban on ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles
with ranges greater than 600 km.
The Soviet Union had dropped earlier proposals for
banning Trident II, long-range air-launched cruise missiles,
limiting the U.S. deployment of Trident submarines from four
to six, and a call to reduce the number of missile tubes on
future Trident submarines from 24 to 16. 160 As noted, these
positions did not differ appreciably from the July 1983
Soviet START proposals.
Note that much of the closing Soviet position closely
paralleled that of specific SALT I and II provisions, and
appeared designed to place severe restrictions on the
advertised U.S. strategic modernization program.
The Soviet Union apparently spent Round Five
exploring the U.S. position rather than presenting changes
160 Ibid .
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in its own, and the round was later characterized as the
"least productive." 161
V. THE SOVIET WALKOUT
On Wednesday, 23 November 1983, the Soviets broke off
negotiations on INF weapons in Europe. 162 A major statement
attributed to Andropov was published in Pravda on Friday, 25
November 1983. 163 Andropov stated that "the United States
had no desire to reach a mutually acceptable accord on
nuclear armaments in Europe and has done everything at the
talks in Geneva and outside them to prevent such an
accord." 164 Then he reviewed a series of decisions adopted
by the Soviet leadership:
Having carefully weighed all the aspects of the
situation which has been created, the Soviet leadership
has adopted the following decisions:
First: Since the United States by its actions has
wrecked the possibility of achieving a mutually
acceptable accord at the talks on guestions of limiting
nuclear arms in Europe and since their continuation in
161 Jay Ross, "Latest START Negotiations Said to Be
Least Productive," Washington Post . 10 December 1983.
162 John Vinocur, "Soviet Breaks Off Parley in Geneva
on Nuclear Arms," New York Times . 24 November 1983; and,
Michael Getler and William Drozdiak, "Soviet 'Discontinue'
Talks On Medium-Range Missiles," Washington Post . 24
November 1983.
163
"Statement by Yu.V. Andropov, General Secretary of
the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme
Soviet Presidium," Pravda , 25 November 1983, p. 1, in Soviet
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these conditions would only be a cover for actions by
the United States and a number of other NATO countries
aimed at undermining European and international
security, the Soviet Union considers it impossible to
participate further in these talks.
Second: The commitments unilaterally adopted by the
Soviet Union with the objective of creating more
favorable conditions for achieving success at the talks
are abrogated. The moratorium on the deployment of
Soviet medium-range nuclear systems in the European part
of the USSR is thereby abrogated.
Third: By agreement with the governments of the GDR
and the CSSR the preparatory work begun some time ago,
as was announced, for the siting of enhanced-range
operational-tactical missiles on the territory of those
countries will be accelerated. 65
Fourth: Since by siding its missiles in Europe the
United States is increasing the nuclear threat to the
Soviet Union, corresponding Soviet means will be
deployed in ocean regions and seas taking this
circumstance into account. In terms of their
characteristics these means of ours will be egual to the
threat created for us and our allies by the U.S.
missiles being sited in Europe.
Of course, other measures aimed at safeguarding the
security of the USSR and the other socialist community
countries will also be taken. 166
A Soviet broadcast by Colonel Edward Grigoriyev on
29 October 1983 made the following comment: "Since
preparations have been stepped up in Western Europe for the
deployment of new American nuclear missiles to be trained on
the Soviet Union and their Warsaw Treaty countries,
preparations are underway in the German Democratic Republic
and Czechoslovakia for the deployment of tactical missiles.
This has been announced by the Soviet Defense Ministry and
the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and
Czechoslovakia." See Soviet Union: Daily Report , FBIS, 29
October 1983, p. AA5.
166
"Statement by Yu.V. Andropov."
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Andropov asserted Soviet willingness to resume
negotiations, but only if NATO withdrew its newly deployed
missiles and restored the pre-existing strategic balance:
If the United States and the other NATO countries
display a readiness to return to the situation which
existed prior to the commencement of the siding of U.S.
medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union too
will be ready to do likewise. And then the proposals
which we submitted earlier regarding questions of
limiting and reducing nuclear arms in Europe would come
into force again. In this event, that is, provided the
previous situation is reestablished, the USSR's
unilateral pledges in this sphere would also come back
into force. 67
It might be noted that there was no similar major
statement by the Soviet leadership in the aftermath of the
START negotiations.
Observers in the West immediately sought to put the
best face on the collapse. Paul Nitze commented "We are
hopeful the Soviet side will come to the conclusion it is in
their interest, as well as in our interest and in the
world's interest, that the negotiations resume." Others saw
an encouraging sign in the fact that the Soviets termed the
walk-out a "discontinuance" rather than a complete
abandonment. 168 For others, the normal resumption of START
negotiations on Tuesday, 29 November 1983, seemed to





168 Daniel Southerland, "A Walkout, But Not a
Breakdown, In East-West Talks," Christian Science Monitor .
25 November 1983.
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hardened INF position, although Soviet negotiator Karpov
reiterated his theme that the United States had blocked
progress: "There is no progress up to now. As I have
explained many times, the position of the American side is
not for an agreement." 1 9
An important theme of this chapter has been the
repeated incidence of Western exaggeration of Soviet
interests in a strategic arms reduction agreement. The
following allegorical commentary gives some indication that
this was the case just after the Soviets walked out of the
INF talks, but came back the next week to the START
negotiations:
Like the dog that didn't bark in the Sherlock Holmes
story, the fact that the Soviets have continued business
as usual in the strategic missile talks in Geneva, after
walking out of the medium-range talks there, is
significant.
It fairly shouts with the message that the
Politburo wants to continue exploring the possibility of
a serious arms-control deal regardless of the political
necessity of baring its teeth after the parliaments of
West Germany, Britain and Italy ignored warnings and
voted to go ahead with deployment of American Pershing 2
and cruise missiles. °
On 8 December 1983 the Soviets concluded Round Five
of START while refusing to set a date for resumption of the
"U.S., Soviets Resume Talks on Long-Range
Missiles," Los Angeles Times , 30 November 1983.
170 William Beecher, "The Other Arms Talks," Boston
Globe
. 2 December 1983.
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negotiations. 171 The Soviet and American delegations issued
statements at the conclusion of the talks. The chief Soviet
negotiator made the following statement:
Today the delegations of the Soviet Union and the
United States met in a plenary session ending the fifth
round of the Start negotiations.
In view of the deployment of new U.S. missiles in
Europe, which has already begun, changes in the global
strategic situation make it necessary for the Soviet
side to review all problems under discussion at the
Start negotiations.
Therefore no date for a resumption of the
negotiations has been fixed. 1
The chief U.S. negotiator responded with the
following comment on the Soviet position:
We regret that the U.S.S.R. has chosen to set a
resumption date for the next round. We cannot agree
with Soviet assertions that developments outside the
scope of these negotiations require the Soviet Union to
withhold agreement on a resumption date for the sixth
round of Start.
The United States, for its part, is fully prepared
to continue the regular pattern of the Start
negotiations. We have proposed to resume Round VI in
early February, and we hope that the U.S.S.R. will soon
171 Frank J. Prial, "Soviet Won't Set A Date to Resume
Strategic Talks," New York Times . 9 December 1983; William
Drozdiak, "Soviets Halt Strategic Arms Talks," Washington
Post
. 9 December 1983; and Don Cook, "Soviets Leave
Strategic Arms Talks in Limbo," Los Angeles Times , 9
December 1983.
172
"Statements on Geneva Talks," New York Times , 9
December 1983.
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agree on a date for resuming these negotiations, which
are in the interest of both our nations and of the
entire world.
The U.S. had made substantially more concessions
than Soviets throughout the course of the START
negotiations, and the U.S. had come significantly closer to
the original Soviet position.
173 Ibid
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ADDENDUM: SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR VERIFICATION AS
INDICATIONS OF INTEREST IN A START AGREEMENT
In conversations with U.S. Senator Larry Pressler,
Viktor Karpov, the designated head of the Soviet delegation
to START, expressed a willingness to discuss on-site
inspections. Other elements of the Soviet opening position
were evident. For example, Karpov noted that Moscow was
against any kind of linkage. He also gave the obligatory
image of pessimism regarding the intentions of the U.S.
administration. Another Soviet official reportedly joked
with Karpov in Pressler's presence, saying "You've just got
yourself a ten year job." The Soviets indicated that they
did not consider it very realistic to expect a treaty before
the end of Reagan's term, substantiating the notion that the
Soviets went into START pessimistic about the prospects of
achieving actual reductions, desiring more to merely
maintain the SALT II arms control framework, and to wait out
the end of the Reagan administration's term in office.
The Soviets may have calculated, in their
characteristically long-term planning style, that at the end
of Reagan's term in office one of two things would happen.
Either Reagan would bow to domestic pressures for arms
control agreements, or a more accommodating Democratic
administration would be elected. By late 1982, soon after
START began, the Nuclear Freeze Movement was well under way
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in the United States, possibly leading the Soviets to
believe that Reagan could not long resist these kinds of
public pressure.
Certainly the Reagan administration's handling of the
Freeze issue did nothing to bring such a perspective into
question, involving as it did the muffling of "rhetoric" on
such issues as fighting and winning a nuclear war, nuclear
warning shots in NATO strategy, and the functions and
desirability of civil defense.
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, in
discussions in Bonn, West Germany, hinted during Round Three
of START "that agreements might be verified by more direct
means than spy satellite." 1 4
14 Hal Piper, "Soviet's Hints for Negotiation on All
Arms Blur Geneva Focus," Baltimore Sun , 20 Jan. 1983.
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SOVIET THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND NEGOTIATING INCENTIVES
I. Threat Perceptions and the Correlation
of Forces IN SOVIET ARMS CONTROL CALCULATIONS
Threat perceptions are a critical element of Soviet
net assessment for foreign and military policy in general,
and for arms control policy in particular. They are the
basis for Soviet defense resource allocation decisions as
well as the basis of Soviet foreign and military policy
calculations. In an arms control context, threat
perceptions include Soviet perceptions of the correlation of
forces and of U.S. bargaining leverage. At a relatively
abstract level, threat perceptions are analyzed by the
Soviets in terms of the "correlation of forces". At a more
specific and less abstract level, threat perceptions involve
Soviet views and evaluations of U.S. bargaining leverage.
'
This chapter will examine Soviet perceptions of the
correlation of forces, showing that the Soviets perceived
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U.S. strategic nuclear force modernization plans as
sufficient incentive to engage in a process of negotiation
in order to maximize Western incentives for restraint
without an agreement that would place undo limits or
reductions on Soviet nuclear weapons.
In conjunction with this discussion, the following
conceptual and substantive issues will also be examined: (1)
do imminent threats increase Soviet interest in arms
control, particularly arms reductions? (2) If so, what
kinds of threats, and in what ways do they increase Soviet
interests in what kinds of arms control? (3) How do Soviet
perceptions of threat impact on Soviet foreign and military
policy? (4) What role do Soviet perceptions of the
"correlation of forces" play in Soviet arms control
interests and objectives?
A more substantive issue this chapter will seek to
explore is the nature and character of Soviet threat
assessment during START. Representative Soviet perceptions
of the U.S. political and military threat will also be
reviewed.
The Reagan administration's strategic policy and
modernization program may have provided sufficient
incentives for the Soviets to resume negotiations on
strategic arms, but did the lack of sufficient U.S.
bargaining leverage constitute a source of Soviet
disinterest in a strategic arms reduction agreement? The
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chapter following this will deal more specifically with
Soviet perceptions of the U.S. bargaining position. It will
develop the theme that although U.S. strategic nuclear
modernization programs elicited Soviet support for
negotiating strategic arms reductions, the U.S. lacked
sufficient deployed forces to interest the Soviets in
actually agreeing to a strategic arms reduction accord.
Historical perspectives on Soviet interests in arms
control shed interesting light on Soviet motivations.
Soviet interests in arms control and disarmament have at
times increased when a hostile external threat or
deteriorating international situation threatened Soviet
interests. 1 As noted, Soviet perceptions of the
international situation are conceived in terms of the
concept of "correlation of forces" explained below.
This was true in the 1920s when the Soviet Union
sensed a lingering international hostility to the Bolshevik
regime. At that time Lenin reversed his earlier opposition
to disarmament (which he had opposed for fear that it would
disarm the peasants he relied upon to overthrow existing
Historical Soviet perceptions of the international
situation can be found in Myron Rush, ed
.
, The International
Situation and Soviet Foreign Policy
. (Columbus: Charles E.
Merrill, 1970). See also, Robert B. Mahoney, Jr. and
Richard P. Clayberg, "Images and Threats: Soviet Perceptions
of International Crises, 1946-1975," in Pat McGowan and
Charles W. Kegley, Jr., eds., Threats, Weapons, and Foreign
Policy , (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980)
, pp. 55-81.
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governments) and soon became a vocal champion of disarmament
efforts.
A similar shift in Soviet policy occurred in the
1930s. Faced with a growing imperialist threat in the East
from Japan, and the ascendence of Hitler and Nazi
expansionism in the West, the Soviet Union adopted a policy
of "collective security" which included cooperation in
international disarmament efforts.
The Soviet Union has never been willing to rely
exclusively on disarmament for its security. It has always
taken steps to provide for its security independently of
arms control arrangements with potential adversaries. Also,
the espousal of arms control has been only one of several
diplomatic instruments the Soviet Union adopted when
confronted with external threats to its survival. It is
also important to appreciate that Soviet interests in
disarmament were limited, even at these times. It proposed
disarmament measures and urged Western participation in
various disarmament schemes, but always in conjunction with
unilateral initiatives to improve its security position
relative to its potential adversaries.
The Soviets perceived the correlation of forces
during the 1981-1983 period as being in their favor (as the
following analysis will show) , but with the possibility of
either (1) shifting back to U.S. favor in the near future
(principally as a result of NATO INF deployments) , or (2)
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becoming more costly to maintain in their favor. During
this period of time, the Soviet Union perceived multiple
sources of danger to the favorable correlation of forces
they had achieved during the so-called 'SALT decade'. This
chapter will suggest that this conclusion provided
sufficient incentives for the Soviets to propose and
negotiate strategic arms reductions initiatives. But did
they provide sufficient incentives for the Soviets to sign
an agreement on strategic arms reductions?
The primary focus of Soviet concerns with possible
adverse trends in the correlation of forces during this time
related to NATO INF modernization. This chapter will
therefore treat Soviet threat perceptions of NATO INF
modernization in some detail, especially in terms of their
impact on Soviet interests in START.
It is useful to recall that a distinction was made in
Chapter Two regarding the degree and scope of Soviet
interests in strategic arms reductions between Soviet
interests in proposing and negotiating versus actually
signing arms control agreements, and that this dissertation
examines the thesis that the Soviets were relatively
uninterested in a strategic arms reduction agreement during
the START negotiations of 1982 and 1983.
The prospect of a reversal in the "favorable" trend
of the 1970s in the correlation of forces — due to U.S.
strategic nuclear force initiatives in the early 1980s —
- 102 -
SOVIET THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND NEGOTIATING INCENTIVES
provided strong incentives for the Soviets to negotiate
strategic arms reductions. On the other hand, the lack of
U.S. bargaining leverage counteracted those incentives with
strong disincentives for reaching an agreement that might
have entailed substantial costs to the Soviets in terms of
diminishing strategic nuclear power accumulated over more
than a decade at enormous expense.
Before proceeding, a few methodological caveats are
in order. Much interpretation of Soviet perceptions is
necessarily inferential. The evidential base for inferring
Soviet calculations regarding arms control consists
primarily of Soviet writings published in the West. These
Soviet writings are often nauseatingly propagandistic and
easily dismissed as dogmatic, self-serving and polemical on
face value. Yet the Soviets may also be communicating in a
way they consider guite clear and understandable. After
all, there are important points Soviet writers want to
convey to both internal and external audiences. The
difficulty lies in distinguishing substance from propaganda.
One Western analysts framed the problem this way:
An evaluation of Soviet material must interpret each
Soviet statement in light of the different purposes and
multiple audiences at which it is thought to be
directed. For example, the analyst must judge whether
the Soviets calculate a greater benefit from
understating or over-estimating their real threat
perceptions in their ever evolving official negotiating
postures. The analyst must also draw significance from
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contradictory statements in the Soviet press with the
realization that, even in the realm of threat
perceptions, the Soviet process of consensus building
allows a measure of debate to spill over into public
view. At the same time, the complementarity of
seemingly contradictory statements about foreign
military threats can frequently be revealed by a
thorough examination of those tenets of Soviet military
doctrine to which their authors attach them.
Soviet criticisms of U.S. START proposals may be more
than simple propaganda. They may have some substance that
serves as evidence of actual Soviet threat perceptions. But
there are certain caveats to bear in mind. Soviet
statements are sometimes calculated to suppress appreciation
of fundamental differences between East and West —
especially in terms of military and foreign policy, and to
stress areas of alleged common interests. This is
especially true in an arms control context. Common
interests are defined in self-serving ways by Soviet
spokesmen. Identification of problems (both for the Soviets
and for the West) by these spokesmen frequently appear to be
drawn from Western analyses. It is uncharacteristic of
Soviet authors to discuss or divulge internal problems.
Again, this often seems calculated to promote ostensible
common interests in combating common problems, especially in
an arms control context where the Soviets would like to
exaggerate Western expectations of grounds for agreement.
2 William V. Garner, Soviet Threat Perceptions of
NATO's Eurostrategic Missiles , (Paris: The Atlantic
Institute for International Affairs, November 1983), p. 9.
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Soviet writings are permeated by a siege mentality.
They are preoccupied with casting the United States as the
militarist enemy and the Soviet Union as the indefatigable
champion of world peace and tranquility. But Soviet
writings also reveal insight and appreciation for U.S.
domestic political considerations (e.g. a fragile defense
spending consensus) with important implications for Soviet
perceptions of the U.S. bargaining position. 3
To better appreciate Soviet threat perceptions, and
their impact on Soviet arms control interests, it is
important to understand what the Soviets feel they have to
defend.
The Soviets often speak in terms of "the gains of the
October Revolution." In a very real sense it is these
"gains" that constitute the essence of Soviet security
interests. Specifically, these "gains" refer to the
Bolshevik seizure of state power in 1917, and can now be
interpreted as control of the assets of the Russian/Soviet
nation-state by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU) . The Soviet state serves as the corporal basis for
the CPSU's role as "vanguard" of the socialist revolution.
The Soviets interpret both internal and external threats in
3 See for example the evaluation given by Soviet
officials reported in Howard Simons and Dusko Doder, "Soviet
Officials Pessimistic About Improving Relations With U.S."
Washington Post . 26 Oct. 1981. This subject is treated at
greater length in the next chapter.
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terms of their danger to CPSU control of the Soviet state.
CPSU control of the Soviet state would be meaningless if
that state ceased to exist, or if that state's power were
relatively diminished. The interests, then, of the Soviet
state as the power base of world socialism are conceptually
indistinguishable from the framework of interests provided
by Marxist-Leninist ideology. Thus, to the extent that arms
control impacts on Soviet national power, Soviet interests
in arms control will always have ideological undertones.
For present purposes, there are basically two types
of threats to Soviet interests which are potentially
amenable to arms control solutions — political and
military.
Political threats may include increased international
tensions. This is often evidenced in terms of Soviet
discussions of the inevitability of war and is inextricably
connected with Soviet conceptions of "stability" and what
causes "instability." It also includes fears of "capitalist
encirclement." These types of threats have been the
hallmark of Soviet alarmist propaganda since the earliest
days of the Soviet Union. 4
Military threats include concerns with new weapons as
well as the fear of new technologies, especially those
See John Erickson, "Threat Identification and
Strategic Appraisal by the Soviet Union, 1930-1941," in
Ernest R. May, ed., Knowing One's Enemies . (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 375-423.
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technologies that may unfavorably impact on the "correlation
of forces." For example, the Soviets have expressed
apprehensions regarding the U.S. military-technological
challenges in strategic defenses.
It should be noted that the Soviets do not always
respond to these threats, political or military, with arms
control initiatives. One task of this chapter will be to
identify those types of threats which promote Soviet
incentives for proposing and negotiating, but more
especially agreeing to strategic arms reductions.
The primary military and political threat to the
Soviet state in the post-war era has been the United States.
In terms of its capability to impose damage on Soviet
interests, the United States has been the "only meaningful
enemy." 5 Although it can be argued that China has posed a
greater ideological threat to Soviet interests at certain
periods in the post-war era, only the United States has
consistently possessed the means and, in the Soviet view,
the intention of opposing the U.S.S.R.
Furthermore, American possession of nuclear weapons
and their delivery vehicles are the main military
instruments of danger to the U.S.S.R. The danger posed by
nuclear weapons and intercontinental delivery means is
augmented, in the Soviet view, by the U.S. policy of
5 P.H. Vigor, The Soviet View of Disarmament , (New
York: St. Martin's, 1986), p. 56.
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encircling the Soviet Union with foreign military bases and
alliances, partly because these can be used as staging areas
for nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.
It is not surprising then to find that Soviet
proposals for General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) since
1945 have nearly always contained three basic elements:
a ban on nuclear weapons;
destruction of delivery systems for nuclear
weapons; and,
abandonment of all foreign military bases and
withdrawal of all foreign troops.
II. SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE CORRELATION
OF FORCES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1980S
As mentioned previously, the correlation of forces is
the conceptual framework for Soviet net assessment
processes. According to Soviet sources, the correlation of
forces interacts with arms control in two ways. First, the
Soviets view arms control as a zero-sum interaction.
Whatever their opponent loses is their gain and vice versa.
The correlation of forces determines the outcome of arms
negotiations. If the East-West correlation of forces is
favorable to the Soviets, the outcome of any East-West
negotiation will be in their favor. Second, an arms
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forces while also promoting beneficial trends in the
correlation of forces.
The correlation of forces at the time SALT II was
signed (1979) was characterized by Soviet spokesmen as
"rough parity." Parity in nuclear forces is declared by the
Soviets to be a necessary basis for any accord on nuclear
arms. The Soviets perceive many advantages to a condition
of U.S. -Soviet strategic parity and equality. SALT I and II
were possible because parity had been achieved through the
Soviet Union's efforts to match the U.S. in strategic
nuclear forces. In turn, compliance with SALT I and II
would insure continued parity by placing ceilings on the
aggregate numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles
(SNDVs) permitted to both sides, and by restricting
strategic force modernization to defined parameters. The
Soviet Union regarded the establishment of parity and the
signing of SALT I and II as among the greatest achievements
of the 1970s, and, as will be shown, the Reagan
administration posed multiple serious challenges to these
cherished accomplishments of Soviet diplomacy and military
policy.
The Soviet concept of the correlation of forces
differs substantially from the traditional Western concept
of balance of power mainly in that it encompasses a much
broader number of factors for comparative purposes. These
include economic, military, political, and ideological
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factors. The following passage best serves to illustrate
the many factors that go into Soviet calculations of the
correlation of forces within each of the principal
categories:
Many criteria exist with which to assess the
correlation of forces. In economics , usually we compare
the gross national product on a per capita basis, labor
productivity, dynamics of economic growth, level of
industrial output, particularly in the leading sectors,
labor technology, resources and manpower skills, number
of specialists, and level of industrial output,
particularly in the leading sectors, labor technology,
resources and manpower skills, number of specialists,
and level of development of theoretical and applied
science. In the military aspect, comparisons are being
made of the quantity and quality of arms, fire power of
the armed forces, combat and moral qualities of the
soldiers, training of the command personnel, forms of
organization of the troops and their experience in
combat, nature of the military doctrine, and methods
followed in strategic, operative, and tactical thinking.
In terms of politics , we take into consideration the
breadth of the social base of the governmental system,
its method of organization, constitutional procedures
governing relations between the government and the
legislative organs, possibility to make operative
decisions, and extent and nature of population support
of domestic and foreign policy. Finally, if it is a
question of assessing the strength of one or another
international movement , we take into consideration its
quantitative composition, influence among the masses,
position in the political life of the individual
countries, principles and norms governing relations
among its constituent units, and the extent of their
unity. All these comparisons enable us to determine
with greater or lesser accuracy the correlation of
forces at any given sector or time, and may be used for
purposes of short-term forecasts . . . The trend itself
is uncontroversial : the overall ratio of forces in the
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world is steadfastly changing in favor of socialism. 8
(emphasis added)
There are three important aspects of Soviet
perceptions of the correlation of forces. The first regards
the last line of the above citation — the notion that the
global correlation of forces is irreversibly changing in
favor of socialism. According to Marxist-Leninist ideology
this is historically predetermined. The second point is
that, in the Soviet view, the global correlation of forces
began shifting in favor of the Soviet's in the 1970s. In
1973 Brezhnev noted:
We are deeply convinced that the current changeabout
from cold war to detente, from military confrontation to
a more solid security and to peaceful cooperation is the
main tendency in present-day international relations.
How has this become possible? The main factor, we are
certain, is the general change in the correlation of
world forces — a change that is against the exponent of
cold war and the building up of arms and those who fancy
diverse military ventures, a change in favor of the
forces of peace and progress.
The Soviets believed that the shift in the
correlation of forces was greatly aided by the signing of
SALT I and II, and that the change that occurred in the
8 G. Shakhnazarov, "On the Problems of Correlation of
Forces in the World," Kommunist . No. 3 (Feb. 1974), cited in
Raymond S. Sleeper, ed., A Lexicon of Marxist-Leninist
Semantics, (Alexandria, VA: Western Goals, 1983), p. 69.
9 L.I. Brezhnev, "Speech at the World Congress of Peace
Forces," Moscow, 26 Oct. 1973, in Our Course: Peace and
Socialism, A Collection of Speeches , (Moscow, 1974) , Part
Four, p. 67, cited in Ibid .
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correlations of forces during the 1970s has forced the
U.S.: 10
(1) to recognize the impossibility of winning a nuclear
war;
(2) to recognize the folly of pursuing local wars
(specifically Vietnam)
;
(3) to resort to strategic arms limitation talks;
(4) to modify its strategic doctrine from one of
"strategic superiority" to a less provocative
objective of "sufficiency"; and,
(5) to recognize the Soviet Union as an equal, including
legitimizing Soviet boundaries in Europe.
Detente was made possible, according to Soviet
sources, because the correlation of forces had shifted in
favor of socialism. As early as 1976 Soviet spokesmen were
declaring that:
Decisive significance attaches to the strengthening
of the might of world socialism, primarily of the Soviet
Union, which has been able, in a brief historical
period, to liquidate the U.S. nuclear monopoly and
create a military potential which does not lag behind
the American potential. This very fact has exercised
and still exercises a deterrent influence on the
aggressive circles of capitalism and prompts them to
give up gambling on world thermonuclear war in the
struggle against socialism and other revolutionary
See John Lenczowski, Soviet Perceptions of U.S.
Foreign Policy
. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982)
,
pp. 162-63. See also, Jonathan Samuel Lockwood, The Soviet
View of U.S. Strategic Doctrine
.
(New Brunswick: Transaction
Books, 1983), pp. 7, 123-170.
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forces and to look for new forms of relations with the
socialist countries. 1
According to these Soviet conceptions of the
correlation of force, the West does not grant the Soviets
important benefits of its own accord:
Imperialism accepted detente, not because it wished to
but because it was forced to. It was compelled to
accept detente because the correlation of forces in the
world arena changed in favor of socialism.
The third point to be noted regarding Soviet
perceptions of the correlation of forces concerns the Soviet
understanding of a ••favorable" correlation of forces. A
"favorable" correlation of forces means two things to the
Soviets. First, it means that the Soviet Union has
superiority over the U.S., NATO, and China — primarily in
terms of military power (and nuclear weapons are the
principal index of military power). 13 Second, it means that
11 D. Tomashevskiy , "How the West is Reacting to
Detente," International Affairs , (Russian language edition),
no. 10 (1976): 38-47, quoted in Seymour Weiss, "SALT in
Soviet Eyes," in John F. Lehman and Seymour Weiss, Beyond
the SALT II Failure . (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 41. (pp.
37-58.)
i ? . .1979 statement attributed to Yuri V. Andropov during
his tenure as head of the KGB, cited in Albert L. Weeks and
William C. Bodie, eds., War and Peace: Soviet Russia Speaks ,
(New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1983)
, p.
6.
For the assertion that a "favorable" correlation of
forces means Soviet superiority, see Julian Lider, "The
Correlation of World Forces: The Soviet Concept," Journal of
Peace Research , 17, 2 (1980), p. I67fn.
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the overall trend in world politics is evolving in a
direction that promotes Moscow's long-term aims and
ambitions. In a chapter titled "The Main Factor of World
Politics" from a 1980 book published in the Soviet Union,
author Nikolai Lebedev leaves no uncertainty regarding what
the "main factor" is:
The change in the correlation of forces in favour of
socialism is an objective and natural law of world
development. It is realised through the actions of
states, classes, and parties, and through a very complex
interaction of diverse social forces, which influence
the general situation in the world, and of shaping
tendencies and counter-tendencies in world development.
At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s
it was precisely this new correlation of forces which
created conditions for a fundamental restructuring of
international relations on the basis of the assertion of
the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with
different social systems. 4
In 1981 during a review of Soviet foreign policy
throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s, Andrei
Gromyko characterized the late 1960s and early 1970s as a
period "when favorable opportunities for restructuring the
entire postwar system of international relations on a
peaceful and democratic basis emerged as a result of the
change in the correlation of forces in the world in favor of
14 Nikolai Lebedev, The USSR in World Politics ,
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socialism." 1 Gromyko notes that this favorable change in
the correlation of forces allowed the Soviet Union to
advance a "Peace Program" at the 24th CPSU Congress.
The role of the correlation of forces in Soviet arms
control calculations can be inferred from the role with
which the Soviets credit SALT in affecting the correlation
of forces in the 1970s. Soviet assessments of the
correlation of forces may help determine when to seek arms
agreements or when to seek only negotiations, and if
negotiations are called for they may help determine what
types of arms agreements to seek.
Arms control proposals, negotiations, and agreements
must contribute to a "favorable" correlation of forces in
order for the Soviets to be interested in them.
Furthermore, Soviet compliance with arms control agreements
will be assured only if such compliance contributes in some
way to maintaining a "favorable" correlation of forces (if
only to encourage compliance on the part of the other- side
to an agreement)
.
Peter Vigor has conducted an extensive survey of
Soviet perspectives on disarmament up to 1980 in an effort
which may properly be considered a chronological precursor
to the present undertaking. Taking care to note the
"Leninist Foreign Policy in the Contemporary World,"
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explicit and official long-standing historical interest of
the Soviet state in disarmament, he interprets such interest
to mean Soviet determination to slow down and eventually
halt the arms race. But while the conventional Western
wisdom is that this can only be accomplished through arms
control mechanisms, Vigor concludes that the Soviets have a
different view:
[H]aving agreed that the first step along the road to
any form of disarmament, in the proper sense of that
word, is to slow down, and eventually halt, the arms
race, the next thing is to discover by what means the
latter can be accomplished. In the Soviet view, there
is only one method by which this can be done; and this
is by getting the world "correlation of forces"
(sootnoshenie sil) to tilt in favour of socialism.
The Soviet concept of the "correlation of forces"
lies at the root of all their thinking on international
affairs, whether in the political, the economic or the
military sphere, or indeed in any other for that
matter. 16
Soviet perceptions of the correlation of forces at
the beginning of the 1980s reveal the substance of Soviet
incentives for negotiating strategic arms reduction issues
with the United States. They also confirm many of the
aspects of the concept of the correlation of forces
discussed above. For example, the following statement from
a 1983 article makes it clear that attempts to best the
16 Vigor, The Soviet View of Disarmament , pp. 11-12
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Soviet Union through accelerated arms comptetition will not
work because of the correlation of forces:
Present-day U.S. leaders make no secret of the fact that
they are using the arms race to try to exhaust the
Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. These
are futile schemes! The United States and its allies
failed to achieve that goal at our most difficult time -
- after World War II. That is even more unrealistic
nowadays. The correlation of forces in the world makes
the policy a pure anachronism under present day
conditions. 17
By the time SALT II was signed (1979), the
correlation of strategic nuclear forces was profoundly
characterized by "parity" in the Soviet view. Brezhnev
noted:
As regards the global correlations of forces between
the biggest participating powers in these two military-
political groupings, that is, the Soviet Union and the
United States, here, as is officially acknowledged by
both sides, a rough parity, that is a balance of
strategic forces, has taken shape is maintained . It is
precisely this parity that lies at the basis of the
Soviet-U.S. agreement on strategic offensive arms
limitation, concluded in 1972, and also at the basis of
the agreement now being drawn up [i.e. SALT II].
(emphasis added). °
17 ...Robert Ivanov, "International Review: Disarmament,
Words and Deeds," Sovetskaya Rossiya , 14 July 1983, p. 1,
translated in Soviet Union: Daily Report , FBIS, 19 July
1983, p. A12.
"From Interview Given to Vorwarts , " in Leonid
Brezhnev, Peace, Detente, and Soviet-American Relations: A
Collection of Public Statements , (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1979), p. 213. (pp. 211-217.)
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"Parity" in the Soviet view is a concept that
requires some qualification. It is not "balance" as that
term is understood in the West. "Parity" is a condition
that favors the advancement of Soviet strategic and
political objectives. The Soviet Union enjoys substantial
superiority in nearly every indice of strategic nuclear
power. 19 The SALT I agreement accorded the Soviet Union a
one-third superiority in all categories of weapons covered
by the treaty ("deployed launchers" of land- and sea-based
inter-continental missiles)
,
yet was described by the
Soviets as codifying "strategic parity."
There are some categories of weapons the Soviet Union
has refused to subject to arms reduction efforts, and for
which the United States has never received formal rights to
deploy in U.S. -Soviet arms control agreements, such as
"heavy" ICBMs which are necessary for a prompt hard-target
kill capability. The Soviet Union has rationalized terming
the strategic balance "parity" despite its monopoly in this
category of weapons by allowing the United States to retain
a superiority in bombers as an "offset." It is clear that
the Soviet Union considers "parity" a condition where it is
19 On the U.S. -Soviet strategic balance, see Quentin
Crommelin, Jr., and David S. Sullivan, Soviet Military
Supremacy
. (Los Angeles: Crommelin and Sullivan, 1985), etc
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allowed to establish and modernize a prompt hard-target kill
capability but the United States is not. 20
"Equal security" is a Soviet concept meant to
rationalize including American "Forward Based Systems" in
the category of strategic weapons. Gerard Smith notes the
following explanation from the SALT I negotiations:
Agreements on the basis of equal security . . . had to
deal with threats as perceived by each side. All
nuclear delivery systems which could be used to hit
targets in the other country should be covered in SALT,
regardless of whether their owners called them strategic
or tactical. 21
Western scholars have also recognized that "equal
security" in Soviet usage is "a code word for unequal
strategic numbers." 22 According to this Soviet notion, the
USSR must have military forces equal to all actual and
potential threats to its security. A further refinement on
20 This point is developed in Robert J. Einhorn,
Negotiating From Strength: Leverage In U.S. -Soviet Arms
Control Negotiations
.
(New York: Praeger, 1985)
, pp. 42-55
21 Gerard Smith, Doubletalk: The Story of the First
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks , (Garden City: Doubleday,
1980), p. 91.
22 Nathaniel Davis, "'Equality and Equal Security 7 in
Soviet Foreign Policy," Essays on Strategy and Diplomacy ,
No. 5 (Claremont, CA: Keck Center for International
Strategic Studies, January 1986), pp. 4, 7.
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this concept suggests that the security requirements of the
2 3
Soviet Union are greater than those of the United States.
U.S. -Soviet agreements of 1972-74 provided a "sound
foundation" for the "positive development" of Soviet-
American relations, and created "objective possibilities for
further developing equal and mutually advantageous co-
operation in various spheres for the good of both countries
and of universal peace." 24
According to Soviet officials, American compliance
with Soviet conceptions of "equal security" is a "realistic"
policy:
The most important thing is that the American
administration should take a fully realistic stand and
proceed from the principle of equality and equal
security.
On this issue Brezhnev has promised the following:
23 Daniiel M. Proektor, "Problems of the Soviet Union's
Military Policy," Co-existence , 19, 1 (April 1982), cited in
Davis, pp. 5-6.
24
"From Speech at the 16th Congress of Trade Unions of
the USSR," in Leonid Brezhnev, Peace. Detente, and Soviet-
American Relations: A Collection of Public Statements . (New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), p. 156. (pp. 154-
162. )
25
"From Address for French and Soviet Television," in
Leonid Brezhnev, Peace, Detente, and Soviet-American
Relations: A Collection of Public Statements , (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), p. 168. Emphasis added.
(pp. 167-170.)
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In a word, if the government of the United States
adheres to the principles of equal security and
renunciation of attempts to gain unilateral advantages,
as set down in our agreements, the Soviet Union will
always be a conscientious and active partner in such an
important cause as the limitation and reduction of
strategic arms. 26
The Soviets see many advantages accruing from a
condition of East-West parity. For example, they declare
that "parity is a reliable guarantee of peace," and they
have often enshrined the principle in speeches, agreements,
and communiques. Andropov has stated:
The military-strategic parity attained [by the Soviet
Union] has deprived the United States of a possibility
to blackmail us with the nuclear threat. This parity is
a reliable guarantee of peace, and we will do everything
to preserve it.
The Soviets probably see at least four substantive
advantages to be gained from a condition of "parity,"
described above as a condition favoring the advancement of
Soviet strategic and political objectives, including the
deployment of a unilateral prompt hard-target kill
capability. The following have been identified by Western
"From Speech to the Electors in the Bauman District
of Moscow, June 14, 1974," in Leonid Brezhnev, Peace,
Detente, and Soviet-American Relations: A Collection of
Public Statements , (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1979)
,
p. 71. (pp. 67-73.
)
"Yu.V. Andropov Answer to a Pravda Correspondent's
Questions," Pravda , 27 March 1983, p. 1, in Soviet Union:
Daily Report , FBIS, 28 March 1983, p. Al.
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analysts as among those advantages of superpower strategic
"parity" accruing to the Soviets: 28
(1) it "increases the military efficacy of military
forces below the strategic nuclear threshold;"
(2) it provides a conducive international environment
for the expansion of Soviet influence;
(3) it contributes to gaining U.S. recognition of the
Soviet Union as an equal power; and,
(4) it promotes exploitable tensions between the U.S.
and its NATO allies.
According to a Soviet source late in the START
negotiations:
Luckily for mankind the period of U.S. military
superiority was relatively short-lived. As early as the
end of the fifties the correlation of forces in the
world arena began to change toward a gradual
establishment of a strategic equilibrium. This process
took place in conditions of a constant whipping up of
the nuclear arms race by the United States which tried
stubbornly, though in vain, to maintain its advantage.
In the sixties and seventies the strategic equilibrium
became a reality, was recognized by both sides, and was
embodied in the SALT II Treaty, signed in 1979. 29
This Soviet author goes on to elaborate on what is
meant by "strategic equilibrium" and why it is considered an
essential condition of international relations. His first
Robbin F. Laird, and Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet
Union and Strategic Arms . (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984),
pp. 6-7.
29 M. Lvov, "Anatomy of the Nuclear Threat," Pravda . 21
Nov. 1983, p. 6, in Soviet Union: Daily Report , FBIS, 28
Nov. 1983, p. AA8.
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point is that it provides a condition of mutual assured
destruction:
First, strategic equilibrium with a high level of
nuclear potential on both sides means either side has
the guaranteed possibility, should it become the victim
of a nuclear aggression, to retain sufficient means to
carry out a retaliatory strike capable of destroying the
aggressor. ... in the military sense the concept of
"mutual deterrence" has a certain substance since it
reflects both sides' understanding of the fact that in
conditions of an equilibrium of forces in a nuclear war
there can be no winner.
Secondly, strategic equilibrium creates conditions
for strategic arms reductions:
It hints, so to speak, at the possibility — given
goodwill on both sides — of gradually lowering the
level of nuclear confrontation while constantly
maintaining the equilibrium — that is, strictly
adhering to the principle of equality and identical
security. 31
The author further states on this point:
If the SALT II treaty had been ratified and the talks on
a complete and general nuclear test ban brought to a
successful conclusion
,
a favorable starting point for
real progress toward increasingly low levels of nuclear
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Third, strategic equilibrium is, according to this
Soviet viewpoint, an important prerequisite for "lessening
political confrontation and deepening the process of
relaxation of tensions." Additionaly:
In the conditions of strategic equilibrium, the more
distinct the prospects of the levels of military
confrontation being lowered, the more promising is the
potential for expanding and consolidating political
detente. 33
Note that the Soviets rarely speak of the advantages of
strategic parity to themselves alone, but always refer to
these advantages as benefiting the entire international
community.
Soviet officials have stated that a "sober analysis"
of the correlation of forces led the U.S. to realize the
necessity of arms accords with the Soviet Union. Brezhnev,
speaking of the 1976 U.S. Presidential elections, said:
[W]hoever comes to power in Washington after the
elections, it seems that the United States will have to
consider the real correlation of forces in the world,
which prompted American ruling circles, by a sober
analysis of the situation, in recent years to commence a
search for accords with the socialist world. 34
Strategic nuclear parity was created by Soviet
efforts to catch up with the United States. Appreciation
that parity had become the new norm in U.S. -Soviet strategic
33 Ibid .
Pravda , 26 Oct. 1976, quoted in Lehman and Weiss,
Beyond the SALT II Failure , p. 41.
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relations imposed a new "reality" on American political
decision-making
:
The acknowledgement of Soviet-American parity in the
strategic arms sphere played a special part in the
Western ruling circles' appreciation of the new
international realities and the appropriate correction
of their political course. . . . The change in political
strategy toward relaxation of tension revolves not
around random considerations based on expediency, but
around long-term factors stemming from the strengthening
of socialism's positions in the world. 35
Leonid Brezhnev made this connection between parity
and U.S. -Soviet arms control agreements:
As regards the global correlations of forces between the
biggest participating powers in these two military-
political groupings, that is, the Soviet Union and the
United States, here, as is officially acknowledged by
both sides, a rough parity, that is a balance of
strategic forces, has taken shape and is maintained . It
is precisely this parity that lies at the basis of the
Soviet-U.S. agreement on strategic offensive arms
limitation, concluded in 1972, and also at the basis of
the agreement now being drawn up [i.e. SALT II]. 36
(emphasis added)
One Soviet article published in Pravda gave five
reasons for Soviet support of SALT II, again strongly
35 Tomashevskiy, "How the West is Reacting to Detente,"
International Affairs
.
(Russian language edition) , no. 10
(1976): 38-47, quoted in Lehman and Weiss, Beyond the SALT
II Failure p. 41, (see also p. 47) .
"From Interview Given to Vorwarts . " in Leonid
Brezhnev, Peace, Detente, and Soviet-American Relations: A
Collection of Public Statements
,
(New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1979), p. 213. (pp. 211-217.)
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implying that it should be the basis for further arms
limitation agreements: 37
1) the treaty represented a "balance of USSR and U.S.
interests ;
"
2) it was compatible with the principle of "equality
and equal security;"
3) it was supported by President Carter and the U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time ("many eminent
American politicians and scientists are now speaking
of the U.S. refusal to ratify it as a big mistake")
;
4) it "erected definite obstacles in the way of the
further quantitative growth and qualitative
improvement of a number of the most destructive
strategic arms," as well as "initiated their
reduction;" and,
5) "It laid a good foundation for further measures to
limit and reduce strategic arms and was designed to
help improve Soviet-American relations and to
develop and strengthen political and military
detente.
"
Interestingly, the Basic Principles Agreement and the
agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War seem the most
important outcomes of early U.S. -Soviet SALT negotiations
for the Soviets, and not the Interim Offensive Agreement, as
in the view of most Americans. 38 Authoritative Soviet
speeches often refer to them first, and to the other
3 7 A. Nikonov, "Disarmament Is the Demand of the Times:
Acute and Urgent Problem," Pravda
. 13 Aug. 1982, p. 4, in
Daily Report: Soviet Union . FBIS, 17 Aug. 1982, p. AA1. (pp
AA1-AA3.
)
3 8 See Nathaniel Davis, " 'Equality and Equal Security'
in Soviet Foreign Policy," Essays on Strategy and Diplomacy ,
No. 5 (Claremont, CA: Keck Center for International
Strategic Studies, January 1986), pp. 2-3.
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agreements signed at the same time only secondly. 9 For
example, note the following passage from a speech by Leonid
Brezhnev:
As a result of the negotiations with U.S. President
Nixon in Moscow and Washington, and later of the
meetings with President Ford in Vladivostok and
Helsinki, important and fundamental mutual understanding
has been reached between the leaders of the Soviet Union
and the United States on the necessity of developing
peaceful, equal relations between the two countries.
This is reflected in a whole system of Soviet-U.S.
treaties, agreements, and other documents.
Unquestionably the most important of these are the Basic
Principles of Mutual Relations Between the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of
America, the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War ,
and the series of strategic-arms-limitation treaties and
agreements. What is the main significance of these
documents? In all, they have laid a solid political and
legal foundation for greater mutually beneficial co-
operation between the USSR and USA in line with the
principles of peaceful coexistence. To a certain extent
they have lessened the danger of nuclear war. Precisely
in this we see the main result of the development of
Soviet-U.S. relations in the past five years,
(emphasis in original)
The implication is that military-strategic stability
derives (in the Soviet view) , not from any particular aspect
of the strategic weapons balance, but from political
stability, or the "relaxation of international tensions."
1Q
See the various speeches by Leonid Brezhnev, in
Peace. Detente, and Soviet-American Relations: A Collection
of Public Statements , (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1979)
, pp. 23, 56-57, 85.
40 nproin Report to the 25th Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union," in Leonid Brezhnev, Peace,
Detente, and Soviet-American Relations: A Collection of
Public Statements , (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1979), p. 107. (pp. 103-114.)
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To summarize, Soviet substantive interests in
disarmament (as opposed to propaganda interests) are
conditioned by Soviet calculations of the correlation of
forces and Soviet perceptions of parity and strategic
equality.
III. SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF
REAGAN 'S STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM
The Reagan administration posed, in the Soviet view,
multiple dangers to Moscow's foreign and military policy
agenda. According to Soviet sources, President Reagan's
defense program represented an explicit and deep commitment
to the following major objectives:
(1) an unrestricted buildup of military preparations;
(2) "whipping up the nuclear arms race" in order to
break the existing rough military parity between the
USSR and the United States; and,
(3) ensuring United States' nuclear superiority.
About eighteen months into Reagan's first term, an
article written by Soviet Minister of Defense Dimitriy
Ustinov and published by Pravda . stressed that there was a
"sharp deterioration in the international situation," and
that "aggressive imperialist circles with the United States
at the head continue to whip up the arms race, kindle
dangerous crises and armed conflict in various regions of
the world, irresponsibly threatening the use of nuclear
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weapons." He then gave the following as a characterization
of United States military objectives: 41
(1) "The United States should be power No. 1 militarily
as regards all indices. At the same time
superiority is simply understood as the attaining of
an ability to deal a blow at the Soviet Union, at
those targets and at a time when Washington finds it
expedient in the hope that the counterstrike at the
United States would be less powerful than under
different conditions.
(2) "In the name of attaining superiority the programs
for the build-up of strategic offensive forces,
nuclear and conventional armaments, for the beefing
up of U.S. and NATO military might as a whole have
been compiled. Americans demand that their partners
raise military spendings already not by three
percent but by no less than 4.5 percent a year.
(3) "The United States is drawing other countries in
various regions of the world into the orbit of its
military preparations, and is trying to set up new
military blocs. The construction of new and the
expansion of existing military bases around the
Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist
community continue.
(4) "The development of weapons systems to conduct
military operations in outer space and from outer
space is proceeding at a growing pace. The plans
are being implemented for the development and
deployment of missile and laser weapons in outer
space, including with the use of the space shuttle
system.
(5) "Political and economic moves are closely linked
with military measures. Propaganda and special
measures against socialist states are being adjusted
to fit the new doctrine. Having no scruples, even
prejudicing the interests of its allies and itself,
the United States is trying to orchestrate a trade,
credit, and scientific-technological war against the
socialist community."
41 Pravda article by Dimitriy Ustinov, reported by
TASS in Daily Report: Soviet Union , FBIS, 12 July 1982, pp
AA1-AA2
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The most prominent theme in this and other Soviet
commentaries at the time was that the Reagan administration
was seeking strategic superiority, and was doing so in order
to impose its will on other nations as a fundamental aspect
of its foreign and military policy. One Soviet military
spokesman made the following comments in an interview with
Western reporters:
Security is our highest interest. We think it is
dangerous if the United States is superior in some types
of arms. The Americans could exploit superiority for
political purposes, and from that, it would not be a
long way to conflict. We require balance at all stages
of reductions, even at the lowest levels. 2
The Soviets were not so much concerned with U.S.
attempts to achieve nuclear superiority as they were with
the threat that U.S. defense programs would upset a balance
that favored Soviet strategic objectives, which the Soviets
had expended considerable resources to achieve. Although
the 1980 Republican party platform certainly gave the
appearance of an official endorsement of superiority as a
national priority, by 1982 the Reagan administration had
quite clearly renounced any intention of pursuing nuclear
superiority as the price for appeasing the nuclear freeze
movement in the United States. 43
Ma j . Gen. Viktor Starodubov in Flora Lewis, "Soviet
Arms-Control Expert Asks Nuclear Balance," New York Times , 2
Sept. 1982.
Note the furor over revelations in the American
press concerning the "Fiscal Year 1984-1988 Defense
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The Soviets pointed to specific weapons programs as
evidence that the Reagan administration was seeking nuclear
superiority. These included cruise missiles, but more
importantly, NATO INF modernization plans, discussed more
fully below. Other Soviet commentaries also charged that
the Reagan administration was "pressing forward with
material preparations for war," and that the United States
was responsible for a "sharp deterioration" in the
international situation due primarily to an intensification
of the American ideological war against the Soviet state,
and U.S. pursuit of military superiority. These
commentaries also doubted U.S. sincerity in the INF and
START negotiations, saying that the U.S. "may have decided
to enter the talks in an effort to deflect antinuclear
movements in Europe and the United States." 44
Guidance" and the subsequent retractions by Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger: "Weinberger Disavows Idea Atomic
War Can Be Won," Baltimore Sun , 4 June 1982; Michael Getler,
"Pentagon Acts to Clarify Position on Nuclear War,"
Washington Post , 4 June 1982; "Transcript of an Interview
With the Secretary of Defense (Weinberger), June 20, 1982
(Extract)," in U.S. Department of State, American Foreign
Policy: Current Documents. 1982
.
(Washington, D.C., 1985),
pp. 97-98; and Jack Nelson, "Weinberger Expands on Nuclear
Plans," Los Angeles Times , 26 August 1982. See also the
testimony and insertions given in U.S. Senate, "U.S.
Strategic Doctrine," Hearings , Committee on Foreign
Relations, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 14 Dec. 1982.
44 See, for example, Dimitri Ustinov in 30 June 1982
TASS commentary reported in Dusko Doder, "Soviets Mark Arms
Talks by Accusing U.S. of Preparing for War." Washington
Post
. 1 July 1982.
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Soviet threat perceptions may have actually reflected
Soviet aims and ambitions in terms of Soviet preparations
for war, the Soviet-instigated intensification of an
ideological struggle, Soviet pursuit (and actual
achievement) of strategic nuclear superiority, and Soviet
exploitation of the Western peace movement.
A dominant theme in Soviet writings from the START
period was that Reagan's military program was comprehensive,
and that it tied together elements of foreign, economic, and
trade policy. 45 Throughout the 1970s the Soviet Union was
consistently critical of certain "circles" in the United
States who were opposed to detente and which were "striving
to spur on the arms race" while attempting to place the
responsibility for this arms race on the Soviet Union. 46
Soviet leaders also criticized these "circles" for
pretending the Cold War was still in progress, or for
wishing to bring it back. Conditions had changed, the
Soviets asserted, and detente had been established. Either
this new condition was being ignored, or "certain circles in
the West" were seeking to undermine or destroy it. In 1976
Brezhnev stated:
4 5 For an example, see the Ustinov article cited
footnote 41.
See for example, "From Speech to the Electors in the
Bauman District of Moscow, June 14, 1974," in Leonid
Brezhnev, Peace. Detente, and Soviet-American Relations: A
Collection of Public Statements
.
(New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1979), p. 70.
- 132 -
SOVIET THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND NEGOTIATING INCENTIVES
They behave as if nothing has happened in recent years,
as if nothing has changed and the world continues to be
in a state of 'cold war'. They instigate one noisy
campaign after another about an allegedly increasing
'military threat' from the USSR, demand more and more
military appropriations, and are intensifying the arms
race. 4
With the inauguration of Ronald Reagan in 1981 these very
"circles" were now at the pinnacle of power in the United
States, occupying the White House.
Soviet criticisms of the Reagan administration echoed
many, if not all, of the criticisms hurled at the
administration by its own domestic American critics. The
most central theme in Soviet perceptions of Reagan's defense
agenda was that the United States was now determined to
achieve strategic nuclear superiority over the USSR. The
Reagan administration was seen by the Soviets as determined
to destroy the basis of the existing condition of strategic
"parity" (and thus the basis of any eguitable arms
agreement) through its strategic programs and defense policy
(which the Soviets characterized as a shift toward nuclear
war-fighting) . The Soviets also claimed that Reagan was
This quote is from "Replies to Questions by Joseph
Kingsbury-Smith, Hearst Corporation," in Leonid Brezhnev,
Peace, Detente, and Soviet-American Relations: A Collection
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seeking nuclear superiority through deploying INF systems in
Europe. 48
Soviet commentaries early in the Reagan
administration's tenure depicted expectations of the worst
in the U.S. -Soviet military arena. The administration was
accused repeatedly of seeking military superiority with a
"comprehensive plan" that envisioned modernization of all
three legs of the Triad, with the MX missile, Trident SLBM,
and B-l bomber as its centerpieces.
With its very first steps the Reagan administration too
a course directed toward undermining detente,
confrontation with the Soviet Union and pursuit of
military superiority. Both the President himself and
his closest aides and associates have repeatedly stated
this publicly. Nor do they conceal their objective in
this connection: the United States must be the most
powerful country in the world and to achieve this they
are 'prepared to pay any price 7 . 49
The Soviets noted Reagan's plans for increasing
funding for the Rapid Deployment Force, conventional forces
intercontinental nuclear forces, and theater nuclear forces,
Specific weapon programs were often singled out for
particular criticism. These included the Pershing II,
cruise missiles, the MX missile, B-l, and D-5 — virtually
a a
See, for example, Col. -Gen. N. Chervov, "Who Is
Seeking Missile Superiority?" Soviet Military Review , No. 12
(Dec. 1983) : 46-47.
49 Ma j . Gen. R. Simonyan, "The Pentagon's Nuclear
Ambitions," Agitator Armii i Flota , No. 1 (Jan. 1982): 30-
32, translated in USSR Report: Military Affairs , JPRS No.
1695 (4 Aug. 1982) : 1-3.
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the entire spectrum of Reagan's strategic nuclear
modernization efforts.
The Soviets also criticized plans to modernize
American strategic nuclear command and control systems, and
charged that the United States was developing "fundamentally
new types of strategic weapons" — probably referring to new
generation ICBMs and SLBMs. 50
The Soviets also accused Reagan of trying to make the
idea of nuclear war more acceptable to the American people,
ostensibly to promote public support for his nuclear
modernization efforts. 1
The Soviets at this time declared that a dangerous
shift had occurred in U.S. strategic policy, but had been
declaring such dangerous developments at each major junction
in the evolution of American nuclear deterrence policy.
What made Reagan's shift particularly antithetical to Soviet
interests was that it came at the height of Soviet success
in creating a "favorable" correlation of forces (i.e.
favorable to Soviet interests) . Also, NATO's INF
modernization plans posed a greater possibility of
materializing than had any U.S. or NATO nuclear force
50 Ibid .
51 Laird and Herspring, pp. 105-106.
See, for example, the analysis in Jonathan Samuel
Lockwood, The Soviet View of U.S. Strategic Doctrine , (New
Brunswick: Transaction Books), 1983.
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modernization effort since the neutron bomb fiasco of the
Carter administration. This kind of threat to the
correlation of forces — one involving an incipient Western
weapon modernization effort — was, in the Soviet
calculation, the kind most easily thwarted by arms control.
Soviet Minister of Defense, Dimitri Ustinov, listed
the principal threats to international peace and stability
from the Soviet viewpoint in late 1982. Predictably, the
United States was behind each one. Nothing new or
particularly noteworthy was presented in Ustinov's
presentation, but his list does provide some insight,
however, into Soviet perceptions of threats to the
correlation of forces as the START negotiations got under
way. His comments show Soviet concern with a wide range of
American military activities, not just nuclear modernization
programs: 53
(1) heavy U.S. military spending increases, with "the
lion's share of these colossal resources going to
the development of strategic offensive forces and
nuclear weapons of all kinds."
(2) President Reagan's decision to deploy 100 MX ICBMs;
(3) U.S. modernization of "Eurostrategic" systems,
including Pershing II missiles, cruise missiles,
military space systems, and increases in the NATO
arsenal of chemical weapons;
(4) improvements in American conventional force posture,
including increases in U.S. naval forces, efficiency
ST . .Dimitriy Ustinov in TASS International Service, 6
Dec. 1982, translated in Daily Report: Soviet Union . FBIS, 6
Dec. 1982, p. AA1.
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of conventional munitions, and perfection of the
network of military bases and other facilities
"aimed against the USSR and the whole socialist
community;
"
(5) formulation of a U.S. military doctrine of "direct
confrontation" aimed at achieving military supremacy
over the Soviet Union and the establishment of "U.S.
world overlordship;" 54
(6) large-scale exercises of U.S. and NATO land and
naval forces (which are "in effect rehearsals for
starting and waging nuclear war against the USSR and
the Warsaw Treaty") ; and,
(7) Reagan's new "crusade" against communism, which has
the aim of achieving U.S. world domination. 55
Additionally, the Soviets also deeply resented the
feeling that the Reagan administration had tacitly withdrawn
American recognition of the Soviet Union as an equal, and
they charged that the U.S. was out for nothing less than
"world domination," as the following quote by Ustinov makes
clear:
Despite the present objective realities, and in the
final analysis and despite all good sense, Washington is
as before doing everything it can in order to outdo the
Soviet Union in the military sense and at the same time
to give themselves full scope for winning world
domination.
This passage continues: "The doctrines include a
broad range of aggressive concepts — from a massive first
nuclear strike to the waging of 'limited' and 'protracted'
nuclear wars. But from the directives made public in the
United States, they amount to 'the destruction of socialism
as a sociopolitical system'."
55
"Its purpose is to politically isolate and
economically weaken the USSR and its friends."
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This aim is served by taking to an unprecedented
level the intensity of military preparations by
imperialism. 56
Finally, the Soviets warned that Reagan's strategic
modernization program would destroy the basis for arms
talks, saying that conclusion of a strategic arms accord was
"the key problem" in international relations, and would
determine the climate of world politics throughout the
1980s. The Soviets consistently made such claims at each
major initiative in Western defense policy since substantive
East-West negotiations began in the early 1960s. These
claims were made in conjunction with accusations that the
Reagan administration was trying to deal with the Soviet
CO
Union from "positions of strength." 30 The extent to which
specific U.S. systems constituted bargaining leverage in
Soviet eyes will be discussed in Chapter Five. Here it is
only necessary to establish Soviet views of these systems as
posing potential threats to the correlation of forces during
the START negotiations.
To provide the reader with some idea regarding how
the Soviet Union portrayed their perceptions of selected
Ustinov, cited in footnote 41.
"Soviet Says U.S. Moves Threaten Arms Accord," New
York Times
. 29 June 1982.
See, for example, the introduction to USSR Ministry
of Defense, Whence the Threat to Peace , (Moscow: Military
Publishing House, 1982), pp. 5-6.
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Reagan administration strategic modernization efforts,
Soviet views of the U.S. cruise missile program, the MX
missile development, and the Small ICBM (SICM) are briefly
reviewed in the next several paragraphs.
One principal source of threat to the Soviets'
cherished condition of "parity" in the early 1980s was U.S.
cruise missile programs. 59 For example, note the following
passage:
Washington's measures to achieve a military advantage in
strategic arms pose tremendous danger for the cause of
peace. One of the ways in which this plan is being
carried out is the large-scale production of strategic
cruise missiles of all types — land-, sea- and air-
based. 60
Soviet Chief of Staff Marshal Ogarkov reportedly stated
that:
[Deployment of American cruise missiles] not only would
disrupt the approximate balance of medium-range nuclear
systems that has been created in Europe but would also
lead to a sharp qualitative change in the political-
military situation since it would create the threat of a
surprise suppression of our strategic nuclear forces. ^
In an interview as spokesman for the Soviet military, Ma j
.
Gen. Viktor Starodubov stressed that U.S. intentions to
59 Raymond L. Garthoff, "Soviet Perspectives," Richard
K. Betts, ed., Cruise Missiles: Technology. Strategy,
Politics
.
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1981), pp. 339-358.
60 N. Fyodorov, "Cruise Missiles and the Arms Race,"
Pravda
.
7 Jan. 1982, p. 4, in Current Digest of the Soviet
Press , vol. 34, no. 1 (3 Feb. 1982), p. 10.
61 Quoted in Drew Middleton, "Cruise Missile a Major
Issue in Arms Talks," New York Times . 6 Dec. 1981.
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start a "cruise missile race" would undermine the value of
any strategic arms reduction agreement that might be signed
between the two sides. 2
According to Soviet commentaries, the U.S. intended
to "make up for the reduction in the number of warheads in
ballistic missiles through a massive deployment of long-
range cruise missiles with nuclear charges." Soviet
writings declared that the U.S. intended to place 4,000
cruise missiles on heavy bombers, thus perpetrating not only
a "considerable increase" in the number of "nuclear charges"
on carriers of strategic weapons, but a determined drive to
achieve clear superiority in air-launched cruise missiles. 63
The Soviets also claimed that the Pentagon was planning to
deploy "12,000 cruise missiles of various basing modes," of
which 8,000 were to be air-launched. 64 The number 8,000 is
apparently based on a Soviet calculation that the U.S. would
deploy 400 B-l and stealth bombers carrying 20 air-launched
cruise missiles each. 65
Flora Lewis, "Soviet Arms-Control Expert Asks
Nuclear Balance," New York Times . 2 Sept. 1982.
63
"The USSR and the U.S.: Two Approaches to Strategic
Arms Limitation and Reduction," Pravda 4 Jan. 1983, in
Current Digest of the Soviet Press , vol. 35, no. 1 (Feb.
1983), pp. 1-4; see also 2 Jan. 1983 Washington Post
article, which gives a preview of this Pravda editorial.
64
"Stuck Fast," Pravda
. 17 July 1983, p. 5, translated
in Daily Report: Soviet Union . FBIS, 18 July 1983, p. AA2
.
65 See Moscow World Service, 26 July 1983, translated
in Daily Report: Soviet Union . FBIS, 28 July 1983, p. AA1.
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Further, the Soviets appeared extremely concerned
about stealth cruise missiles, which were then on the
technological horizon. 66 Such radar-eluding weapons
threatened to render impotent and obsolete the extensive
Soviet air-defense network.
Soviet threat perceptions with regard to Reagan's
strategic modernization program often combined elements of
clear exaggeration and accurate insight. For example,
Soviet sources anticipated a deployment of 100 MX missiles
in upgraded Minuteman silos. 6 They attributed MX with 11
to 12 warheads each and yields of 500 to 600 kt. with a CEP
of 90 meters. This combination of accuracy, yield, and
MIRVed warheads indicated that it was intended as a "first-
strike" weapon. 68 MX would disrupt the counterforce balance
66 For a representative Soviet view see, A. Mozgovoy,
"Who Will Profit from the Cruise Missile?" in Soviet Press:
Selected Translations . No. 83-3 (May-June 1983) : 110-111.
6 Soviet perceptions of the MX and Small ICBM have
been concisely analyzed in Roger E. Peterson, et al., Open
Source Soviet Perspectives on Minuteman Silo Based
Peacekeeper and the Proposed Small Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile , (Englewood, CO: Science Applications,
Inc., 1 Oct. 1983). See also Jonathan R. Adelman, Soviet
Views of Some Political-Military Implications of the MX
Missile System , (Englewood, CO: Science Applications, Inc.,
1 Oct. 1982) . The following section draws primarily on
these analyses of Soviet sources.
It is worth noting that this combination of
accuracy, yield, and warheads by itself does not in fact
constitute a "first-strike" weapon. It is the basing of MX
in vulnerable Minuteman silos that makes it useable only in
a "first-strike" mode — since it cannot be expected to
survive a Soviet first-strike and retaliate effectively.
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between Soviet nuclear systems and U.S. Minuteman II,
Trident C-4 , cruise missiles, and Pershing II systems. MX
was also seen by the Soviets as an attempt to substantially
increase the U.S. strategic nuclear warhead inventory.
Finally, Soviet sources indicate that the development of MX
was a quantitative and qualitative improvement in U.S. ICBM
forces.
The Soviets denounced with particular vigor the
efforts of President Reagan to sell the MX missile to
Congress as a vital element in his arms reduction plans. '
The Soviets were very much aware of Congressional pressures
on Reagan to trade support for MX for administration
flexibility on arms control. 70 One Soviet source cited a
letter from Senators Nunn, Percy, and Cohen stressing that
they "will not vote for the deployment of the MX
intercontinental ballistic missiles until the administration
takes a new, more flexible position on the question of arms
control." 71
For Reagan's selling of MX as a vital element of his
arms reduction policy, see Ronald Reagan, "The MX: A Key to
Arms Reduction," Washington Post . 24 May 1983, p. 19. For
the Soviet criticism of these efforts, a representative
reference would be V. Soldatov, "On a Timely Subject:
Contrary to Common Sense," Izvestia . 27 May 1983, p. 4,
translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press , vol. 35,
no. 21 (22 June 1983), pp. 11-12.
See, for example, "Deep Concern," Pravda , 4 May
1983, p. 5, translated in Current Digest of the Soviet
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According to a 1983 Science Applications study,
certain ambiguities exist in Soviet perceptions of the Small
ICBM (SICM) program. This possibly indicates some doubt in
Soviet minds as to whether or when the missile would be
deployed:
Areas not addressed in Soviet sources include details on
research, development (including possible contractors)
and warhead accuracy and explosive power. Most
importantly, Soviet authors have not defined the role or
mission of the SICM. There is no mention of a first-
strike capability or a possible role for the missile in
a secure strategic reserve. . . . American defense
policy being as it is, the SICM could assume new
unpredicted dimensions or disappear altogether. This
appears to be the Soviet judgement at this time which is
reflected in the paucity of information on the new
weapons systems. 2
Soviet sources apparently ascribe to the SICM such
characteristics as an 8,000 mile range, 15 ton overall
weight, and a single warhead. Early Soviet sources
predicted 3500 would be deployed by the United States, but
later sources reduced that figure to "several hundred."
Soviet commentaries also foresaw a mobile basing and
criticized this a dangerous and destabilizing (even though




These perceptions of Reagan's strategic modernization
program reflect certain judgments about the intentions of
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the United States government. The Soviets accused the
United States of seeking to use arms control to achieve a
condition of superiority over the Soviet Union. In essence,
the Soviet Union was accusing the United States of having
abandoned the commitment to the "principle of equality"
codified in the Basic Principles agreement of 1972. 74 The
Soviets charged that the U.S. position at the Geneva talks
was trying to force the Soviet Union to disarm unilaterally
while allowing the United States to continue to buildup its
nuclear forces, and proceed unhampered with its modest
strategic nuclear force modernization efforts. This was
clearly a Soviet tactic for discrediting the U.S. position
in START.
American arms control policy was seen by the Soviets
as one avenue of threat to the condition of parity they
claimed existed when the Reagan administration entered
office. Soon after negotiations began, Gromyko accused the
U.S. of basing its START policy on a desire to upset the
strategic status quo: "Its position on this question is
based on a desire to change the alignment of forces in the
"Basic Principles of Relations Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, May 29, 1972," in Coit D. Blacker and Gloria
Duffy, eds., International Arms Control: Issues and
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military field in favor of the United States of America." 5
Of course, Soviet criticisms to this effect were intended to
reduce pressures on the Soviet Union to agree to such
measures, and to make the Soviet START proposals appear more
reasonable in comparison.
The following Pravda editorial is interesting for its
representative criticism of the Reagan approach to START,
and for its indignant defense of the heavy Soviet reliance
on large offensive ICBMs, which it characterizes as the
backbone of the Soviet Union's "strategic defensive might":
The incompatibility of the selective American
approach with the principle of equality and equal
security is manifest with special clarity in the
American side's proposal for dealing with the Soviet
ICBMs. An analysis shows that if the whole set of
American proposals were accepted, the Soviet side would
have to dismantle more than 90% of all its ICBMs, which,
as is known, are the basis of the USSR's strategic
defensive might. This, it turns out, is the aim of the
American plan — by hook or by crook, to achieve a
unilateral weakening of the USSR's defense potential.
At the same time, the US, by virtue of the same
unilaterally drawn-up proposals, would receive an
opportunity to significantly increase the number of
warheads on its own ICBMs and to continue the
implementation of the programs for a strategic weapon
buildup that it has already projected.
Thus, the American approach — and this can be seen
in literally all of its elements — constitutes not a
path to reaching a mutually acceptable accord but a
plan, cloaked in the form of proposals for 'reductions,'
for the USSR's unilateral disarmament, thereby ensuring
75
"A. A. Gromyko's Press Conference in New York,"
Pravda, 23 June 1982, p. 5, excerpted in Current Digest of
the Soviet Press . 34, 25 (21 July 1982): 6-7.
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for the US its bygone superiority in the strategic
field. 76
The Kremlin was sensitive to what it perceived as
American determination to upset the existing "favorable"
trend in the correlation of forces. The Soviets recognized
several potential threats to the correlation of forces that
was established in the 1970s with the help of SALT I and II.
In addition to the U.S. approach to START, one of those
threats was the U.S. military-technological challenge:
The Kremlin has been and continues to be concerned with
the possibility that the United States might achieve a
major technological breakthrough in the strategic arms
race for which the Soviets would have no credible
response in a timely fashion. This concern with U.S.
technological virtuosity is suggestive of Soviet
expectations that they could not win an all-out
strategic arms race. 77
The Soviets have long been sensitive to new weapons
that might upset the balance of power, as this 1972 passage
from a Soviet book demonstrates:
The appearance of new types of weapons could seriously
affect the balance of military forces between the two
world systems. . . . Far-reaching international
"The USSR and the U.S.: Two Approaches to Strategic
Arms Limitation and Reduction," Pravda . 2 Jan. 1983, p. 4,
translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press , vol. 35,
no. 1 (2 Feb. 1983), p. 3. (pp. 1-4.)
Laird and Herspring, p. 88.
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consequences could arise in the event that one side
possessed qualitatively new strategic weapons. 78
This sensitivity extended to a fear of the U.S. regaining
its erstwhile status of superiority over the Soviet Union,
even if momentarily — a kind of "window of vulnerability"
in reverse:
Even a relatively marginal and brief superiority by the
United States over the Soviet Union in the development
of certain 'old' or 'new' types and systems of weapons
could significantly increase the strategic effectiveness
of American military force, exert a destabilizing
influence on the international political situation
throughout the entire world, and create very unfavorable
consequences for the cause of peace and socialism.
Robbin F. Laird and Dale R. Herspring have identified
two Significant elements of the U.S. strategic challenge in
the Soviet view as follows:
Soviet commentary does reveal two significant
expressions of concern about the nature of the U.S.
strategic challenge. First, Soviets note with
admiration the inventiveness of U.S. strategic force
structure development. The United States has clearly
been seen as a dynamic actor in shaping the nature of
contemporary warfare. Second, the Soviets especially
emphasize the high quality of U.S. scientific and
technological capabilities. These capabilities are
perceived to be a major force generating the continued
U.S. ability to develop strategic power.
78 V.M. Kulish, ed. , Voennaia Sila i Mezhdunarodnye
Otnosheniia , (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1972) , p,
222, cited in Ibid., pp. 87-88.
79 Ibid .
80 Laird and Herspring, p. 107.
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In a 1981 study of Soviet elite opinion, the U.S.
International Communication Agency reportedly found an
"extremely great respect — even awe" for American
technological and scientific prowess. According to a
newspaper account, the study also found that:
Despite the Soviet Union's claims that it can match
whatever the United States can do in the arms race or
elsewhere, many Russians simply do not believe that. .
On the contrary, it was found, popular Soviet suspicions
tend to run in the opposite direction — that the UnitedQ "I
States can perform superhuman tasks. -L
The study itself is quoted as saying:
This feeling translates for most Soviets into . . . the
belief that if the U.S. wants to, it can change the
military balance in its favor almost overnight — that
it can pull some weapon/rabbit out of its technological
hat at any moment and leave the Soviet Union far behind
in the arms race. 82
Only one class of threats were emerging suitable for
an arms control response outside the framework of SALT, and
thus warranting renewed Soviet interests in negotiations —
U.S. INF deployments. The principal threat to the
correlation of forces (from the Soviet point of view) during
the START negotiations was U.S. INF deployment plans, and
Gregory Guroff and Steven Grant, Soviet Elites:
World Views and Perceptions of the U.S. , (Washington, D.C.:
Office of Research, The International Communication Agency,
1981) , reported and summarized in Murrey Marder, "Soviets
View U.S. as Obstructionist," Washington Post , 25 Oct. 1981
82 Ibid.
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this had profound implications for Soviet interests in
START.
IV. INF AS THE PRINCIPAL THREAT
DURING START NEGOTIATIONS
The cetnral hypothesis of this dissertation is that
the Soviet Union was relatively more interested in
negotiating issues of strategic arms reductions than
actually agreeing to such reductions. One line of reasoning
supportive of this hypothesis is that during the course of
the START negotiations, the Soviets made progress toward a
strategic arms reduction agreement contingent upon Western
forthcomingness in the INF negotiations. Clearly,
resolution of the INF issue had a higher priority in the
Soviet view than did START. 83
What is important to realize concerning Soviet threat
perceptions of NATO's INF modernization is that they reveal
the substance of Soviet strategic priorities and objectives.
From the Soviet point of view there were real and
substantive reasons to fear that NATO's efforts to deploy
Pershing II and cruise missiles would begin to undercut
Soviet nuclear hegemony in Europe. For example, the Soviets
were concerned with the potential for American circumvention
of any future START limits or reductions. They had
expressed such fears in the SALT negotiations, insisting on
83
"Soviets Add New Twist to Talk Demands," Los Angeles
Times . 2 Jan. 1983.
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inserting a "non-circumvention" clause in the SALT
agreements (i.e. article IX of the ABM Treaty), and
demanding the right to compensation for increases in NATO
allied submarine strengths beyond the levels provided for in
the SALT I agreement. 84
Soviet suggestions for merging INF and START are
further evidence that the Soviets viewed the issues
discussed in the two talks as strategically related. 85 The
Soviets continued to make such suggests even after walking
out of START and INF.
After outlining Soviet START proposals, Pravda made
the following observation:
In putting forward the above-said proposals, the Soviet
Union considers the fact that the USA has at its
disposal forward-based nuclear means deployed in close
proximity to the borders of the USSR and its allies.
These weapons are of a strategic character for the USSR.
As from its side they are not balanced by anything (we
do not have such means close to the territory of the
USA) , in reducing the number of ICBM's, ballistic
missiles in submarines and heavy bombers, the proportion
of the American forward-based nuclear means would
steadily increase in the strategic balance of the sides.
Therefore, the Soviet proposals presuppose that in
a mutual reduction of strategic nuclear forces, the USA
will, at least, not build up its other nuclear means,
84 See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms
Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of
Negotiations . (Washington, D.C., 1982), pp. 141 and 157.
For Soviet suggestions late in the negotiations that
START and INF be merged, see Baltimore Sun , 4 October 1983.
86 Christian Science Monitor, 20 Dec. 1983.
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which are capable of reaching objectives in the
SovietUnion's territory. Failing which, the USA would
receive a channel for by-passing and, as a matter of
fact, undermining the very fundamentals of a future
agreement. '
Evidence that INF was the principal threat to the
correlation of forces as it had developed by the beginning
of the 1980s can be found in number of sources. These
include Soviet statements to that effect, the fact that the
Soviets linked their START position to progress in the INF
negotiations, and the fact that other U.S. weapon programs
were either running into trouble domestically in Congress
(thus obviating the Soviet need to address them at the
bargaining table) , or were in the early stages of research
and development.
NATO's INF modernization plans also posed substantial
Soviet incentives for negotiating arms control limits
because other U.S. programs were arguably covered by the
SALT I and II agreements. Certainly, the deployment of
Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe was much further
along at the time the START negotiations convened than other
potential sources of U.S. bargaining leverage, such as the
MX missile, D-5 SLBM, or B-l bomber. 88
87 Pravda , 4 Jan. 1983.
88 Discussed at greater length in the following
chapter.
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Also, as noted below, the seriousness with which the
Soviets threatened counter-measures to NATO's INF deployment
may be regarded as further evidence that Soviet INF threat
perceptions reflected the genuine concern of Soviet military
planners. This deployment threatened both to pose a
military threat to Soviet objectives in Europe and to
strengthen NATO's political unity, proving that it could
stand up to the Soviet Union. 89
It seems likely that the Soviet Union's previous
success in defeating the neutron bomb deployment may also
have encouraged the Soviets to engage the West in an arms
control effort for potentially beneficial side-effects that
would derive from the pressure on Western governments to
ensure an environment conducive to "constructive"
negotiations.
While the West generally blamed the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan for the final collapse of a detente which
had, in any case, been largely illusory since 1976, the
Soviets placed the blame detente 's demise on NATO's December
1979 decision to deploy GLCMs and Pershing lis in Europe.
This decision, in the Soviet view, sparked a new "crisis in
detente"
.
In considering Soviet threat perceptions of NATO's
INF modernization efforts, it is important to appreciate
89 Garner, p. 7.
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that the Soviets almost certainly exaggerated the INF threat
in order to dissuade certain European NATO members from
deploying them on their territory. They did this by
maximizing the likely military effect of Western GLCM and
Pershing II systems deployed in Western Europe. However,
there are important reasons for concluding that the Soviets
actually perceived NATO's INF modernization as the most
serious threat to the "favorable" correlation of forces
established through arms control agreements with the United
States, and through expansive Soviet weapon programs.
Certainly, the NATO INF threat was the most likely to
materialize in the near future since U.S. strategic
modernization programs were still several years off.
The Soviet Union began its arms control offensive
against NATO's INF even before the December 1979 decision to
pursue negotiation and deployment options simultaneously.
In an attempt at conciliatory preemption, Leonid Brezhnev,
speaking in Berlin on 6 October 1979, offered a reduction in
"medium-range nuclear means" deployed in the Western USSR,
"but only if NATO were first to renounce its plans for
additional nuclear deployments." 90
The Soviet Union kept up the arms control pressure
for Western compromises on INF deployment. Eventually,
Brezhnev would even add such "sweeteners" as unilateral
90 See TASS, 6 Oct. 1979
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troop withdrawals in conjunction with calls for progress in
the testudinous MBFR negotiations.
When the West announced the dual track decision,
coupling deployment with calls for arms control, the Soviets
insisted at first that the basis for constructive
negotiations had been destroyed. This position was to
change twice during the negotiations. It first changed in a
July 1980 Brezhnev meeting with Chancellor Schmidt. At that
time, the Soviet precondition that NATO suspend the planned
deployments before negotiations started was dropped, to be
replaced by allowing negotiations to proceed but on the
condition that the deployments be rescinded before any
agreement was signed.
Western analysts describe Soviet perceptions of the
NATO INF threat in the following terms:
[Cjruise missiles deployed on land in Europe raise some
distinct and additional problems for the Soviets. One
is that GLCMs deployed in Germany could increase the
likelihood that any conventional conflict in Central
Europe could escalate rapidly to nuclear strikes against
the USSR. Another problem is emotional in character for
the Soviets — Germany would be the source of such
strikes. Third, the Soviets might be concerned that
conventionally-armed variants of long-range GLCMs could
in the future help NATO out of its long-standing nuclear
dilemma.
But Soviet concerns about the INF deployments are
clearly not confined to GLCMS. The minimal warning time
provided by the Pershing II ballistic missile puts
Soviet early warning systems under greater stress than
they faced previously. . . . even if the Pershings do
not now have sufficient range, they could in the future
be upgraded in range and number (from the currently
planned 108) and could then pose a serious threat to
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Soviet command and control facilities and other time-
urgent targets in the western USSR. 91
This analysis identifies most, but not all, of the
Soviet concerns with NATO's INF modernization plans. There
were four basic facets, or elements, to Soviet INF threat
perceptions reflected in Soviet literature. Of course,
these do not necessarily reflect actual Soviet concerns with
Pershing lis and GLCMs. Some of those concerns were
mentioned in the passage above. But what needs to be
stressed here is that the Soviets genuinely saw these
systems as real threats to the correlation of forces that
favored their strategic deterrence requirements. The four
basic elements of Soviet commentaries on NATO INF
deployments included the following assertions: 92
1) The Pershings and Cruise Missiles will give NATO
fundamentally new weapon capabilities;
2) They will circumvent the existing inter-continental
equilibrium embodied in SALT II;
3) They will destroy the existing equilibrium in
Europe
;
4) The NATO decision reflects a US strategy to
"Europeanize" and fight a limited nuclear war.
Q
1
. . .Robert J. Einhorn, Negotiating from Strength:
Leverage in U.S. -Soviet Arms Control Negotiations , (New
York: Praeger, 1985), p. 17.
These four Soviet threat perception themes are drawn
from Garner, p. 12, and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, Soviet Propaganda Campaign Against NATO ,
(Washington, D.C.: ACDA, Oct. 1983).
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An analysis of these four themes demonstrates that
Soviet concern with NATO's INF modernization program was, t
a large extent, substantive (from the Soviet point of view)
Although Soviet commentaries on the subject were mingled
with blandishments and often had an extortionary character,
the Soviets had reason to believe that Pershing and cruise
missiles would in some way upset the strategic situation
they had carefully cultivated in Europe, one that accorded
them clear nuclear superiority, and, in the case of
intermediate-range nuclear weapons, virtual hegemony.
Soviet threat perception themes regarding NATO's INF
deployment furnish evidence of the substance of Soviet
concerns with what must in all fairness be termed a modest
(and militarily questionable) response to Soviet nuclear
hegemony in Europe. They are elaborated below.
1. The Pershings and cruise missiles will give NATO
fundamentally new weapon capabilities . Soviet literature
claimed that NATO INF deployment would eventually involve
3000 warheads on over 1000 missiles. The Soviets insisted
that this would give NATO fundamentally new weapon
capabilities, upsetting the existing correlation of forces.
This argument was put forward to counter the NATO argument
that PIIs/GLCMs were made necessary by the 'new' SS-20
capabilities. Soviet literature claimed that these 'new'
capabilities consisted of increased range, strike speed,
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accuracy, and survivability. J It was further claimed that
NATO INF deployment would give the U.S. substantially
increased strategic capabilities against the USSR. But
perhaps the greatest Soviet concern in terms of fundamental
changes to Western strategic capabilities was the fear that
INF would "increase the possibility of West Germany
acquiring 'strategic' missile forces." 94
The Soviets claimed all along that the SS-20 was a
'reaction' made necessary by American actions, as amply
illustrated in the passage below by Soviet leader Brezhnev.
Brezhnev makes three points. First, Soviet weapon
deployments are reactions to NATO initiatives, and are
necessitated by strictly defensive motivations. Second, a
condition of parity characterizes the East-West
Eurostrategic balance. Third, as far as the Soviet Union is
concerned, NATO's intermediate range nuclear forces are
strategic in nature.
Now put yourself in our position. Could we watch
impartially as one surrounded us on all sides with
military bases, as a growing number of carriers of
atomic death in different parts of Europe were aimed at
Soviet towns and factories, regardless in what shape: as
sea- or land-based missiles, bombers or the like? The
Soviet Union had to build weapons to defend itself, not
to threaten anybody, Europe least of all. We built them
and stationed them on our own territory and in an amount
that counterbalances the arsenal of those who have
declared themselves our potential opponents.
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If one counts as medium-range weapons on NATO's side
the main nuclear missile and air force units in
territories of West European countries and waters
bordering on Europe that can reach targets in the Soviet
Union — that is, those with a range of a thousand
kilometers and more (of course, below the
intercontinental range) — as well as the Soviet arms of
corresponding range stationed in the European part of
the U.S.S.R., there is at present in Europe an
approximate parity between NATO and the U.S.S.R. in such
weapons.
. . . the targets of the American rockets are
strategic objects on the territory of the U.S.S.R. and
that the new American carriers can be used as first-
strike weapons.' 95
Ustinov further reinforces Brezhnev's arguments cited
above by characterizing the Soviet position in the following
terms:
The United States is making a determined effort to
upgrade NATO arms by means of new medium-range nuclear
missiles. Realization of this plan would mean a
considerable upsetting in favor of the West of the
approximate equilibrium of forces that has been
established here and would create on the continent and
on a global scale a qualitatively new military strategic
situation. 96
2. NATO's INF deployments will circumvent the
existing inter-continental equilibrium embodied in SALT
95
"Excerpts from Brezhnev's Printed Answers," New York
Times . 4 Nov. 1981.
96
"Extracts from Remarks by Soviet Minister of Defense
Ustinov," Moscow Domestic Service
. 6 Nov. 1981, translated
in Daily Report: Soviet Union , FBIS, 9 Nov. 1981, pp. 07-
011; also reprinted in Documents on Disarmament, 1981 ,
(Washington, D.C.), p. 545.
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I_I.
97 In connection with the argument that NATO INF
deployment would circumvent existing arms agreements, the
Soviets declared that SALT II would be of little or no value
(to them) if NATO INF deployments were to go through.
The Soviets insisted that NATO INF deployments would
compensated the U.S. for reductions that were ti have been
carried out under SALT II. Some Soviet commentaries went so
far as to suggest that NATO INF deployments would be a
violation of SALT II, or at least that NATO INF deployments
would undercut the importance of SALT II to Soviet security.
3. NATO / s INF deployments will destroy the existing
equilibrium in Europe . 98 Another prominent theme in the
Soviet literature on NATO's INF deployments was that it
would destroy the existing strategic situation in Europe
characterized by the Soviets as "rough parity" or
"equilibrium." There were three reasons the Soviets
frequently cited to support this charge:
1) according to the Soviet count, NATO's planned INF
deployment would give NATO nuclear superiority in
Central Europe; 99
2) NATO's argument that its modernization program is
necessary to offset Soviet deployment of SS-20s is
spurious, since Soviet SS-20s "are intended to
Q7 Semeyko, "Washington's 'Eurostrategic' Stake,"
Novoye Vremya
.
4 July 1980; and, "Strategy of Parity and
'Eurostrategy ' of Superiority," Co-existence , 17, 2 (Oct.
1980): 158-59; cited by Garner, p. 20.
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fulfill the same tasks as the medium-range missiles
they replace . . . and cannot serve as a pretext fo:
the deployment of new types of American nuclear
missile weapons in the region." 100
3) Soviet forces are equal to the existing British and
rench forces, and additional U.S. forces will give
NATO incremental superiority. 101
The Soviets reiterated charges that NATO's INF plans
were a sinister U.S. plot to acquire nuclear superiority by
stratagem. The following citation is typical of Soviet
commentaries on this score:
The belligerent circles of the United States and NATO
have adopted a policy of subverting the military-
strategic balance which has been brought about. They
are striving to achieve military superiority over us,
and are trying to impose a state of siege on the
countries of socialism to roll back the forces of
national and social liberation. 102
The Soviets repeatedly claimed that NATO intended to
acquire nuclear superiority, and that deployment of Pershinc
and cruise missiles would dramatically alter the existing
strategic balance in Europe:
Ibid., p. 24. Garner cites Lt. Gen. Petrov,
"Hopeless Course: The US and NATO Attempt to Disrupt
Military Equilibrium," Pravda . 16 June 1980.
101 Garner, p. 25
102
"Extracts from Remarks by Soviet Minister of
Defense Ustinov," Moscow Domestic Service, 6 Nov. 1981,
translated in Daily Report: Soviet Union , FBIS, 9 Nov. 1981,
pp. 07-011; also reprinted in Documents on Disarmament,
1981 . (Washington, D.C.), p. 544.
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The dangerous plan for the deployment of new American
nuclear missiles on the territory of Western Europe . .
. would substantially change the strategic situation, on
the continent. Their objective is to upset the existing
balance of forces in Europe and to try to ensure
military superiority for the NATO bloc. 103
4. The NATO decision reflects a US strategy to
/ Europeanize / and fight a limited nuclear war . The United
States not only sought to upset a strategic balance that had
been carefully crafted through decades of effort, but the
United States also aimed to 'Europeanize' any future U.S.-
Soviet nuclear war, and limit damage to the European
continent. This was the fourth theme of Soviet INF threat
perceptions, and it obviously sought to exploit European
anxieties concerning U.S. security guarantees to its NATO
allies.
Soviet commentaries incorporating this theme also
suggested that the U.S. would seek to win a nuclear war by
augmenting its own first-strike capability with deployments
of INF weapons in Europe, and that the U.S. was determined
to turn Western Europe "into a launchpad for U.S. first-
strike weapons." Soviet commentators even cited
Presidential Directive 59 (President Carter's 1980 nuclear
103 Brezhnev in Pravda , 7 Oct. 1979, cited in Vernon V
Aspaturian, "Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of
Forces," Problems of Communism , 29, 3 (May-June 1983), p. 7.
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1
deterrence policy) as supporting such a conclusion. 04 One
Western analysis noted that:
[T]he Soviets allege that the US seeks to introduce
sufficient preemptive counterforce systems into Europe
so that their combination of strike speed, accuracy and
range could be critical to a strategic disarming strike
against the Soviet Union. 105
In this regard, the following polemic is also of interest:
It comes out that the possibility to use nuclear weapons
in the 'European theatre of military operation' is being
elevated to the status of a military doctrine. As if
Europe, where hundreds of millions of people live, were
already doomed to become a theatre of military
operations. As if it were a box of little tin figurines
which do not deserve a better fate than being melted in
the flames of nuclear explosions. 06
Also in connection with the theme that the U.S.
planned to fight a limited nuclear war in Europe and to
pursue a policy of first-strike, the Soviets claimed that
NATO INF deployment would reduce 'warning times' and
threaten large areas of Soviet territory. 107 The following
passage provides another example of Soviet statements
alleging U.S. intentions to make NATO INF modernization part
of a first-strike policy, and seeks to develop support for





"Address by Soviet President Brezhnev: Medium-Range
Nuclear Forces," TASS , 23 Nov. 1981, reprinted in Documents
on Disarmament 1981 , p. 618.
107 Ibid.
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Soviet efforts to extract a no-first-use (of nuclear
weapons) from the United States:
Plans for a first nuclear strike against the Soviet
Union and other Warsaw Treaty countries are being
hatched in Washington. A fresh confirmation of this was
a report by the American television company NBC
concerning the existence of a "top-secret report"
prepared by the U.S. Congress. The cynical conclusion
made in this report is that the U.S. Armed Forces in
Western Europe do not allegedly have enough conventional
arms for a war with the Soviet Union — and this is
said about the American Army which is armed to the teeth
in this region — that [the] United States will have to
use tactical nuclear weapons at an early stage of a
military conflict. So that is the reason which
Washington flatly refuses to follow the Soviet Union's
example and pledge not to make first use of nuclear
weapons. The impression is that the USA wants to be
free to make a first nuclear strike with all means at
its disposal and use Western Europe, because of its
proximity to the Soviet Union, as a convenient staging
ground for such an attack and, accordingly, as a target
for a retaliatory blow, in the hope that Americans,
lying overseas, will not suffer. 1 8
In their propaganda offensive against NATO's INF
deployment, the Soviets cited Western media reports. A
Pravda article cited a Los Angeles Times article by U.S.
General B. Rogers to the effect that "the North Atlantic
block is prepared to use nuclear weapons in the event of a
military conflict and, moreover, to do so first." 109
108 Ivan Ablamov, TASS, 15 July 1983, translated in
Daily Report: Soviet Union , FBIS, 18 July 1983, p. AA8
.
109 V. Dobkov, "Rejoinder: Rogers Spells It Out,"
Pravda , 14 July 1983, p. 5, translated in Daily Report:
Soviet Union , FBIS, 18 July 1983, p. AA10.
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There is further evidence to suggest that Soviet INF
threat perceptions were reflections of a genuine strategic
concern with priority over intercontinental-range nuclear
weapons. Central Europe has traditionally been the focal
point of Soviet geographic attentions, especially in a
security context. 110 Soviets military planners have
historically relied on a 'Europe first' strategy by which
the Soviet Union hoped to deter American aggression by
holding U.S. allies in Europe hostage to a nuclear
retaliation. Soviet nuclear weapon deployments began with,
and continued to emphasize, a European orientation. 111 The
persistent Soviet concern with 'Forward Based Systems' [FBS
has been noted earlier and is a symptom of this European
orientation. The Soviets began SALT I, SALT II, INF, and
START negotiations with calls for restricting U.S. FBS.
Also, an important long-term Soviet objective in
European has been to "detach Western Europe from its
For treatments of this theme, see: Coit Dennis
Blacker, "The Soviet Perception of European Security," in
Derek Leebaert, ed., European Security: Prospects for the
1980s . (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1979)
, pp. 137-161; and
Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe. 1945-1970 ,
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).
111 Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe. 1945-
1970
. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 40-42.
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dependence on the United States, especially where defense is
concerned, and to make it dependent on the USSR." 112
Further evidence of the substantive character of
Soviet INF threat perceptions is expressed in Soviet threats
of countermeasures. There are several reasons why, in the
Soviet view, NATO's INF modernization plans warranted an
arms control response that eclipsed Soviet interests in a
START agreement. First, the Soviets had very successfully
addressed their European concerns in SALT I and II with non-
circumvention clauses and unilateral statements. The
international environment of detente and relaxation of
tensions characterizing much of the 1970s reinforced the
natural Western reluctance to expend resources on military
forces, especially nuclear forces. This environment was
promoted both by arms agreements and by on-going
negotiations.
Second, the Soviets may have also calculated that
NATO's INF plans were most vulnerable to an arms control
solution prior to their deployment, and this may have
accounted for their priority over START. The Soviets were
experienced in playing to West European audiences, and it
was that audience which could most effectively bring
unilateral pressure to bear on the U.S. and other Western
112 Richard Pipes, "Detente: Moscow's View," in Richard
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governments to accede to Soviet offers for arms control
settlements.
Third, arms control was a Soviet method for
increasing the political cost to Western governments
desiring to proceed with NATO's INF deployments. David
Yost, for example, has argued that the Soviet campaign
against NATO's INF modernization plans appeared to have
failed with the deployment of GLCMs in November 1983, but
that it may have ultimately yielded three successes for
Moscow by contributing to: (1) the polarization of West
European political parties; (2) the deligitimization of
NATO's transatlantic security consensus; and, (3) the
socialization of the West European successor generation
toward greater neutralism. 113
V. CONCLUSIONS
An important incentive for Soviet interests in
negotiating issues of strategic arms reductions with the
United States in the 1981 to 1983 time frame involved Soviet
perceptions of threats to the correlation of forces. The
Soviets entered the 1980s satisfied that a combination of
arms control constraints and its own modernization programs
had established a favorable trend in the correlation of
113 David S. Yost, "The Soviet Campaign Against INF In
West Germany," in Soviet Strategic Deception , eds. Brian D.




SOVIET THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND NEGOTIATING INCENTIVES
forces that meant the strategic balance was evolving in a
manner that facilitated greater flexibility in the
achievement of Soviet foreign and military objectives.
Among the many potential threats to that correlation
of forces, in the Soviet view, were key elements of Reagan's
strategic modernization program and NATO's plans to deploy
new generation INF systems. Of these two general areas,
clearly NATO's INF deployment intentions were the most
grave. Soviet perceptions of the INF threat underly its
indirect motives in negotiating strategic arms reductions,
as well as its more direct motives in the INF negotiations
themselves.
Knowing that the U.S. placed highest priority on
resolving the vulnerability of its strategic nuclear forces
to the superior Soviet ICBM arsenal by negotiating
reductions in offensive intercontinental strength, the
Soviets sought to exploit this leverage by pressuring the
West to address its own greatest concern — INF deployment
plans.
In the Soviet view, NATO's INF deployment plans
apparently threatened the correlation of forces in several
ways. First, they would grant NATO fundamentally new and
improved capabilities in terms of weapon prelaunch
survivability, increased range, greater response speed, and
upgraded accuracies. This combination threatened an
incremental reduction in the Soviet nuclear advantage in
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Europe. Second, a principal Soviet objective in SALT had
been to place constraints on the U.S. option of
circumventing restrictions on intercontinental weapons by
placing the Soviet Union in an analogous dilemma with
shorter ranger nuclear weapons placed nearer Soviet borders
in Western Europe. NATO's INF deployment plans represented
a potential realization of that concern, and consequently
downgraded the value of strategic arms limitations to the
USSR. Third, the Soviets insisted that parity in nuclear
weapons existed in Europe. Additional NATO weapons would
upset that equilibrium.
Perhaps the greatest threat posed by NATO's INF
deployment plans did not concern the military dimension of
the correlation of forces. After all, NATO intended to
deploy only 574 warheads — a fraction of the SS-20
inventory. Moreover, NATO withdrew 1400 warheads in
conjunction with its modernization plans, representing a net
disarmament. NATO also planned to spread its INF deployment
out over several years, maximizing the Soviet opportunity tc
counter it with additional weapons of its own or by
exploiting the opposition of Western peace movements to NATO
nuclear policies. In strictly military terms, NATO's INF
modernization (by design) posed a relatively modest threat
to the Soviet Union. It must be concluded, therefore, that,
in the Soviet view, the greatest threat was not military,
but political. Successful implementation of its INF
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modernization plans would signal Allied unity, substantiate
American leadership of the Atlantic Alliance, sanction the
legitimacy of American security interests in Europe, and
strengthen the resolve of West European governments to
resist Soviet blandishments — all of which undermine Soviet
objectives in Europe.
The greatest threat to the correlation of forces was,
therefore, primarily political in nature. A political
threat is best met by a political instrument. Initiating
and sustaining an arms control process offered, in the
Soviet view, the best chance of eliminating the INF threat
at the lowest cost (in both military and political terms) to
the Soviet Union. This conclusion substantiates the
hypothesis that Soviet interests in START were best served
by arms control negotiations rather than agreements.
- 169 -
CHAPTER THREE
U.S. AND SOVIET BARGAINING POSITIONS IN START
This dissertation has sought to establish that the
context of Soviet START policy was not conducive to a
strategic arms reduction agreement, and that Soviet
political and foreign policy objectives were effectively
served by START negotiations even though these negotiations
made little progress toward an actual agreement. The Soviet
assessment of the correlation of forces did not warrant a
strategic arms reduction agreement, since the correlation
was clearly in the Soviet favor and a strategic arms
reduction agreement (at least one that was even nominally
mutually beneficial) would have upset the favorable balance
(and trends in that balance) that the Soviets had with
determination achieved over the previous 15 years. Further
militating against the achievement of a START agreement in
this time period was the abject deficiency in U.S.
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bargaining leverage in those categories of armament under
negotiation in START (e.g. large land-based ICBMs and throw-
weight) .
The START experience proves the adage that an arms
agreement will only reflect the actual military balance (or
the likely very near-term military balance) existing between
the given parties at the time of agreement. Soviet
agreement to Reagan's START proposals would have
unquestionably promoted strategic stability as understood in
the West. That is, after making the proposed reductions in
nuclear warheads, neither side would have possessed an
ability to undertake a disarming first strike against the
other with high confidence. Stability, as understood by the
Soviet Union, resides in the ability to dominate an opponent
at all levels of potential conflict. The U.S. could not
have seriously expected (and probably did not expect) the
Soviets to make a disproportionate sacrifice in strategic
nuclear assets for the sake of enshrining Western principles
of strategic stability not shared by Moscow.
The previous chapter looked at Soviet perceptions of
the correlation of forces and various threats to the
strategic relationship the Soviets had labored to establish
through arms control arrangements with the United States and
by unilateral initiatives of their own. It concluded that
the Soviets saw in Reagan's strategic modernization program
a sufficient cause for concern to warrant attempting to
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regulate, delay, or thwart U.S. efforts by subjecting those
programs to negotiation, while phrasing their proposals in
such a manner as to leave recent Soviet modernization
efforts relatively unrestricted.
This chapter argues that, while President Reagan's
efforts to initiate a strategic force modernization program
provided the Soviet Union with sufficient incentive to seek
negotiations, the U.S. lacked the substantive bargaining
leverage to interest the Soviets in an actual strategic arms
reduction agreement. As discussed below, there is always a
trade-off in seeking arms control outcomes. In attempting
to maximize the pay-off in terms of restrictions on U.S.
systems the Soviets try to pay as little as possible in
restrictions on their own systems.
There are two dimensions to bargaining leverage as
developed by Robert J. Einhorn. 1 From the Soviet
perspective, there is the question of which U.S. systems the
Soviets would like to limit, ban, or otherwise restrict.
Another dimension is, of course, which systems of their own
the Soviets are willing to negotiate away in exchange for
limits on U.S. programs. This chapter is therefore divided
into two parts. The first part examines the relative
bargaining position of the United States in the START
Robert J. Einhorn, Negotiating From Strength:
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negotiations from 1981 to 1983, including an evaluation of
Reagan's strategic modernization program and the extent to
which it provided the U.S. with bargaining leverage toward
an agreement on strategic arms reduction. This will also
include a discussion of the domestic pressures on the Reagan
administration, and some judgments on how this may have
undercut the bargaining leverage of the United States, and
hence the ability of the U.S. to secure a strategic arms
reduction agreements on favorable terms. The second part
will examine how Soviet military objectives and priorities
affect Soviet willingness to consider arms control
restrictions on their own weapon systems.
While the previous chapter sought to establish the
relationship between elements of Soviet threat perceptions
in general — and Soviet perceptions of the correlation of
forces in particular — and Soviet desires and objectives
for engaging the U.S. in strategic arms reduction talks,
this chapter will seek to demonstrate that American nuclear
weapon programs as perceived by the Soviets constituted
insufficient bargaining leverage to interest the Soviets in
an accord providing for substantial cuts in offensive
nuclear forces along the lines first suggested by President
Reagan in his 1982 Eureka address.
There were three basic sources of disincentives for
Soviet interest in an accord providing for deep reductions
in offensive nuclear strength. First, as was shown in the
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previous chapter on Soviet threat perceptions, NATO's INF
modernization program constituted the graver, more immediate
threat to Soviet interests than did any of the key elements
of Reagan's strategic modernization program. NATO's
contemplated INF assets posed the potential for U.S.
circumvention of any limits or reductions in
intercontinental range forces by making up for cuts in long-
range weapons by covering the same targets with larger
deployments of intermediate-range forces closer to Soviet
borders. Until that loophole (from the Soviet perspective)
was resolved, there could be no point in a strategic arms
reduction agreement. (Although negotiations on reducing
strategic arms could be — and were — used by the Soviets
as one more forum for putting pressure on the U.S. and its
NATO allies to cancel INF deployment plans.
)
Second, President Reagan's strategic modernization
program faced considerable Congressional opposition. The
domestic vulnerability of U.S. strategic weapons programs
was exploited by Soviet intransigence in the START
negotiations. One aspect of this domestic vulnerability
that crippled the value of whatever incipient U.S. strategic
weapon modernization programs may have had as bargaining
leverage in START was Congressional threats to link funding
to progress in negotiations. 2 Congressional efforts and
See the treatment of this subject in Chapter Three.
- 174 -
U.S. AND SOVIET BARGAINING POSITIONS IN START
intentions to legislate U..S. compliance with unratified arms
agreements may be viewed as another domestic source of
disincentives for Soviet forthcomingness in strategic arms
reduction negotiations. 3
Third, most key elements of U.S. strategic force
programs underway in the early 1980s had been on the
planning boards since the early 1970s and had experienced
multiple delays imposed by political considerations. It is
important to note that the Soviets may derive considerable
satisfaction from at least two points regarding Reagan's
strategic nuclear force "build-up." First, the U.S. entered
the START negotiations long before there were any prospects
of Reagan's military program actually materializing. Since
the Administration had first portrayed such a restoration of
American nuclear strength as a prerequisite to negotiations,
the Soviets could view the U.S. presence at the negotiating
table prior to this as a concession. Second, from the
perspective of the late 1980s, the Soviets might also take
satisfaction in realizing that Reagan's strategic
modernization program never materialized to the extent he
originally planned.
The Soviets reacted indignantly to official U.S.
suggestions that Congress approve funding for new weapon
->
, ...
Bruce Fein, "Negotiating with the Soviets by the
House of Representatives: Unconstitutional and Improvident,"
National Security Record . No. 95 (October 1986), p. 5.
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systems to improve the U.S. bargaining position in START.
It may be recalled that in the spring of 1983 the Scowcroft
Commission recommended congressional approval of the MX and
Small ICBM programs for largely arms control reasons.
Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov made the
following statement in a speech to a joint meeting of the
CPSU Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and
the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation in December
1982:
No programmes of a further arms build-up will ever
force the Soviet Union to make unilateral concessions.
We will be compelled to counter the challenge of the
American side by deploying corresponding weapons systems
of our own — an analogous missile to counter the MX
missile, and our own long-range cruise missile, which we
are already testing, to counter the U.S. long-range
cruise missile.
Those are not threats at all. We are wholly averse
to any such course of events, and are doing everything
to avoid it. But it is essential that those who shape
U.S. policy, as well as the public at large, should be
perfectly clear on the real state of affairs. Hence, if
the people in Washington really believe that new weapons
systems will be a 'trump' for the Americans at
negotiations, we want them to know that these 'trumps'
are false. Any policy directed to securing military
superiority over the Soviet Union has no future and can
only heighten the threat of war. 4
4 TASS, 21 Dec. 1982, translated in Daily Report:
Soviet Union
. FBIS, 21 Dec. 1982, pp. B8-B11, and reprinted
in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on
Disarmament 1982 . (Washington: USGPO, 1985), p. 920.
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The Soviet Union recognized that changes in the U.S.
START position were often related to changes in the White
House's deployment plans for various U.S. systems:
When the United States needed, say, to ensure the
deployment in the future of another new type of inter-
continental ballistic missile "Midgetman" — in
addition to the newest ICBM "MX" which are to add not
less than 1,000 high-yield warheads to the U.S. nuclear
arsenal, the U.S. delegation in Geneva immediately
stated readiness to "adjust" its position. It would not
now be against raising the level of 850 units for
deployed land-based and sea-launched ballistic missiles,
which was earlier suggested by the U.S. side. And this
is being presented as "flexibility." In actual fact
they try to open yet another channel of the strategic
arms race.
Such charges are often accompanied by claims of Soviet
flexibility, or by assertions that Soviet programs have not
"upset" the balance, but "restored" it:
I declare quite emphatically: the Soviet Union has done
nothing since the signature of the SALT II treaty in
1979 in the area of strategic arms which could lead to a
change in the existing approximate situation of parity.
In contrast, new military programs are continually
being approved in the United States. It looks as though
in Washington they are not working toward reductions but
toward increases in strategic arms and toward making the
negotiations depend on the speed of the armaments
assembly lines.
5
"Stuck Fast," Pravda , 17 July 1983, p. 5, translated
6
"Excerpts from Brezhnev's Printed Answers," New York
in Daily Report: Soviet Union , FBIS, 18 July 1983, p. AA1
Times . 4 Nov. 1981,
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The Reagan administration claimed that the Soviet
presence at the START talks was proof that its weapons
procurement policies had provided arms control payoffs. Of
course, the Soviet Union adamantly denied this, saying:
The Soviet Union was quick to come to the negotiation
table because it is prepared for talks and willing to
resume them ... We are prepared to continue the
relevant negotiations with the United States without
delay, preserving all the positive elements that have sc
far been achieved in this area."
Soviet spokesman Sergey Vishnevskiy wrote in Pravda two days
later: 7
It can be stated with certainty that these
negotiations would not have taken place, had it not been
for the USSR which exerted persistent purposeful efforts
aimed at restraining such armaments.
The Soviet Union approaches the negotiations with
the sincere intention to work for elaboration of such a
decision that would promote consolidation of
international stability, the interests of peace. The
Soviet Union's decision to undertake the obligation not
to be the first to use nuclear weapons is a profound
stimulus for the Geneva negotiations. 8
I. COMPONENTS OF THE U.S.
BARGAINING POSITION IN START
A. The Reagan Strategic Modernization
Program
7 Igor Dmitriyev in Moscow World Service, 2 July 1982,
in Daily Report: Soviet Union . FBIS, 6 July 1982, p. AA1
8 TASS, 4 July 1982, transla
Union
. FBIS, 6 July 1982, p. AA2
.
ted in Daily Report: Soviet
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Reagan pledged both during his presidential campaign
and afterward that he would restore America's strategic
nuclear strength before proceeding to arms negotiations with
the Soviets. Indeed, the 1980 Republic Party platform had
clearly declared this objective. Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger, in his Fiscal Year 1983 Report to
Congress, boasted that "President Reagan's program for
strategic forces, while consuming less than 15 percent of
defense spending over the next five years, will give us the
greatest addition of modern, strengthened strategic forces
planned and funded by any United States President." 9 The
stated objectives of President Reagan's strategic force
modernization program were twofold: first, to restore
American strength sufficiently to tide it over a so-called
"window of vulnerability" in the mid-1980s; 10 second, to
provide the United States with the necessary leverage to
secure a viable strategic arms control accord with the
Soviet Union.
The proposed strategic modernization program
consisted of five elements. They included improvement of
U.S. strategic command and control systems, modernization of
the manned bomber force, deployment of new submarine-
9 Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress,
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launched ballistic missiles, improvements in the
survivability and accuracy of land-based intercontinental
ballistic missiles in conjunction with the deployment of a
new generation ICBM, and upgrading of U.S. strategic
defenses. 11 In terms of additional deployed strength,
Reagan's strategic modernization program proposed continued
funding for a new SLBM (the D-5) , additional construction of
new Trident ballistic missile submarines, a new ICBM (the
MX) , two new bombers (the B-l and the 'Advanced Technology
Bomber'), and development of air- and sea-launched cruise
missiles. 12
Specifically, the Administration's original plans
called for procurement of 100 MX missiles with 10 warheads
each. 40 were to be deployed initially in Minuteman silos.
Three approaches to MX survivability were proposed for
further study: (1) deep underground basing; (2) continuous
airborne patrol basing; and, (3) some form of ballistic
missile defense. 13 The Administration planned to procure
100 B-1B manned strategic bombers, with initial operational
capability (IOC) sometime in 1986. Trident submarines were







It should be noted that all of these programs were
in existence at the time Reagan assumed office.
1-42.
Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1983 , p
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in fiscal year 1983 to make up for the lack of funding in
fiscal year 1982. Furthermore, "several hundred" nuclear
sea-launched cruise missiles were to be procured for
deployment on general purpose submarines beginning in 1984.
The Trident D-5 SLBM was to be deployed in 1989. 14
None of these programs would mature before 1984, even
if they proceeded according to schedule (see Table 3.1), and
in comparison to Soviet strategic nuclear force
modernization efforts, they were profoundly modest. The
Reagan strategic modernization program also provided for
unilateral reductions in U.S. nuclear forces, involving the
deactivation of 52 Titan II ICBMs and the phasing out of the
B-52D manned bomber.
B. U.S. Bargaining Leverage in START
In START the United States chose to propose limits on
systems in which it was quantitatively inferior relative to
the Soviet Union. Some critics charged that this was proof
that the Administration was not serious about reaching a
viable strategic arms accord with the USSR. On the other
hand, the Administration was merely proposing arms control
restrictions on those systems that most threatened stability
as it was understood and pursued in the West. The
administration should not be blamed for seeking terms of
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strategic requirements. Failure to secure a START agreement
in the 1982-1983 time period was not a result of choosing
the wrong units of limitation on which to negotiate the
terms of an agreement, but of U.S. quantitative inferiority
in those units of limitation.
In other words, one major source of Soviet
disinterest in a strategic arms reduction agreement prior to
1984 was the lack of U.S. bargaining leverage those systems
that were the subject of the START negotiations. During the
course of the START negotiations, the United States proposed
at least 12 principal units of limitation and 4 major
categories of aggregate systems. These are given in the
figure below. The point is that at the time
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Table 3. 1
THE REAGAN STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM:
INITIAL DEPLOYMENT DATES AS OF 1982*
Weapon Proaram Date of Initial Deployment
MX ICBM 1986
Small ICBM 1992**
Trident SSBN (w/C4) 1980***
Trident D-5 SLBM 1989
B-1B**** 1986
ATB ('Stealth' bomber) 1990S
ALCM 1982***
SLCM 1984
* Fiscal Year 1983 Annual DoD Report , pp. 111-57 to
111-63.
** International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Military Balance. 1983-1984 . p. 23.
*** Ibid . . pp. 118-120.
**** The IOC for the B-1B was moved forward one year to 1985
according to the Department of Defense's Fiscal Year
1984 Report , p. 223.
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of proposing them, the United States was inferior to the
Soviet Union in nearly all categories, and certainly in the
categories of weapons the Administration most wanted to
curtail (i.e. "heavy" missiles). As Table 3.2 demonstrates,
the United States went into the START negotiations with a
numerical disadvantage hard bargaining leverage.
The Soviets understood that the MX program, as it
emerged from the give and take compromises between Congress
and the White House, was rationalized on largely arms
control grounds. They went out of their way to make sure
the United States understood that they rejected this
argument completely. A 1 July 1983 Pravda commentary
carried by TASS began with the following statement:
The Reagan administration is known to have succeeded in
railroading through the U.S. Congress a programme for
the production and deployment of new intercontinental
'MX' missiles, worth billions of dollars, only due to
the promises to give a greater flexibility and
constructive character to the stand of the USA at the
talks with the USSR on questions of limitation and
reduction of strategic weapons. 15
Among the three U.S. cruise missile programs (air-
launched, sea-launched, and ground-launched) , the Soviets
have been especially concerned about sea- and ground-
launched versions. Robert Einhorn writes:
"Deception Is an Unreliable Method," Pravda , 1 July
1983, translated in Daily Report: Soviet Union . FBIS, 1 July
1983, p. AA 1.
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Table 3 .2
U.S. -SOVIET STRATEGIC BALANCE
IN TERMS OF UNITS OF LIMITATION
PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES IN START
(1982 Figures)
Strateaic Delivery Vehicles U.S. U.S.S.R.
-ICBMs 1049 1398
-"heavy" ICBMs 308
-"medium" ICBMs 49 300
-"light" ICBMs 1000 790
-MIRVed ICBMs 550 752
-SLBMs 520 969
-MIRVed SLBMs 520 224
-long-range bombers 355 245
Strategic Nuclear Warheads
-ICBM warheads 2149 5862
-MIRVed ICBM warheads 1650 5216
-SLBM warheads 4800 1865
-MIRVed SLBM warheads 4800 1120
Aaarecrate Categories
-total ICBMs and SLBMs 1569 2367
-total ICBM and SLBM
warheads 6949 7727
-total MIRVed ICBM and
SLBM warheads 6450 6336
-total (ICBM and SLBM)
throw-weight (in millions 3.7 12.5
of pounds)
Sources: John M. Collins, U.S. -Soviet Military Balance,
1980-1985 . (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey 's, 1985)
, pp. 173-
183; The Military Balance. 1981-1982 . (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), pp. 104-107;
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Posture
For FISCAL YEAR 1982 . (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1981); and,
U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power , 1st ed.,
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1981).
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Soviet persistence in constraining cruise missiles has
been strongest in the case of long-range SLCMs and
GLCMs, where the Soviets have never deviated, either in
SALT or START, from their position that the deployment
of such systems should be banned. Their attitude towarc
ALCMs has been less strict. 16
The reasons are obvious. Sea- and ground-launched cruise
missiles (SLCMs) are the most difficult to defend against,
and may have the shortest warning times. Ground-launched
cruise missiles have an added disadvantage (in the Soviet
view) in that they are stationed on the territories of
America's European allies — with all the implications for
NATO unity and "German hands on the nuclear trigger" that
entails. Air-launched cruise missiles are relatively easier
to deal with since their launch platforms (heavy bombers)
can be detected and defended against. Soviet priorities
regarding cruise missiles may also reflect greater
confidence in their air-defense network to handle air-
launched versions. On the reasons for the less strict
Soviet attitude toward constraining ALCMs, Einhorn writes:
First, as their own cruise missile programs progressed
and as their air defense capability against small, low-
flying missiles improved, both the potential U.S.
advantage from ALCMs and the Soviet 'need' for strict
limits decreased. Second, once the introduction of
ALCMs became inevitable, the more relevant comparison
for the Soviets in determining their negotiating
priorities was not between U.S. and Soviet ALCMs, but
between the threat posed by U.S. ALCMs and the threat
posed by U.S. ballistic missiles ... it appears that
the Soviets do not find U.S. ALCMs any more threatening
1 Einhorn, Negotiating from Strength , fn. #6, p. 115
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than U.S. ballistic missile capabilities. They may well
find them less so. 7
C. Impact of U.S. Internal Dissension on
American Negotiating Leverage
When reviewing the history of the START negotiations
from 1982 to 1983, it is hard to escape the conclusion that
frequent reformulations of the U.S. negotiating position and
the highly public nature of the inter-agency policymaking
process hurt the credibility and tenability of the U.S.
bargaining posture. Einhorn notes that:
Because of the public nature of the U.S. defense
planning and budgetary process, [the Soviets] have had a
fairly good basis for projecting years into the future
the U.S. side of the strategic equation. 8
Past experience demonstrates that the Soviets respect
tenacious and serious negotiating partners. Yet, several
incidents that became public during the START negotiations
had a direct impact on Soviet perceptions of U.S. ability to
negotiate seriously. These incidents involved both the
complexities of the U.S. inter-agency process charged with
formulating the U.S. START position as well as congressional
debates over funding of the Reagan administration's
strategic modernization program. They included the MX
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Reagan to make compromises in his START approach, and
resulted in a somewhat curtailed MX program. 19 President
Reagan eventually had to threaten to recess START if his
castigated MX policy were defeated.
Other episodes included the so-called "Rowny
memorandum flap," involving a memorandum by the head of the
U.S. START team given to Kenneth Adelman in January 1983 and
passed by him to his adviser for personnel matters. The
memorandum critized several individuals on the delegation
and called into question not only the unity of the U.S.
START personnel in Geneva, but also the credibility and
support of the head of the delegation. 20
Various specific elements of the U.S. negotiating
position were subject to considerable public exposure,
further eroding the bargaining leverage Washington brought
to the talks. A notable example was the public airing of
internal Administration disagreement over treatment of
throw-weight limitations in START. 21
See reporting of these episodes in New York Times .
16 Dec. 1982; and Washington Post . 7 Jan. 1983.
20 For a chronology of the "Rowny memorandum flap," see
The Arms Control Reporter . March 1983, p. 611. B. 81.
A discussion of the internal U.S. debate over how to
handle throw-weight limits in START can be found in Strobe
Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the
Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control , updated edition (New
York: Vintage Books, 1985), pp. 214-221 and 307-311.
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The Soviet media often picked up on domestic
opposition to Reagan's defense and arms control policies,
and it can be assumed that this information figured
prominently in Moscow's calculations regarding its START
position. For example, in late June or early July 1983,
ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman wrote a letter to Senator
Charles Percy, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, apparently suggesting a trade of MX for certain
Soviet heavy missiles. The Soviets picked up on the
hypocrisy of using American missiles that were still in the
development stage as bargaining leverage in trade for long-
deployed Soviet weapons: "in response to the non-creation of
100 MX missiles, the White House is demanding that the
Soviet Union dismantle its ground-launched SS ICBMs
[sic]." 22 (emphasis added)
The Soviet article then cites Senator W. Cohen as
saying: "I am sure that the Soviet Union will reject this
proposal." Senator J. Biden was also cited as stating
Adelman 's letter exposes the Administration's stance on
this problem. After all, it is stating that we will make
certain concessions only if the other side abandons
everything." Senator P. Tsongas was also cited to support
the conclusion that "people no longer believe that the White
22 A. Tolkunov, "A Poor Grade Not Just in Arithmetic,"
Pravda
. 3 July 1983, p. 5, translated in Daily Report:
Soviet Union . FBIS, 5 July 1983, p. AA 2.
- 189 -
U.S. AND SOVIET BARGAINING POSITIONS IN START
House is sincerely striving for nuclear arms control." 23
The Soviet article also mentions the opposition of a New
York Times editorial and concludes by saying:
That is why, having forgotten the basics not only of
arithmetic but also of political science, the White
House is trying to deceive public opinion by presenting
its desire for military superiority as a 'constructive
stance. ' Such hypocrisy even angers the White House's
own legislators. 4
Persistent and vocal criticisms of the
Administration's START position also hurt its negotiating
strength. Accusations that the President lacked seriousness
in arms control talks was picked up by the Soviets and
certain Administration officials acknowledged the damage to
American bargaining leverage. 25
It is indisputable that public foreknowledge of
American negotiating positions and priorities seriously
eroded the U.S. bargaining position in START. Asymmetries
in knowing the other side's game plan are a recognized
23 Ibid .
Ibid . For other examples, see TASS , "Reagan's
'Rearmament' Strategy Attacked," in Daily Report: Soviet
Union
. FBIS, 6 July 1983, pp. A6-A7.
See observations by Richard Perle in, Hedrick Smith,
"Military Aide Says Reagan Critics Damage U.S. Stand in Arms
Talks," New York Times . 13 July 1983.
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liability for American negotiators. 26 This is also a well-
appreciated principle of negotiating theory. 27
Note that domestic policy turmoil in the United
States would be a definite source of Soviet disinterest in a
strategic arms reduction agreement, but would also be a
definite source of Soviet interest in negotiating strategic
arms reductions. Negotiating would be a way of feeding that
internal turmoil and disagreement over negotiating
positions. Internal consensus must be considered a
prereguisite for any democracy succeeding at the negotiating
table with an authoritarian system. 28
D. Other Factors Affecting the U.S.
Bargaining Position in START
It is not difficult to surmise other factors that
affected, in the Soviet view, the credibility or seriousness
of the U.S. bargaining position in START. These probably
included Soviet perceptions of U.S. vulnerabilities and
weaknesses in political as well as military terms. Was the
26 For a SALT I example, see William R. Van Cleave,
"Political and Negotiating Asymmetries: Insult in SALT," in
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, ed. Contrasting Approaches to
Strategic Arms Control . (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1974)
,
pp. 14-15.
27 I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The
Practical Negotiator
.
(New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1982)
,
pp. 152-153.
28 See comments by Brent Scowcroft in Brad
Knickerbocker, "Scowcroft: US Needs Consensus on Arms if it
Wants Pact With USSR," Christian Science Monitor . 2 Sept.
1983.
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present U.S. administration something the Kremlin had to
reckon with on a time-urgent basis? Could the Kremlin wait
out U.S. domestic instabilities for a better agreement in
the future, perhaps under a different administration?
It is clear that Moscow observers interpreted
Reagan's START initiatives in the context of 1984
electioneering. When they did so, they attributed such
views to the American media:
Most of American specialists in the sphere of
disarmament, the ABC [television company] points out,
link the obviously ostentatious activity of the White
House in the sphere of restruction [sic] and reduction
of strategic armaments with the President's election
plans. Such an insincere approach is prompted by purely
transient considerations. 29
The peace movements in Europe also had an impact on
the U.S. START position. This is almost certainly a
principal reason for their support by Moscow. For example,
the Soviets demonstrated keen appreciation for the impact of
the American and West European peace movements on the
international environment surrounding NATO efforts to retain
cohesiveness on INF modernization issues. 30 Some Soviet
29 TASS, 15 July 1983, translated in Daily Report:
Soviet Union , FBIS, 20 July 1983, p. AA2
.
For representative Soviet articles making such
claims, see " Pravda Examines Growing Antiwar Movement,"
translated in Daily Report: Soviet Union , FBIS, 8 Sept.
1982, p. AA9 ; and, "US Masses Oppose Nuclear Preparations,"
in Daily Report: Soviet Union . FBIS, 31 Aug. 1982, pp. AA4-
AA5.
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commentators even claimed that the Reagan administration had
been forced to "tone down openly aggressive statements," as
a direct result of the strength and influence of the peace
movements
:
Antiwar demonstrations and their influence on the NATO
countries' governments are causing increasing concern in
bellicose U.S. circles. While seeking to attain
aggressive goals, they try to disguise their plans. At
times they even have to tone down openly aggressive
statements made earlier by high-ranking figures. 31
The last line probably refers to the Reagan administration's
early embroglio with remarks on nuclear war-winning and
fighting, which had cause so much furor during the first
year of the Administration. 32
A Pravda editorial on the origins and causes of the
peace movement made the following assertions regarding the
impact of peace movements on American policy:
The U.S. President has made an unexpected 'discovery,
'
that the citizens of his country 'feel alarm for the
fate of their children and the fate of peace.' He
expressed concern that Americans are feeling fright and
horror of nuclear war.
In the light of the actions of the Washington
authorities, should one be surprised that people — and
not only in the United States — have become more
Nikolay Prozhogin, "International Review," Pravda , 9
may 1982, p. 4, in Daily Report: Soviet Union . FBIS, 11 May
1982, p. AA9. (pp. AA8-AA11.)
32 For a sensationalist and distorted account of these
episodes, see Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan,
Bush, and Nuclear War , (New York: Random House, 1982).
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alarmed for their own future and that of their children,
for the fate of life on earth? No, one should not.
The antinuclear, antiwar movement in the United
States emerged spontaneously as a mass protest against
militarism. It stems from a realization of the threat
to peace posed by Washington's current policy. 33
There is some evidence that the Soviet Union
perceived the U.S. as experiencing economic difficulties in
the early 1980s during the START negotiations. Georgiy
Arbatov, considered the Kremlin's top U.S. observer and
analyst, refers to American citizens as too "preoccupied
with economic troubles and the increased nuclear danger" to
heed President Reagan's exhortations to not be afraid of
"heroic dreams." 34 This may have been another element of
Soviet calculations regarding the vulnerabilities of the
U.S. bargaining position in START.
In meetings with Soviet officials, Western
journalists reported that the Soviets believed mounting
unemployment, inflation, and high interest rates to be among
domestic problems plaguing the United States. These Soviet
officials suggested that the "arms race" was an obstacle to
resolving these difficulties: "Both sides face practical
33 nTne Peoples' Will Must Be Reckoned With," Pravda ,
25 Nov. 1982, p. 6, translated in Daily Report: Soviet
Union . FBIS, 26 Nov. 1982, p. AA5
.
Georgiy Arbatov, "American Policy in the
Dreamland," Pravda . 16 July 1982, in Daily Report: Soviet
Union
. FBIS, 19 July 1982, p. Al. (pp. A1-A5.)
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problems whose solutions are likely to be deflected by the
arms race." 35 Other Soviet spokesmen urged "common sense"
as a basis for Reagan's arms control policies in the face of
alleged economic and foreign policy failures. 36
Soviet objections to Rowny as head of the U.S.
delegation almost certainly represented a smokescreen for
Soviet disinterest in a strategic arms reduction agreement.
At the very least, these Soviet objections were
unconstructive and unbecoming a diplomatic exchange. Soviet
correspondent 0. Nikiforov quoted a German periodical, the
Frankfurter Rundschau , as termming Rowny "simply a militant
anticommunist who doubts that there is any expediency in an
agreement with Moscow." 37 Soviet "political observer"
Valentin Zorin made the following remarks several months
into the START negotiations:
I must tell you, comrade viewers, that I personally had
grave doubts as to whether Washington really wanted to
make progress at the Geneva talks the moment I read that
the head of the American delegation to these talks was
to be Edward Rowny. . . .
35 Howard Simons and Dusko Doder, "Soviet Officials
Pessimistic About Improving Relations With U.S.," Washington
Post . 26 Oct. 1981.
36 Georgi Arbatov, "The U.S. — Will There Be Changes?"
Pravda . 17 March 1983, pp. 4-5, in Current Digest of the
Soviet Press , vol. 35, no. 11 (13 April 1983), pp. 1-4.
0. Nikiforov, "At the Geneva Crossroads,"
Komsomolskava Pravda . 23 Sept. 1982, p. 3, in Daily Report:
Soviet Union . FBIS, 30 Sept. 1982, p. AA5
.
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He was included as a military specialist in the
American delegation to the Soviet-American talks on the
SALT II treaty. However, General Rowny made use of his
appointment to the American delegation not to facilitate
the achievement of agreement but to sabotage it . . .
Edward Rowny played a very ignoble part in burying the
SALT II treaty. 38
Soviet commentary on this issue must be regarded as
unworthy of serious negotiators. It had no bearing on the
substance of the talks, and Rowny faithfully discharged the
directives given him by President Reagan. His appointment
as head of the U.S. START delegation was no doubt intended
to signal the Soviets concerning the Administration's
resolve to engage in hard bargaining. There is no guestion,
though, that Rowny 's presence at the head of the START
negotiating team provoked domestic criticism of the
Administration's sincerity. 39 Here again, the Soviets
appeared to have parroted internal American dissatisfaction,
turning it against the Administration and undermining the
U.S. bargaining position.
II. THE SOVIET BARGAINING POSITION
IN START
Valentin Zorin, "The World Today," Moscow Domestic
Television Service, 5 Oct. 1982, in Daily Report; Soviet
Union . FBIS, 6 Oct. 1982, p. AA
39 Strobe Talbott has implied that Rowny's presence
served as a deterrent to Soviet acceptance of the 'double
build-down' proposal in the fall of 1983. See Deadly
Gambits; The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in
Nuclear Arms Control
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As noted in the introduction to this chapter,
calculations of bargaining leverage will always be relative
in several ways. For example, trade-offs must be considered
between one's own programs and those of an opponent. The
foregoing section has examined a number of aspects of the
U.S. bargaining position that tended to undermine either the
credibility and seriousness of the U.S. government, or that
left the U.S. in a poor negotiating position relative to
units of limitation under discussion in START. This section
examines the bargaining leverage position from the point of
view of Soviet systems, and the willingness of the
leadership in Moscow to accept limits or reductions on their
own systems in return for limits or reductions in U.S.
weapons.
A START agreement that involved substantial
reductions in land-based ICBMs would have made a significant
contribution to strategic stability by reducing the ability
of either side to execute a disarming first strike. Since
the Soviet side was the only one with such a capability at
the time of the START negotiations (and a more destabilizing
situation could hardly be imagined) , this necessarily meant
that a disproportionate reduction would have to be made in
Soviet offensive nuclear strength.
The Soviets were uninterested in a START agreement
that would have seriously impinged on the military's ability
to carry out its primary war-time missions, which involve
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the possibility of preemptive counterforce strikes on the
nuclear assets of an opponent who appears to be on the verge
of mounting an attack against the Soviet homeland. The
Soviet military had, by the beginning of START in 1982,
essentially achieved their principal objectives relative to
strategic nuclear force requirements. The strategic balance
favored the Soviet Union, especially in those indices
considered necessary by the Soviets to fight and win a
nuclear war. Two factors were operative in helping them
achieve this state of affairs: (1) U.S. inaction ,
particularly in the area of strategic defenses, but also in
terms of offensive force modernization; and (2) Soviet
action , both in terms of offensive nuclear power and
strategic defenses.
SALT was a key element in the first factor in two
ways — by placing bounds on the U.S. strategic nuclear
force program, and by not restricting those systems the
Soviets felt essential to deterrence as they perceived it.
SALT inhibited U.S. strategic nuclear force modernization
not only by explicit limits on the number of new ICBM
systems permitted, but also by restricting ABM deployments
(and thereby perpetuating an illusion of Soviet moderation
in accordance with the MAD philosophy of finite deterrence
and mutual societal vulnerability) , and proscribing several
alternative approaches to strategic nuclear force
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survivability. 40 This is the desired objective from the
Soviet point of view
. . . the Soviet Union has consistently approached
SALT as a unified actor with a well-developed sense of
strategic purpose. The Soviets have never regarded arms
control as an alternative to unilateral defense
investments (as many U.S. SALT enthusiasts tend to have
done) but rather have treated it as a direct adjunct of
their national security planning. 41 (emphasis added)
Benjamin Lambeth has developed the theme that Soviet
objectives in arms control often emphasize placing
disproportionate restrictions on U.S. systems, while leaving
key Soviet systems relatively unrestricted. He has argued
that Soviet arms control goals
. . . have been motivated by a self-interested
desire to bring U.S. force planning into an explicit
negotiating context that might allow Soviet planners to
impose constraints on U.S. strategic programs, while at
the same time exacting American acceptance of
countervailing Soviet programs and pursuing whatever
margin of strategic advantage the traffic of SALT and
detente might allow. In this sense, Moscow's arms
control policy has not only been consonant with Soviet
defense planning but indeed has constituted an integral
part of it, aimed at helping achieve — to the maximum
extent possible — Soviet strategic goals cheaply
through negotiation rather than through the more costly
avenue of unrestrained arms competition. 42
40 Conceptually, there are several ways to insure the
survivability of land-based forces. These forces can be
hardened, dispersed, mobilized, defended, or concealed. Of
these, only hardening is not expressly forbidden or
discouraged by arms control agreements and considerations.
41 Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Arms Control and Defense
Planning in Soviet Strategic Policy." in Richard Burt, ed.
,
Arms Control and Defense Postures in the 1980s , (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1982), p. 61.
42 Ibid.
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Later in this same article, Lambeth more explicitly makes
the point that arms control is subordinate to Soviet defense
planning requirements:
. . . the net effect on SALT created by this Soviet
propensity to rely on unilateral initiatives rather than
on negotiated measures for assuring Soviet security has
been a clear Soviet determination to use arms control in
support of Soviet strategic goals. Seen from this
perspective, SALT has proven for the Soviets to be a
lucrative means for seeking to impose constraints on
American exploitation of military technology while
providing a context for continuing the development and
operational application of Soviet military technology
with the express blessings of the United States, as
reflected in the formal language of whatever agreements
that Soviet negotiating finesse can help bring about.
For Soviet planners, SALT has not been an exercise in
'arms control' at all. Instead, to bend the idiom of
Clausewitz somewhat, it has been a continuation of
strategy by other means. 43
The second factor — Soviet unilateral actions to
modernize and expand its strategic nuclear forces — took
place both within and without the legal parameters of
existing strategic arms limitation agreements. Soviet
actions sanctioned by SALT included maximizing the number of
ICBMs, SLBMs, and MIRVed launchers permitted.
According to Robert Einhorn:
The [Soviet] planning process seems to be carried out
independently of arms control considerations, without
counting on successful negotiations to help solve
critical security problems. . . . arms control has
tended to have a marginal impact on Soviet forces and
plans as a consequence of a Soviet strategic mindset
that places paramount importance on unilateral defense
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Soviet planning system that makes ongoing programs
difficult to alter. 44
Soviet actions on the fringes of (or beyond) treaty
obligations included the large-scale deployment of the SS-20
missile (whose characteristics place it just below the
threshold for intercontinental systems accountable in SALT)
,
and continued development of new types of ICBMs, as well as
preparing the base for a nation-wide ABM defense. 45
A new agreement on strategic arms was not essential
to maintaining Soviet satisfaction with the strategic
balance at the beginning of START. All that was necessary
to perpetuating the contribution of arms control to Soviet
military requirements was ensuring continued U.S. adherence
to the SALT I and II agreements. This could be done by
threatening to call off on-going negotiations if the
President seemed about to commit the U.S. to punitive
sanctions.
The Soviet Union had to preempt the possibility that
the Reagan administration would end American compliance with
the SALT I and II agreements by keeping alive the prospect
of progress in arms control. This was accomplished by
44 Robert J. Einhorn, Negotiating From Strength:
Leverage in U.S. -Soviet Arms Control Negotiations
.
(New
York: Praeger, 1985), pp. 43, 45.
45 Both of these are discussed in President Reagan's
most recent Soviet noncompliance report, see U.S. Department
of State, Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements .
Special Report No. 163, March 1987.
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participating in U.S. -Soviet negotiations even though, for a
variety of reasons, there was little Soviet interest in an
actual agreement
.
The involvement of the Soviet military in the
formulation and implementation of Soviet START policy
insured that the START negotiations would conform, above
all, to the interests and requirements of Soviet military
doctrine.
Since the late 1950s, the Soviet Union has sought
meaningful strategic superiority in terms of what is now
called prompt, hard-target kill capability. This capability
resides primarily in large, accurate ICBMs. Soviet
objectives for accumulating prompt, hard-target kill
capability are two-fold. First, by possessing such
capability the Soviet Union hopes to deter the West from
initiating nuclear war. Second, if for whatever reason,
the Soviet Union should fail in deterring the West, it wants
the capability of limiting damage to the Soviet homeland
while completely destroying the West's ability to continue
waging war. These reasons were recognized by Western
scholars as long ago as 1958, along with a third reason:
If the Soviet Union should continue to gain
technologically while the NATO alliance made little
progress, the Soviet Union would be able to make war
without fear of the consequences. It will be difficult
to attain the ability to eliminate the opponent's
nuclear striking forces in a single blow. But that is
the goal which the Soviet leaders must strain to reach.
If they should acquire such preponderant military
strength, they would have policy alternatives even more
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attractive than the initiation of nuclear war. By
flaunting presumably invincible strength, the Soviet
Union could compel piecemeal capitulation of the
democracies. This prospect must indeed seem glittering
to the Soviet leaders. 4 °
An appreciation for the difficulties involved in
seeking nuclear preponderance illustrates the critical role
that arms control negotiations and agreements can make in
helping the Soviets achieve their goal of nuclear hegemony.
The Soviets faced a series of problems in achieving
meaningful nuclear superiority over the United States,
including the difficulty of eliminating the consequences of
a retaliatory blow. Also, even if "preponderance" was
achieved, capitulation on the part of the West would only be
forthcoming if; (1) the Soviet Union was clearly perceived
as having preponderance, and (2) the West chose to respond
to such a perception of Soviet preponderance by capitulation
rather than unilateral strategic initiatives.
Prior to SALT there were two episodes where the
significance of Soviet strategic breakthroughs were
neutralized and defeated by the Western reaction — the
Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb several years prior to
expectationstogether with the subsequent development of a
deliverable hydrogen bomb before the West could itself
produce such a weapon, and the Soviet production of
46 Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Revolution in Soviet
Strategic Thinking," Foreign Affairs , 36, 2 (Oct. '58): 252
241-52.
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intercontinental-range ballistic missiles in the late 1950s.
Both these eras produced successful large-scale U.S. efforts
to catch up and overcome the Soviet developments.
For the Soviet Union, the question became: In the
future, how could it ensure that the West responded by
'capitulation' rather than 'arms racing'? Prior to the
commencement of SALT in 1968, the Soviet Union must have
reached some preliminary answers to this question. Among
these were undertaking efforts to mask and obscure the level
of its strategic nuclear weapons program, and to create
pressures in the West for 'arms control' responses, rather
than 'arms racing' responses. The Soviet Union proceeded to
implement both by way of SALT negotiations. 47
Following SALT I, U.S. analysts began calling
attention to Soviet strategic weapons buildup and Soviet
war-fighting doctrine to show that the ABM Treaty did not
mean that the Soviet's had accepted MAD. Such insight
damaged Soviet strategic deception efforts:
The Soviet Union responded quickly. It first muted or
deleted the most explicit references to its nuclear
weapons policies. This was followed by a public
campaign by its political leadership and by the social
science institutes of the Academy of Sciences aimed at
Two highly recommendable sources in particular
develop these themes in greater detail: John J. Ballantine,
"Arms Negotiations: Soviet Path to Power?" International
Security Review . 6, 4 (Winter 1981-1982): 519-532; and,
Capt. George H. Selden (USA) , SALT: The Soviet Approach to
Strategic Superiority . Student Research Report (Garmisch,
Germany: U.S. Army Russian Institute, 1978).
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Soviet conceptions of "stability" and stabilizing
versus destabilizing weapons shed further light on Soviet
military objectives in START, with particular reference to
Soviet willingness to negotiate limits or reductions in its
own systems.
For example, in START the Soviets heavily criticized
the American claim that Soviet large land-based ICBMs were
destabilizing. The reason these missiles were not
destabilizing, according to Soviet sources, was because
"these missiles are immobile," and "their deployment areas
are well-known and it would not be too much of a problem to
destroy them." 49 The argument here is that they are not
destabilizing because they can be easily destroyed in a
first-strike. This curious Soviet logic betrays Soviet
strategic intentions. It is precisely because they can be
easily destroyed in a first-strike that they are considered
destabilizing by Western strategic analysts. Yet it is
their disarming first-strike qualities that recommend them
to the Soviet military. The Soviet Union has resisted
A ft ...See William C. Green, Soviet Disinformation and
Strategic Deception Concerning Its Nuclear Weapons Policy .
(Arlington, VA: Science Applications International, Inc.
Feb. 1984) . The quote is from the title page summary.
49 From commentary by Col. Eduard Grigoriyev, Soviet
broadcast in English to North America, 12 July 1982, in
Soviet Union: Daily Report , FBIS, 13 July 1982, p. AA10.
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restrictions on its ICBM modernization in every major U.S.-
Soviet strategic weapons negotiation since SALT I. 50
The Soviet commentary cited in the foregoing
paragraph continues by applying the term "destabilizing" to
U.S. ballistic missile submarines, which the Soviets
consider a major source of strategic instability. 51 It is
ironic that the Soviets define bombers and cruise missiles
as destabilizing, since these systems have always
recommended themselves to U.S. analysts precisely for their





In addition to criticism of U.S. SLBM forces, the
Soviets seemed to place a great deal of emphasis on
criticizing cruise missiles as destabilizing in their view.
In labelling the cruise missile destabilizing, Soviet
commentaries cited several characteristics. Among these
were the relative size of its warhead, its economical
suitability for large-scale production, its small size, and
its interchangeable warhead:
First of all, the cruise missile is a powerful weapon
that equals in its striking capacity about 15 or 17
bombs dropped on Hiroshima or Nagasaki. It is not so
costly as other weapons and can therefore easily be put
in serial production. Its small size allows making its
Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Arms Control and Defense
Planning in Soviet Strategic Policy," in Richard Burt, ed.,
Arms Control Postures for the 1980s , (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1982), pp. 66-69.
51 Ibid.
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production, storage, and transportation secret so that
no means of international control can spot the place of
deployment of such missiles and their real numbers. And
finally, this is a missile that can be equipped with
various charges. 52
This commentary continues by citing five more
features of cruise missiles which the Soviets find
destabilizing, including a dismissal of the U.S. assertion
that the slow speed of the cruise missile renders it
unsuitable for traditional first-strike targets:
First of all, with the accumulation of nuclear
arsenals the first-strike concept itself has changed.
Today first-strike targets include not only objectives
capable of changing their location in one way or another
but also objectives that cannot be hidden from a first-
strike attack even in a matter of hours, and the speed
of a missile in this case is of secondary importance.
Secondly, cruise missiles can be moved very close to the
frontier, which Washington intends to do, planning to
start deploying 464 cruise missiles in Western Europe as
of December this year.
Thirdly, cruise missiles can be launched by
different launching devices, and thanks to that they can
fly over different trajectories which makes their timely
detection difficult. Fourthly, their altitude is very
low and on the strength of this factor they can be
spotted, despite their slow speed, only as they approach
the warning radars. And finally, the United States is
now working on the development of supersonic cruise
missiles. All the above listed factors make cruise
missiles an extremely destabilizing weapon. 53
52 Commentary by Aleksey Vasiliyev, Soviet broadcast in
English to North America, 5 Oct. 1983, Soviet Union: Daily
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These comments on the destabilizing features of U.S.
cruise missiles suggest that the Soviet concept of a
destabilizing weapon is one that the Soviet military cannot
easily preempt.
Limits and restrictions on cruise missiles figured
prominently in Soviet START proposals.
A. The Contribution of Arms Control to
Soviet Military ReouirementsAnns control
makes a significant, but still only limited contribution to
Soviet military requirements. The nature of this
contribution can be illustrated by the role of SALT in
Soviet military strategy. According to Richard Pipes, SALT
has been "a device to inhibit the United States response to
Soviet long-term strategic programs." 54 In addition, Pipes
also notes that SALT has the following benefits from the
Soviet military's point of view: 55
— SALT "fixes the number of United States systems and
thereby facilitates the task of estimating what is
required to render them harmless."
— "SALT alleviates the Soviet Union's recurrent
nightmare that an American technological achievement
(such as ABM or the cruise missile have been in the
past) should suddenly neutralize the ponderous and
incremental Soviet buildup."
54 Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Wants SALT II,"
in Charles Tyroler, II, ed., Alerting America: The Papers of
the Committee on the Present Danger , (Washington, D.C.:
Pergamon-Brassey 's, 1984), p. 168.
55 Ibid.
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— "SALT serves to create in the United States a
political atmosphere obstructive to defense
expenditures. . . [by persuading] much of the American
public that any improvements in strategic forces are
'destabilizing' .
"
All these features of SALT are inherently beneficial to the
Soviet Union. It likes to depict SALT as the linchpin of
detente, as it depicts detente as the only alternative to
nuclear holocaust.
An analysis of Soviet military doctrine and its
relationship to Soviet military force procurement showed
that the following requirements would be needed in order to
fulfill Soviet security objectives: 56
1) preemptive counterforce capability against enemy
nuclear forces;
2) sufficient weapons to cover all other military and
defense industrial targets;
3) large, secure reserve forces;
4) active air defenses against both the high and low
altitude bomber threat;
5) ballistic missile defenses;
6) strategic ASW forces capable of attacking open ocean
U.S. SSBNs as well as protecting Soviet SSBNs (both




8) a survivable C2 network;
9) improved reconnaissance and early warning; and,
Derived from Mark E. Miller, Soviet Strategic Power
and Doctrine: The Quest for Superiority , (Advanced
International Studies Institute, 1982), p. 149.
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10) an expansion and strengthening of civil defense for
the protection of the political-military leadership,
elements of the work force essential to postwar
economic recovery, and the general population.
Of all these capabilities, arms control in general has a
direct bearing on only a few.
Soviet strategic objectives at the time of the START
negotiations included the following elements, according to
Alfred Monks: 57
(1) deterrence of war where the survival of the U.S.S.R.
and its socialist allies in Europe and Asia is at
stake
;
(2) prevention of the formation of a cohesive, anti-
Soviet bloc;
(3) retention of adequate military forces to survive
and, if possible, to win a war if deterrence fails;
(4) an unabated military buildup in order to reduce the
West's, principally America's, political, economic,
and military influence in all areas of the world;
and,
(5) matching the strategic and tactical military power
of the forces perceived as opposing Soviet foreign
policy objectives.
Negotiations on strategic arms reductions helped make
substantial contributions to all of the above objectives.
Monks later says: "the Soviets are convinced their security
57 Alfred L. Monks, Soviet Military Doctrine: 1960 to
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requires that they match the strategic and tactical military
power of a large bloc of imperialist states." 58
Thomas W. Wolfe has noted that several schools of
thought exist on the nature of Soviet civil-military
relations, but the one he appears partial to is that
perspective which
. . . contends that there is what amounts to a
division of labor or cooperative partnership between
them, with the political leadership tending to delegate
authority for the professional side of national security
planning to the military while reserving to itself the
right of final decision, especially on matters involving
large resources or issues of war and peace. 59
Wolfe cites two factors minimizing civil-military conflict
among Soviet elites. One is an unwritten rule that "support
for competing policy positions is not to be sought outside
the elite family itself." 60 The other is the fact that,
while differing perspectives may at times be discernible on
specific issues, Soviet political and military leaders share
a common perception of the larger national security
objectives and the manner in which they should be
addressed. 61
58 Monks, Soviet Military Doctrine: 1960 to the
Present , p. 241.
59 Thomas W. Wolfe, The SALT Experience , (Cambridge
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There are two schools of thought on the extent to
which the Soviet military supported Soviet participation in
SALT. One holds that the military was initially reluctant
to engage in substantive strategic arms negotiations with
the United States. Wolfe is representative of this point of
view. He has noted that: "With regard to SALT itself, the
attitude of the Soviet military was wary from the beginning;
indeed, the military had evidently been reluctant to enter
the talks at all." 62
Whatever the degree of initial support the Soviet
military gave the political leadership at the beginning of
SALT in 1968, both schools of thought acknowledge that the
Soviet military quickly assumed a dominant position in
determining and implementing Soviet strategic arms control
policy. On this score Wolfe says:
throughout SALT I and at least much of SALT II, the
military leadership has exerted a strong, conservative
influence on the negotiations, and that the political
leadership — whatever its own bent may have been — has
tended to eschew agreements that, in the judgment of the
military professionals, might adversely affect the
Soviet military posture. 63
B. The Soviet Strategic Nuclear Force
Modernization Effort
Soviet strategic nuclear force programs demonstrate
unequivocally that the Soviet Union is prepared to secure
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accumulation of overwhelming military power, without the
assistance of negotiated arms control agreements if need be.
When the United States entered the SALT negotiations
in 1968, its strategic weapons programs had been fulfilled
and the United States was not adding quantitatively to its
nuclear stockpile. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was
building strategic nuclear forces at a steady and impressive
rate. Thus the United States entered the negotiations with
a disadvantage in terms of dynamic bargaining leverage.
The United States entered the START negotiations in
only a slightly better position. In one respect, the U.S.
was worse off. It had fallen seriously behind in most
important indices of the strategic balance, including those
to be negotiated in START. In another respect, the Reagan
administration was determined to correct that situation.
But there were serious questions about whether the
Administration was doing enough.
Prior to the beginning of START the Soviet Union had
amassed a formidable strategic nuclear arsenal, posing a
significant risk to America's nuclear deterrent. This
problem was known as the "window of vulnerability," and was
an important strategic rationale for Reagan's approach to
START (i.e. calling for sharp cuts in Soviet heavy ICBMs)
.
64 See Chapter Five on bargaining leverage
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According to official Soviet sources, the 1983 budget
for military expenditures was 17.05 billion rubles, or 4 .
8
percent of the Soviet government's total budget. 5
According to the Defense Department's 1983 version of
Soviet Military Power , between late 1981 and March 1983, the
Soviet Union: 66
— began flight testing of two new land-based ICBMs;
— continued modernization of deployed ICBMs (SS-17, 18,
and 19) ;
— began flight testing of a new generation of
strategic, manned bombers (Blackjack)
;
— commenced flight testing of new generations of
ground-sea- and air-launched cruise missiles with
nuclear capability and ranges in excess of 1,600
kilometers;
— test fired MIRVed, 8,3 00 kilometer range, submarine-
launched ballistic missiles with nuclear-warhead
capability; and
— launched a second Typhoon-class SSBN.
The 1983 version of Soviet Military Power makes clear
that the Soviet Union was determined to complete nuclear
"Following the Road of Peace and Creation," Pravda ,
1 Dec. 1982, p. 1, in Soviet Union: Daily Report , FBIS, 1
Dec. 1982, p. CC2
.
66 Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power , March
1983, p. 1.
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force programs dating from the 1970s as well as initiate new
efforts to obtain strategic objectives:
Much of what the Soviets have done since September
1981 involves the consummation of programs begun in the
1970s and offers the first signs of new programs
designed to help remedy weaknesses still remaining and
to allow them to attain their own strategic objectives
in the face of prospective Western programs. '
Soviet strategic programs that were nearing
completion during the START negotiations involved
improvements to strategic offensive forces, strategic
defensive forces, and strategic command and control
elements. Specifically, they included: 68
— replacement of older missiles with SS-19 Mod 3 and
SS-18 Mod 4 MIRVed ICBMs;
— construction of Delta II SSBNs, fitted with 16 SS-N-
18 MIRVed SLBMs, with Yankee and Hotel SSBNs dismantled
to remain within the SALT II limits for SSBNs;
— continuation of the SS-NX-2 MIRVed SLBM testing
program (which became operational during the START
negotiations)
;
— continued production of Backfire bombers;
— further deployment of SA-10 low-altitude SAMs around
Moscow and throughout the USSR;
— initial production of the 11-76 Mainstay airborne
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— continued development of a high-speed ABM interceptor
and a modified version of the older Galosh ABM
interceptor;
— additional construction of large phased-array radars
around the periphery of the USSR; and,
— continued construction of hardened shelters and
command posts for passive defense.
New programs started since late 1981, just prior to
the beginning of INF and START negotiations were intended to
improve Soviet nuclear forces in terms of quantity, quality
and survivability. They included: o:7
— first tests of a new solid-propellant ICBM similar in
size and payload to the U.S. MX ICBM;
— preparations to begin testing other new ICBMs;
— development of a series of long-range cruise missiles
intended for ground, air and sea launch platforms;
— preparations to begin testing another new SLBM;
— the first flight tests of the new Blackjack strategic
bomber
;
— new ABM deployment around Moscow to include a new,
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— testing of high-energy laser systems for land-based
and sea-based air defense;
— testing of a mobile version of the SA-10 SAM system;
— the initial deployment of the Foxhound interceptor
(designed to identify and track slower-flying cruise
missiles) ; and,
— testing of two additional new air defense interceptor
aircraft.
Quantitative improvements included "a dramatic
increase in the number of deliverable nuclear warheads as
the MIRVed versions of the fourth generation (SS-17, SS-18,
and SS-19) have been deployed." Although there was a
reduction in the number of Soviet SALT-accountable
launchers, the number of deployed ICBM nuclear warheads
• 70 • • •increased by a factor of four. u Qualitative improvements
included upgrading the accuracy and throw-weight
capabilities of new ICBMs (giving the newer versions hard-
target kill capability) , and developing rapid reload
capabilities. Survivability improvements involved hardening
the silos that launch Soviet ICBMs, and development of
mobile launching systems to make detection and targeting
7 1difficult for enemy attacks. L





71 Ibid . , pp. 20-21. See also Robert P. Berman and
John C. Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and
Responses , (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1982), pp. 65-67
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In reviewing the public record of Soviet START
diplomacy, it is clear that the Soviet military retained the
dominant role they had staked out in the SALT negotiations.
\
For example, Soviet Minister of Defense D. F. Ustinov played
a prominent role in extolling Soviet arms control policies
during the START negotiations. 72 The ubiquitous presence of
the Soviet military, both in what is known of Soviet arms
control decisionmaking in general, and on the Soviet START
delegation in particular, ensured that the direction of the
talks did not impinge on basic Soviet nuclear force
requirements
.
Soviet military objectives in START can be derived
from reviewing Soviet threat perceptions. Soviet threats of
retaliatory arms initiatives in response to U.S. weapon
deployment plans are also a valuable source of evidence for
Soviet military objectives in START. 73 There were two
distinguishable classes of Soviet military objectives in
START. The first were those related to perpetuating the
SALT regime of the 1970s. These objectives included
relatively high ceilings on strategic nuclear launchers,
7 S> .See, for example, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F.
Ustinov, "Mighty Factor of Peace and the People's Security,"
Pravda
. 23 Feb. 1983, p. 2, in Soviet Union: Daily Report .
FBIS, 23 Feb. 1983, pp. AA1-AA6.
7 3 For an example of retaliatory deployment threats,
see Ustinov in FBIS 1 Aug. 83, AA1-4.
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high levels of allowable warheads, vague modernization
parameters for new ICBMs, loose verification provisions,
protection for Soviet heavy ICBM assets, and restrictions on
U.S. ABM activities. Many of these objectives were
reflected in the Soviet START position, which in turn
reflected Soviet expectations of a follow-on 'SALT III '-type
agreement. The essence of this position was to preserve and
perpetuate the military gains of SALT I and II.
Perhaps the most important Soviet military objective
in START had nothing to do with weapons being negotiated by
the START delegations. This was NATO INF deployments. As
previously discussed, the primary Soviet military concern
was forestalling deployments of American Pershing lis and
GLCMs in Europe where their presence would legitimize the
American commitment to NATO Europe and symbolize North
Atlantic solidarity at the expense of Soviet political
influence in Europe. Knowing that the Americans' greatest
concern was resolution of issues raised in START, the
Soviets used that as leverage in seeking cancellation of
NATO INF modernization by making progress in START dependent
on U.S. forthcomingness in the INF talks.
The resolution of INF issues had always figured
prominently in Soviet expectations of SALT III as a follow-
on set of negotiations and agreements to SALT II. Witness
the following quotation:
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When SALT I and II were being negotiated, our position
was to take all factors into consideration: The U.S.
forward-based systems in Europe, the nuclear means of
countries other than the USSR and the United States —
France, Britain, and China — and the geographical
position of each. Thus the USSR, some of whose ports
are frozen in winter, was allowed to have a larger
number of submarines than the Americans. Faced with the
Americans' opposition to discussing their "forward-based
systems," we agreed to discuss them only in SALT III.
Finally, since we had reached agreement on significantly
reducing strategic arms, and with a view to SALT III,
the role of the medium-range weapons became more
important. 4
New concerns for the Soviet military had arisen
during and after the negotiation of SALT II. The second
class of Soviet military objectives in START included U.S.
military programs and policies not resolved in SALT. The
most important of these was, of course, NATO INF
modernization efforts, referred to be the Soviets as "FBS"
or Forward Based Systems. 75 This had been a perpetual
concern for Moscow since prior to SALT I and the Soviets
expected a definitive arms control resolution of their
concerns in a SALT III agreement. Other major Soviet
objectives for a post-SALT II agreement included maintaining
and perpetuating the correlation of forces as it existed at
the beginning of START. This also included heading off any
challenges from new American technology.
Jean-Louis Arnaud, "Interview with Soviet General
Yuriy Lebedev [in Moscow]," Le Matin . 20 July 1983, in
Soviet Union: Daily Report . FBIS, 25 July 1983, p. AA1.
See Chapter Four for a detailed discussion of Soviet
threat perceptions of NATO INF.
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In September 1982, Ma j . Gen. Viktor Starodubov, the
General Staff representative on the Soviet START delegation,
gave a three hour "interview" to members of the Western
press in which he stressed several principal objectives the
Soviets had been pursuing in Geneva. 76 These objectives
reflected Moscow's post-SALT II concerns. They were:
(1) to place limits on U.S. cruise missile developments;
(2) to insure that British and French independent
nuclear forces were counted against the U.S.
strategic total
;
(3) to impose limits on other U.S. strategic
developments of concern to the Soviet Union, namely
the Ohio-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine;
and,
(4) to stress the Soviet Union's commitment to "equality
and equal security" as the basis for any U.S. -Soviet
agreement.
The Soviets did not hesitate to use blandishments
during the START negotiations to discourage the development
of modern American nuclear weapons. Connected with this
tactic was the Soviet call for a freeze on the development
and deployment of new strategic systems while the talks were
being held.
With regard to the MX missile, for example, the
Soviets threatened to respond in kind by deploying a missile
of similar features:
76 Flora Lewis, "Soviet Arms-Control Expert Asks
Nuclear Balance," New York Times , 2 Sept. 1982.
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The true purpose of deploying the MX is to achieve U.S.
military superiority over the USSR. But this
importunate desire is nothing more than the result of
self-hypnosis. Nothing will come of it. As was stated
quite clearly not long ago, the Soviet Union will be
forced to respond to the American Administration's
challenge by deploying a new ICBM of the same class, and
its characteristics will not be inferior to the MX. 77
This was clearly a disingenuous position. U.S. or
Soviet strategic requirements ostensibly do not require
matching the other side's systems one-for-one, at least that
is the argument Soviet authors preach to American
negotiators. The Soviet emphasis on deploying a system
matching exactly the features of the MX was obviously
intended to dramatize and substantiate the Soviet claim that
the U.S. was driving an action-reaction "arms race."
Further demonstrating the disingenuousness of the above
comments is the fact that the Soviets were then already in
the process of developing and deploying a system of the
characteristics of the MX missile — the SS-24. 78
Apparently in response to U.S. reluctance to accept
Soviet proposals on cruise missiles, Starodubov emphasized
the importance of limiting U.S. cruise missile programs as a
quid pro quo for reductions in heavy missiles. The
newspaper account of this talk quotes him as saying that "no
77 V. Sukhoy, "At Your Request: MX — A Weapon of
Aggression," Pravda
. 25 Jan. 1983, p. 5, in Soviet Union:
Daily Report . FBIS, 27 Jan. 1983, p. AA7
.
78 See Soviet Military Power . 1983 edition, p. 2; and
1984 edition, p. 4.
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arms control agreement 'will be of any value' if the United
States starts a cruise missile race while seeking reduction
in the number of heavy missiles." Cruise missiles were
cited as a new weapon technology where the U.S. was seeking
to gain unilateral advantages. Starodubov stated:
Security is our highest interest. We think it is
dangerous if the United States is superior in some types
of arms. The Americans could exploit superiority for
political purposes, and from that, it would not be a
long way to conflict.
We have always been following the United States on
the arms issue. History shows that the Soviet Union has
never been superior to the United States in strategic
arms. 79
Here again, the Soviets were trying to emphasize the
importance of preventing the United States from breaching
the existing strategic 'equilibrium' and seeking strategic
superiority.
Certain U.S. analysts felt the Soviet Union would try
to eliminate ground-launched cruise missiles intended for
deployment in Europe altogether, while banning or severely
limiting sea-launched cruise missiles, and placing
restrictions on air-launched cruise missiles. Apparently
Moscow's proposed warhead limit in START would count 3,800
prospective U.S. air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. 80
79 Lewis, "Soviet Arms-Control Expert Asks Nuclear
Balance.
"
80 Leslie Gelb, "The Cruise Missile: Preventing New
Arms Race With U.S. Is Seen as Key Soviet Goal in Geneva,"
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With regard to nuclear ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs) , Starodubov indicated that the Soviets had proposed
a ban on Ohio and Typhoon class submarines, but that the
United States had rejected it. It is not clear whether he
was referring to a proposal made during the course of the
SALT II negotiations, or to a proposal made in START, but it
was most probably a reference to a SALT II proposal to
include SLBMs in the "new type" restriction on ballistic
missile development. The Soviets rejected including SLBMs
in that restriction and ultimately proposed exempting SLBMs
from modernization limits altogether. 81
Starodubov, according to this report, "said the basic
Soviet policy was peace and a stable balance," and "he
repeatedly insisted that the Soviet Union sought only a
balance in strategic weapons." The report ends with this
quote from Starodubov 's interview: "If a state has a policy
of peace, it will never seek superiority. It is a dangerous
madness to count on victory." 82
Another Soviet military objective in START was
demonstrating the Soviet commitment to "equality and equal
security" by promoting detente and negotiated solutions to
New York Times . 2 Sept. 1982. See also a 'news analysis'
based largely on the same presentation by Ma j . Gen. Viktor
Starodubov in Flora Lewis, "Soviet Arms-Control Expert," New
York Times . 2 Sept. 1982.
81 See Strobe Talbott, Endgame , pp. 161-163.
82 Flora Lewis, "Soviet Arms-Control Expert," NYT, 2
Sept. 1982.
- 224 -
U.S. AND SOVIET BARGAINING POSITIONS IN START
issues of East-West concern. The primary value of this
objective, in the view of the Soviet military, was to
inhibit public and congressional support for nuclear weapons
modernization programs in the United States by portraying
them as upsetting the correlation of forces, undermining
detente, and wrecking prospects for negotiated arms control
outcomes .
III. SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARDS
CONSTRAINTS ON THEIR OWN SYSTEMS
The foregoing discussion illustrates the point that
the Soviets were far more concerned about either restricting
certain U.S. programs or pursuing objectives not directly
related to the substance of the START negotiations. But
what about Soviet attitudes towards proposed constraints on
their own weapon systems?
Robert Einhorn has published one of the more recent
examinations of this question, and finds that some Soviet
systems may simply be non-negotiable:
Why have they never offered to reduce their 308 heavy
ICBMs for some price — even an outlandish price? . . .
It seems that the Soviets were less interested in
pursuing such deals than in retaining the forces deemed
necessary to perform a central Soviet strategic mission.
What this may demonstrate is that, at any given time,
certain elements of the Soviet force structure may
simply not be negotiable — at least not at any price
that the United States would conceivably be willing to
pay. 83
83 Negotiating from Strength , pp. 49-50
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Einhorn firmly asserts that the basic Soviet
inclination is "to forgo limitations on the United States if
such limitations would involve trading away capabilities
needed to achieve critical Soviet strategic objectives," 84
and determines that those capabilities reside primarily in
heavy ICBMs (SS-18s) . In addition to a discussion of Soviet
reluctance to subject its hard-target kill capabilities (in
the form of heavy ICBMs) to negotiation, Einhorn finds three
other areas of Soviet reticence, some of which are related
to constraints on Soviet hard-target capabilities. As
Einhorn states: 85
1) "Soviet negotiators have vigorously opposed U.S.
proposals in SALT and START that would have altered
significantly their preferred mix of strategic
forces, particularly by decreasing their reliance on
ICBMs and moving toward sea-based and bomber
capabilities; 86
2) "The Soviets have also opposed U.S. proposals that
have had the effect of blocking a promising new
weapons program in an advanced stage of
development; 87 and,
3) "Another sticking point for the Soviet Union has
involved U.S. proposals calling for the dismantling
or destruction of weapon systems before the end of










Einhorn believes that Soviet rejection of limits on
Backfire in SALT II was because of this consideration.
87 Einhorn notes Soviet rejection of establishing
boundaries between light and heavy ICBMs in SALT as a key
example.
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It appears that in START there were two categories of
non-negotiable systems from the Soviet perspective. First,
as Einhorn has noted, the Soviets were reluctant to
negotiate limits on intercontinental hard-target kill
capability. This was a consistent Soviet tendency
throughout the SALT and START processes. Second, the
Soviets were reluctant to negotiate limits on Eurostrategic
systems below a certain level. That level varied during the
course of the INF talks but corresponded roughly to the
minimum number of warheads the Soviet Union would need to
cover critical, time-urgent targets in Western Europe —
usually given as about 100 targets.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING
BARGAINING LEVERAGE
A. U.S. Bargaining Leverage in START
from the Soviet Perspective
This chapter and the one preceding it have sought to
present an analysis that distinguishes between two elements
of Soviet threat perceptions regarding arms control — one
general and abstract, the other more specific. The first
involves Soviet perceptions of the correlation of forces,
which acts as a general analytical device for explaining
Soviet gains in ideological terms — treated in Chapter
Four. The other relates to Soviet perceptions of U.S.
bargaining leverage — examined in this chapter.
The basic conclusions of Chapter Four were that
Soviet perceptions of the correlation of forces in the early
1980s posed sufficient incentives for the Soviets to seek
and enter negotiations on issues of strategic arms
reductions with the United States, but on the other hand,
the lack of credible U.S. bargaining leverage in what would
be START-accountable systems was insufficient to make
reaching a START agreement a relatively high Soviet
priority.
NATO INF modernization posed the most immediate
threat to the correlation of forces in Soviet calculations
and perceptions; and therefore had the greater priority in
Soviet arms negotiation postures. Since the U.S. was more
interested in a START than in an INF agreement, the Soviets
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used this as bargaining leverage to achieve their objectives
in the INF negotiations.
A further conclusion regarding Soviet threat
perceptions was that limitation and reduction of strategic
offensive arms did not warrant a new treaty in the Soviet
view, merely continuation of SALT framework, which was
facilitated by keeping strategic arms negotiations alive. A
review of threat perception sources of Soviet interests in
strategic arms reductions shows a Soviet interest in
negotiating only, and not in reaching agreement. This
interest in negotiating START stemmed from:
— a desire to use that forum to extract U.S.
concessions in the INF talks; and,
— a desire to use the talks to keep Congressional hopes
for arms reductions alive, and thereby to keep up
domestic pressure on the Reagan administration's
strategic modernization programs.
These conclusions have important implications for
bargaining leverage. Reagan began his administration with
high prospects for acquiring substantial bargaining
leverage. It is possible that the Soviets calculated that
Reagan would be unusually successful in getting his
strategic modernization program through Congress, and this
may have led to their interest in beginning START when they
did. However, by late 1983 it may have become apparent to
the Soviets that the Reagan strategic modernization program
could not be sustained at the momentum the Administration
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had hoped for, and was not materializing to the extent
predicted, or that it was taking a different (i.e. more
benign) direction than they (the Soviets) had originally
feared. In short, Reagan's strategic modernization program
failed to materialize during the course of the START
negotiations.
Given the correlation between Soviet threat
perceptions and interest arms control outcomes, what
constitutes meaningful bargaining leverage from the Western
perspective? Several answers are suggested by the material
presented in this chapter. They would include:
— new technologies
— new weapon systems that give the edge to the
technologically advanced side
— evidence of Western bloc unity
— evidence of U.S. resolve in foreign policy, military
strategy, and weapons procurement
B. The Soviet Bargaining Position in
START
Three main conclusions can be derived from the
foregoing chapter. First, the Soviet military played a
predominant role in the implementation of Soviet START
policy. Second, Soviet START proposals were shaped by
Soviet military requirements. In no case did the Soviets
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show the slightest propensity to consider a U.S. proposal
that would have substantially reduced their hard-target kill
potential, restructured their existing mix of strategic
nuclear assets, or impinge on their ability to cover
critical Eurostrategic targets.
Third, Soviet military objectives at the time of
START were adequately served by strategic arms reduction
negotiations, and not necessarily by a START-type agreement.
By the beginning of START negotiations in 1982, the Soviet
Union had achieved a clear superiority over the United
States in prompt hard-target kill capability. In the Soviet
view, relative advantages in this capability are decisive in
deterring and defeating any potential aggressor. In large
measure, the Soviet military had achieved its strategic
objectives in nuclear forces relative to the United States.
It no longer needed an arms control (or reduction) agreement
to achieve strategic superiority — it only needed to
maintain that superiority, and it sought to do this by
keeping strategic arms negotiations alive while not
necessarily seeking an outcome that included a signed
treaty.
A question arises concerning the degree to which the
United States can effectively impact on Soviet interests in
arms control from a bargaining leverage perspective.
Einhorn makes the following observation on this score:
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The Soviets have been able to reach the judgment that,
in the absence of agreement, the United States would not
be in a position credibly to threaten a numerical
buildup that they would have difficulty matching, given
their ongoing programs and open production lines. So,
despite continuing U.S. advantages in several important
areas of the strategic competition, the greater Soviet
numerical momentum has been a critical part of the
setting in which negotiations have taken place and has
had adverse implications for U.S. negotiating
leverage. 8
He further notes that:
Soviet willingness in the future to limit their large
MIRVed ICBMs may have less to do with what the United
States is prepared to offer in return than with how the
Soviets see their own force requirements evolving in a
changing strategic environment. 89








AS AN OBSTACLE TO A STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENT
This chapter seeks to develop two themes. First, the
time was not propitious for an equitable U.S. -Soviet
strategic arms reduction agreement because of leadership
changes in the Soviet Union. Second, even had Andropov
consolidated his authority and influence in an
unprecedentedly quick manner, he showed no disposition to
compromise with the West on a strategic arms reduction
agreement that would have benefited the security position of
the United States and NATO.
An important source of Soviet disinterest in a
strategic arms reduction agreement along the lines of
Reagan's START proposals can be found in the leadership
context of the START negotiations. Throughout the course of
the START negotiations, there was an on-going succession
process (one hesitate's to call it a "crisis") in the Soviet
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Union. Periods of leadership succession in the Soviet Union
have traditionally been characterized by a lack of important
or far-reaching policy-making initiatives, especially in
foreign affairs. This includes arms control. Due to the
leadership succession process taking place in the Soviet
Union during the START negotiations, it may be assumed that
the Soviet Union was not in a position to seriously consider
the kinds of concessions and trade-offs that would have been
necessary were the U.S. to secure a strategically sound
nuclear arms reduction agreement with the Soviet Union.
This chapter will argue that the change in Soviet
leadership occurring in November 1982, in the midst of the
START and INF negotiations, with Yuri Andropov succeeding
Leonid Brezhnev as General Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central
Committee, prevented the Soviet Union from pursuing any
major compromises or arms control initiatives beyond those
that already commanded consensual support among the Soviet
leadership prior to the succession. This apparent consensus
was composed of a relatively hard-line on INF talks, and an
even harder line on START, in which the Soviets linked any
progress to resolution of their INF concerns.
It is important to be absolutely clear about one
point at the outset. The central theme of this chapter is
that Soviet leadership succession was a source of Soviet
disinterest in a strategic arms reduction agreement during
the first set of START negotiations from June 1982 to
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December 1983. What must be stressed is that the dynamics
of succession did not preclude Soviet interest in a START
agreement along the lines it had itself proposed in Geneva.
Moscow would gladly have signed an agreement providing for
American acquiescence in all aspects of its START and INF
positions. These positions almost certainly reflected a
broad consensus within the Soviet leadership that
transcended possible dissent on the part of any one
faction. It can be assumed that the Soviet leadership
succession would not have affected either the existing
Soviet stance in the START negotiations or the Soviet
ability and desire to pursue U.S. initiatives accommodating
the Soviet position.
However, the Soviet succession problem did affect
Soviet flexibility in pursuing avenues of compromise as
proposed by the United States, compromises that might have
entailed significant deviations from the Soviets' own set
positions. In other words, the succession precluded Soviet
interest in any kind of strategic arms reduction agreement
except the one they had proposed. It reduced considerably
the flexibility needed to forge compromises among the Soviet
elite on an arms reduction agreement whose terms would have
1 It should be noted that Soviet START policy in this
period was essentially a continuation of Soviet SALT policy
from the 1970s, and therefore enjoyed a consensus
established over the previous decade.
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been more acceptable and beneficial to the United States.
It was, therefore, unreasonable for the United States to
have expected a favorable outcome to the START process, even
if the United States had initiated a major opening (as some
Americans urged) 2 until after the series of leadership
successions which the Soviet Union experienced in 1982,
1984, and 1985 had been resolved, or had the U.S. acquired
the requisite bargaining leverage.
I. LEADERSHIP PRECONDITIONS FOR SOVIET
INTEREST IN ARMS CONTROL
A. The Historical Leadership Context of
Soviet Disarmament Initiatives
The influence of individuals on national policy is
perhaps nowhere more consistently significant than in
communist regimes, the Soviet Union foremost among them, as
Rodger Swearingen observed:
There is a curious paradox pervading the history of the
Communist realm. A movement which views history as the
outcome of the clash of predetermined, impersonal forces
For example, as William G. Hyland did just two days
after Andropov's accession to the Soviet Party leadership in




cannot, in fact, be fathomed except in terms of the
characters who have shaped its destiny.
To review the historical correlation between the
leadership context and Soviet interests in disarmament
discussed in the first chapter, it should be remembered that
periods of relatively high Soviet interest in arms control
have been marked by post-succession leadership stability.
These periods included the early 1920s, the late 1920s, the
mid-1950s, the early 1960s, and the late 1960s to late
1970s.
In the early 1920s, Lenin was strongly committed to
disarmament for a variety of reasons, including the
exploitation of pacifism in the West, appearing to be a
champion of peace, and fostering an image of ideological
moderation in order to obtain trade and credit concessions
from the West. 4 In the late 192 0s, Stalin committed his
country to disarmament as one dimension of an overall policy
of "collective security" designed to avoid the political
isolation of Soviet state. 5 In the mid-1950s, Khrushchev
3 From the Introduction to Rodger Swearingen, ed.,




4 See Walter C. Clemens, "Lenin on Disarmament."
Slavic Review . 23, 3 (Sept. 1964): 504-525.
5 See the analysis in Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert M.
Slusser, eds., Soviet Foreign Policy, 1928-1934: Documents
and Materials , 2 vols. (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1966) ; and Louis Fischer, The
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used a commitment to disarmament to underscore his
assertions of 'peaceful coexistence, ' as well as for
propaganda, political, military, and foreign policy
purposes.
Brezhnev undertook a commitment to arms control in
the late 1960s to late 1970s period for a variety of foreign
policy and military-strategic reasons that probably included
promoting detente, masking an on-going strategic weapons
build-up (that went unmoderated by SALT I and II) and
enhancing American inhibitions to strategic weapon programs.
In every case, for whatever motivation, high Soviet
interest in arms control has traditionally corresponded to
periods of undisputed leadership stability in the Soviet
Union. Each of these periods were characterized by a leader
who survived a succession crisis, or some other challenge to
his authority (e.g. the multiple challenges to Lenin's
authority at the time of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations)
,
and who emerged as the single most powerful individual in
the Soviet state.
What also emerges from these eras is that disarmament
was used by each successive Soviet leader to serve some
Soviets In World Affairs. 1917-1929 , 2 vols. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1951)
.
6 Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens and Franklyn
Griffiths, Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interests in







wider political objective. Disarmament was never an end in
itself.
B. Importance of a Leader Whose
Authority Is Consolidated
Hypothetical ly, a strong leader is necessary to forge
a consensus on major foreign policy initiatives, especially
those affecting Soviet national security. In this respect,
personal leadership commitment to arms control is an
apparent precondition for Soviet interest in signing an arms
agreement. One can only speculate on why this is so. An
important reason may be that genuine disarmament is a
concept foreign to Soviet leaders, who are preoccupied with
a siege mentality historically characterized by the notion
of 'capitalist encirclement.' Original Marxist-Leninist
doctrine taught that disarmament was impossible until after
capitalist states first disarmed, or were eliminated by the
sweep of world proletariat revolution altogether. It is
easy to suspect that modern Soviet leaders still harbor this
suspicion. Indeed, ultimate loyalty to Marxist-Leninist
ideology requires such a conviction.
Also, given an inherent hostility toward genuine
disarmament in a world of divided and competing ideologies,
it is possible that a strong leader is needed to convince a
7 See Clemens, and V.I. Lenin, "The Military Programme
of the Proletarian Revolution," in V.I. Lenin: Selected




reluctant Soviet elite to place its vested interests on the
negotiating table.
Some evidence has been cited to this effect.
Following Pres. Carter's March 1977 "repudiation" of the
1974 Vladivostok Accords, and his unveiling of the
"Comprehensive Proposal," Georgy Kornienko, senior deputy to
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, told Paul Warnke:
"You shouldn't have disregarded the fact that Brezhnev had
to spill political blood to get the Vladivostok accords." 8
This is an indication that Brezhnev played a pivotal role in
getting support for the Vladivostok agreements, and that
there were sources of internal resistance that had to be
overcome by internal political negotiating.
Further, a strong leader may be necessary to
coordinate a comprehensive campaign of deception and
disinformation of which appearing interested in arms control
negotiations or proposals is one part.
Paul Nitze provided the following insight into Soviet
decision-making for arms control noting that a prior
decision by the Politburo is a precondition to genuine
Soviet interest in negotiating an agreement:
[P]rogress is generally possible only if there has been
a prior full Politburo decision favoring a deal on the
Quoted in Strobe Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story
of SALT II . (New York: Harper & Row, 1979, p. 73; and
Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-






specific subject matter or, in the case of arms control,
a prior decision by the Soviet Defense Council. It is
pretty well agreed that nothing can be done by the
Soviet government, or by any of the other organs of
Soviet society subject to party control, which is in
conflict with decisions of the Politburo. Furthermore,
it is generally agreed that decisions concerning the
basic issues of defense, national security and arms
control are made in the Defense Council, which is
customarily chaired by the General Secretary of the
Party and on which a certain number of the other members
of the Politburo also sit. . . . Once there has been a
prior high-level decision, it is up to the Soviet
negotiators to get the best possible deal for the Soviet
Union. Then, and only then, will they negotiate
seriously with the objectives of arriving at a deal. If
there has been no such prior positive high-level
decision, the United States will find itself negotiating
with itself.
It should be noted that the above factors would be
especially true in cases involving strategic arms
reductions, since this would involve important sacrifices or
cuts in the most important elements of Soviet security
against capitalist imperialism.
C. Power Struggles and Factions in the
Soviet Leadership
The U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
offered the following observation:
If Andropov wants to make any significant policy
departures, he must first be politically strong enough
to overcome the tenacious resistance of a hierarchy
whose positions and privileges are based on the status
quo. 10
9 Paul H. Nitze, "Living with the Soviets," Foreign
Affairs . 63, 2 (Winter 1984/85), p. 362.
10 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The
United States and the Soviet Union: Prospects for the
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The notion that strong central leadership is a
precondition to forging a consensus on arms control policies
presumes that there are factions within a given leadership
that are more or less committed to arms control than are
other factions. The assumption that this is equally true
for the Soviet Union has been around a long time. 11
However, when we are speaking of the Soviet Union, it is an
assumption that requires some qualification.
It is easy to fall into the trap of equating Soviet
political processes with U.S. dynamics, or resorting to the
classic, but discredited "hawks" vs. "doves" dichotomy.
Arkady Shevchenko, in Breaking With Moscow , presents
evidence that there are, in fact, divisions in the Soviet
bureaucracy, but a careful reading of the evidence shows
that it there are Soviet "doves" they are strictly
subordinated to "hawks" and insulated from key policy-making
positions, and furthermore are tolerated only so long as
useful for peripheral staffing tasks. 12 This is to say that




11 Alexander Dallin, et al., The Soviet Union and
Disarmament: An Appraisal of Soviet Attitudes and
Intentions
. (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 77-78.
12 Arkady Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow . (New York:
Knopf, 1985), pp. 180-181; see also, Igor Glagolev, "The
Soviet Decision-Making Process in Arms Control
Negotiations," Orbis
. 21, (Winter 1978).
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there are 'factions' but not along the lines Americans are
familiar with. 13
[T]here is abundant evidence that the USSR is not a
monolith, that decisions are not just the outcome of
informed pragmatic calculations, but that they also
reflect an interplay of a variety of powerful and
assertive institutional interests operating within the
framework of the Soviet bureaucratic system. 4
The idea that the Soviet leadership is split by
factions serves as a deception to obscure fundamental unity
on long-term objectives of Soviet policy. On this, Anatoliy
Golitsyn has written:
The disinformation effort to keep alive Western
belief in the existence and inevitability of recurrent
power struggles in the leadership of communist parities
serves several purposes. There is an obvious close
connection between power struggles and factionalism;
neither exists without the other. Disinformation on
power struggles therefore supports and complements
disinformation operations based on spurious
factionalism, such as those on de-Stalinization, the
Soviet-Albanian and Sino-Soviet splits, and
democratization in Czechoslovakia in 1968. It further
serves to obscure the unity, coordination, and
continuity within the bloc in pursuit of an agreed long-
range policy. . . . The West is more likely to make
concessions, for example, over SALT negotiations, or the
13 A contemporary treatment of foreign policy
"groupings" in the Soviet Union can be found Christer
Jonsson, "Foreign Policy Ideas and Groupings in the Soviet
Union," in Roger E. Kanet, Soviet Foreign Policy and East-
West Relations
.
(New York: Pergamon, 1982), pp. 3-26; groups
specifically concerned with Soviet arms control policy-
making are identified and discussed in Rose E. Gottemoeller,
"Decisionmaking for Arms Limitation in the Soviet Union," in
Hans Guenter Brauch and Duncan L. Clarke, eds.,
Decisionmaking for Arms Limitation: Assessments and
Prospects
,
(Cambridge: Ballinger, 1983), pp. 53-80.
14 Dimitri K. Simes, "Are the Soviets Interested in
Arms Control?" Washington Quarterly , (Spring 1985), p. 147.
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supply of high technology goods to the Soviet Union or
China, if it believes that by so doing it will
strengthen the hand of a 'liberal' or 'pragmatic'
tendency or faction with the party leadership.
Conversely, the West can be persuaded to attribute
aggressive aspects of communist policy to the influence
of hard-lingers in the leadership. 15
D. Impact of Leadership Succession on
Soviet Policy
It has long been assumed by scholars of Soviet
political processes that Soviet foreign and domestic policy
undergoes a certain degree of paralysis during a succession
crisis. Philip G. Roeder characterizes this assumption as
follows: "during successions, Leninist regimes such as the
Soviet Union are far less capable of dynamic responses to
pressing problems." 16 Dimitri K. Simes points up another
aspect of Soviet leadership succession processes:
The impact of the Soviet domestic political process is
particularly great today in the absence of a strong
General Secretary. Without a genuine chief executive,
those vested interests among the Soviet elite enjoy
particular autonomy to pursue their special agendas and
(as a minimum) to exercise veto over proposals of which
they disapprove. 17
15 Anatoliy Golitsyn, New Lies for Old: The Communist
Strategy of Deception and Disinformation , (New York: Dodd,
Mead, 1984), pp. 206-207.
16 Philip G. Roeder, "Do New Soviet Leaders Really Make
a Difference? Rethinking the 'Succession Connection',"
American Political Science Review , vol. 7 9 (1985), p. 958;
also see A. Brown, "The Soviet Succession: From Andropov to
Chernenko," vol. 40, World Today . (1984): 134-141.
17 Simes, p. 147.
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Sovietologists have discerned two stages in past
Soviet leadership successions. According to George W.
Breslauer, the first stage (which in both the Khrushchev and
Brezhnev cases lasted four years) is often characterized by:
[R]ival programs for significant change in policy
structure, by zigzags in policy, and by the polarization
of positions as policy disputes fed into the power
struggle and as the major protagonists seized on
opportunities to portray their rivals in an unfavorable
light. 18
According to Breslauer, during the second stage:
[T]he party leader forged a comprehensive program in
domestic and foreign policy, in so doing striking a
compromise among conflicting tendencies, advocating
significant changes in economic policy and
administrative structure, and proposing significant
Soviet initiatives for the sake of US-Soviet
collaboration in order to regularize the arms race,
reduce confrontations, outflank the PRC in international
affairs, and increase access to Western trade and
credits. "
Note that Breslauer claims a defense buildup
accompanied both the Khrushchev and Brezhnev succession
periods. 20
Raymond Garthoff writes of the post-Brezhnev era:
[T]he post-Brezhnev time of transition has meant that
all policy decisions have become more political, that
is, more susceptible to political challenge and to the
need for constant reconfirmation of consensus among the
18 George W. Breslauer, "Political Succession and the














leadership and key institutional constituencies,
including the military. 21
In other words, major initiatives relating to
strategic arms control policy, or significant flexibility in
arms control negotiations, should not be expected until
after the ostensible first stage of the succession period
has been completed. It can be argued that the Andropov
succession, even if having cleared the first stage in an
unprecedentedly short time, had barely reached this second
stage before Andropov dropped from public sight in the
Soviet Union due to terminal illnesses, and the process of a
new succession period had begun. 22
I. THE ANDROPOV SUCCESSION
Richard Staar has suggested that Andropov's
succession probably began in January 1982 with the death of
chief ideologist Mikhail Suslov. In May 1982 Andropov was
made secretary in charge of ideology, a position expected to
have gone to Chernenko. 23 This has been interpreted as
2 1 Detente and Confrontation , p. 16.
2 2 That the Andropov succession was also characterized
by this two-stage process is confirmed by Bohdan R.
Bociurkiw, "Andropov's Takeover," International
Perspectives
. July/August 1983, pp. 10-13.
23 See Richard F. Staar, USSR Foreign Policies After
Detente
. (Stanford: Hoover, 1985), p. 36; Seweryn Bialer,
The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline ,
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evidence of Andropov's ascendancy over supporters of
Chernenko, and foreshadowed his securing the top position
despite (or perhaps because of) Chernenko 's seniority.
Yuri Valdimirovich Andropov was made General
Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party on 12 November 1982.
Western officials immediately predicted that he would stress
continuity in Soviet foreign policy. And yet, in terms of
on-going arms negotiations, continuity meant perpetuating a
Soviet-imposed stalemate. The Chairman of the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff was quoted the day after Andropov's
accession as saying it would be "difficult for the Soviets
to move off their present position in this round ... I
don't see anything coming out of the present round of arms
negotiations." 24 This sentiment was echoed by foreign
policy specialists and officials in European and Asian
countries, where it was feared the absence of strong Soviet
leader would forestall new arms control initiatives and
maintain the paralysis then believed to characterize the
arms talks. 25
(New York: Knopf, 1986), p. 83: and William E. Odora, "Choice
and Change in Soviet Politics," in Erik P. Hoffmann and
Robbin F. Laird, eds., The Soviet Polity in the Modern Era .
(New York: Aldin Publishing, 1984), pp. 916-920.
24 Joseph Volz, "Standstill Is Seen In Arms Talks," New
York Times , 13 Nov. 1982.
25 Comments by officials from Germany, Britain, France,
Italy, India, and even Peking, are cited in William
Drozdiak, "Brezhnev's Death Evokes Concern Over Detente,"
Washington Post , 12 Nov. 1982.
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A statement issued by TASS on the naming of Andropov
as Party Chief stressed continuity of policy:
On instruction of the Politburo of the Central
Committee, Konstantin Chernenko, member of the Politburo
and secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, made a
speech. He nominated Yuri Andropov for election to the
post of General Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central
Committee
.
The plenary meeting unanimously elected Yuri
Andropov General Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central
Committee. . . .
Yuri Andropov assured the C.P.S.U. Central Committee
and the Communist Party that he will devote all his
energy, knowledge and experience of life to the
successful implementation of the program of building
Communism charted in the decisions of the 26th C.P.S.U.
Congress and to insuring continuity in solving the tasks
of further enhancing the economic and defense might of
the U.S.S.R., improving the welfare of the Soviet people
and carrying out all the Leninist domestic and foreign
policies that had been pursued under Leonid Brezhnev. 26
Andropov's emphasis on continuity of policy was
probably intended to reassure those who had supported him
rather than Chernenko, and to facilitate the rapid
consolidation of party support. But it may also have
reflected the realities of the impact of successions on
Soviet policy-making processes.
Western assessments of what to expect from Andropov's
leadership clearly anticipated continuity in Soviet foreign
26 ii<rAss Statement on Choice of Andropov as Party
Chief," New York Times , 13 Nov. 1982.
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and domestic policy, including emphasis on improving
relations with the PRC. 28 This continuity was also expected
to mean a continuing low priority on arms control agreements
with the Reagan administration.
U.S. observers also pointed to the lack of Soviet
movement on four critical issues as evidence that Andropov
was not pursuing any substantive shifts in policy. These
issues included human rights, withdrawal of Cuban forces
from Angola, nuclear weapons proliferation, and nuclear arms
control. 29
Other general aspects of Andropov's policy priorities
revealed a determination to maintain, above all, the Soviet
offensive against the outside world: "The first year of the
Andropov era revealed a fundamental fact about the policy of
the leader: the war goes on. The first steps taken were
2 For predictions of continuity in Andropov's general
policy initiatives, see Martin McCauley, "Leadership and the
Succession Struggle," in Martin McCauley, ed. , The Soviet
Union After Brezhnev . (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983), pp.
12-39, especially pp. 31-37; and Odom, "Choice and Change in
Soviet Politics," pp. 932-939. Odom marks agricultural
policy as the one area where Andropov was likely to make
major changes.
28 William Beecher, "Some Clues on What to Expect from
Andropov Regime," Boston Globe , 3 Dec. 1982.
29 See, for example, Don Oberdorfer, "Andropov Holding




aimed at strengthening the home front and undermining the
enemy .
"
Andropov's policy priorities may have involved a
cynical form of opening to the West, taking the form of a
"peace offensive" but held little prospect for substantive
arms reductions.
In June 1983 Charles Krauthammer wrote in reference
to Andropov that "With him, not Brezhnev, in charge of the
Soviet Union, the world will be a more dangerous place." 31
Indeed, available evidence suggests that Andropov moved
quickly to consolidate his authority and influence, and
adopted a ruthless bent in his policy initiatives.
Krauthammer argues that Andropov quickly endowed
Soviet foreign policy with what he terms "the Andropov
factor," defined as a Soviet "willingness to risk and
provoke that will make its adversaries think twice." Noting
Andropov's reputation for ruthlessness, Krauthammer notes
that a radical increase in Soviet power over the preceding
two decades constituted an important factor promoting
Andropov's heightened assertiveness in foreign policy. 32
This assertiveness predated Andropov and was most markedly
Michael Heller, "Andropov: A Retrospective View,"
Survey
. 28, 1 (Spring 1984), p. 55.
31 Charles Krauthammer, "The Andropov Factor," The New







demonstrated by Brezhnev's invasion of Afghanistan. 33 But
Andropov without doubt brought a penchant for risk-taking,
even with relatively low apparent gains, to his position at
the helm of Soviet global power. According to Krauthammer,
Andropov presided over an increasingly aggressive Soviet
policy in the border wars raging in Cambodia, Lebanon,
Afghanistan, and Central America; in Soviet actions toward
friendly nations such as Sweden (i.e. submarines in
territorial waters) ; in almost halting Jewish immigration;
and, in elevating the status of the KGB by promoting its
chief to the position of Party Secretary. 34
There were three reasons for suspecting that
Andropov's consolidation of power had fallen short of
expectations as of January 1983, according to administration
analysts as reported by the Washington Times : 35
(1) the sharp contrast between Andropov's optimistic,
compromising tone on strategic nuclear arms in
response to an American journalist last week, and a
hard-hitting attack on the U.S. arms position in an
authoritative Pravda editorial last weekend;
(2) apparent contradictions in Soviet statements
regarding Afghanistan; and,
33 The KGB's role in the Soviet decision to invade
Afghanistan should provide an interesting subject for
consideration.
34 Krauthammer, p. 21.
35 Peter Almond, "U.S. Doubts Andropov Losing Power,"
Washington Times , 4 Jan. 1983.
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Although William Beecher reports the theory that
Andropov himself avoided assuming this post out of political
adroitness, to avoid "the specter of the former boss of the
KGB moving precipitously to grab all of Leonid Brezhnev's
titles before his body was cold." See "Some Clues on What
to Expect from Andropov Regime," footnote 28.
37 Bociurkiw, "Andropov's Takeover," p. 13.
"U.S. Doubts Andropov Losing Power," Washington
Times
. 4 Jan. 1983.
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(3) failure of the Supreme Soviet to immediately appoint
Andropov head of state (concurrently with his
position as head of the Soviet communist party). 6
In addition, other observers of the Soviet leadership
scene have noted the following:
The failure of the June [1983] Central Committee session
to remove Chernenko and elect Andropov's supporters as
new voting members of the Politburo; the earlier
replacement of Fedorchuk by Chebrikov as the KGB chief;
and some contradictory policy pronouncements from the
Kremlin (e.g. on the acute nationality problem) appear
to reflect the continuing difficulties encountered by
Andropov in consolidating his power.
On the other hand, other analysts noted the relative
quick appointment of Andropov, in sharp contrast to the
lengthy succession crises of the past, and Andropov's swift
successes in moving his own people into top administrative
positions. ° Furthermore, some analysts interpreted
Andropov's failure to secure the largely ceremonial head of
state appointment as an indication of political adroitness,
in view of the possibility that "many Soviets might have
been frightened by the specter of the former boss of the KGB
SOVIET LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION
moving precipitously to grab all of Leonid Brezhnev's titles
before his body was cold." 39
Andropov acquired the last of the three top positions
held by Brezhnev (General Secretary of the CPSU, chairman of
the Defense Council, and chairman of the Supreme Soviet
Presidium) on 16 June 1983 when he became chairman of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. In just over six months he
had acquired the positions it had taken Brezhnev 13 years to
accumulate. 40
The U.S. seems to have taken a cautious stance toward
the new Soviet leader, declining to press for an early
summit meeting and urging instead a spring or summer 1983
meeting between Gromyko and Secretary of State George P.
Shultz. 41
Andropov's tenure in office was accompanied by well-
orchestrated perceptions management efforts aimed at
fostering an image of flexibility and renewed interest in
East-West detente on the part of the new Soviet leader.
Andropov had ostensibly been a long-time supporter of
detente, favoring such a course as early as 1975 and
39 Beecher, "Some Clues on What to Expect From Andropov
Regime," cited in footnote 28.
40 Staar, pp. 37-38.
41 Don Oberdorfer, "Andropov Holding Soviet Policy on
Steady Course," Washington Post , 2 Feb. 1983.
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defending it as late as 1980, even after the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan. 2
Another element of this perceptions management
campaign included "hints by several prominent Soviets that
Andropov's KGB had opposed [the] invasion of Afghanistan,
and suggestions that the new leader [was] more interested
than his predecessor in a diplomatic way out." 43
II. ANDROPOV'S ARMS CONTROL POLICY
Andropov's arms control policies can be sketched in
fairly brief terms. INF was emphasized as the top priority.
Themes in the Soviet INF negotiating posture stressed the
Soviet view that parity existed and would be upset by NATO
INF deployments; the Soviets would have to be compensated
for British and French systems; and progress in START was
linked to Western concessions on the INF issue. Finally,
the termination of both INF and START was apparently
insisted upon by Andropov.
In START, Andropov's policies also showed strong
elements of consistency with Brezhnev's approach, placing
priority on American acceptance of a nuclear freeze as a
precondition to negotiations on strategic weapons
On Andropov's alleged devotion to detente, see Jerry
F. Hough, "Soviet Succession: Issues and Personalities,"
Problems of Communism . 31, 5 (Sept. -Oct. 1982), pp. 33-34.
Don Oberdorfer, "Andropov Holding Soviet Policy on




reductions. Andropov also extended an offer of token cuts
from the Vladivostok/SALT II limits. Beyond this, any
substance to Andropov's START position involved little more
than acrid denunciations of U.S. proposals as unfair,
unequal, fraudulent, and insincere.
Even before the news broke that Yuri Andropov had
been appointed General Secretary of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, Western experts on Soviet matters
interviewed in the press stressed that they expected the new
Soviet leadership to seize the opportunity to exploit
Western public opinion in Europe with a "peace offensive"
stressing a "nuclear freeze" and aimed at defeating NATO INF
deployment plans in Western Europe. Some felt it would be
motivated by serious Soviet economic difficulties. Others
felt this would be a minor incentive, but all seemed to
agree that any Soviet moves in the arms control arena would
be of a tactical nature, rather than a significant change in
policy. Significantly, none expected major initiatives in
the START negotiations. 44 These predictions by and large
were proven correct. Andropov did initiate a major
propaganda offensive aimed at INF. START was again
relegated to a subordinate position.
44 See report of interviews with Robert Burns, Amos
Jordan, and Fritz Ermarth in Charles w. Corddry, "Arms




Andropov launched four major policy initiatives soon
after assuming the office of Party General Secretary.
Seweryn Bialer describes them as follows:
The first was greater candor in relations between
leadership and population . . . The second initiative
sought to convince the public that the new leader was
hard at work, on top of his job, and capable of
resolving the difficulties inherited from Brezhnev . . .
The third was a visible and repeated effort to show that
the new leadership was strong and united, and ready and
able to defend Soviet power and prevent its enemies from
taking advantage of the period of transition. . . . The
fourth was probably the most important and impressive.
It sought to enforce greater discipline in the workplace
and society at large, as well as to reduce blatant
official and unofficial corruption. 45
Andropov's first major foreign policy speech was
delivered to a joint meeting of the CPSU Central Committee,
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the Supreme Soviet of
the Russian Federation, gathered to celebrate the 60th
anniversary of the USSR. 46 Apparently, this speech was
carried live on Soviet television. 47 As predicted, Andropov
restated major Soviet arms control themes of the previous
few years, and focused on INF.
45 The Soviet Paradox , p. 91.
See "Report by Soviet General Secretary Andropov:
Nuclear Arms Reduction Proposals and Confidence-Building
Measures [Extracts], Dec. 21, 1982," Documents on
Disarmament, 1982
. (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, ) , pp. 917-922
47 Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan
Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control ,





Andropov first renounced nuclear war, which "must not
be allowed to break out." He reiterated the Soviet Union's
commitment not to use nuclear weapons first, and said the
Soviet Union was "prepared to agree that the sides should
renounce first use of conventional, as well as nuclear
arms." 48 He then turned to the START negotiations, saying
that the U.S. approach to START "can on no account be
acceptable to the Soviet Union, and, for that matter, to all
those who have a stake in preserving and consolidating
peace." 49 He repeated the standing Soviet position calling
for a 25 percent reduction in strategic arms and a freeze on
the strategic arsenals of the two sides while the
negotiations were under way. He did not offer any new START
initiatives.
Giving a vague approbation to confidence-building
measures that would be designed to "take the finger off the
trigger, and put a reliable safety catch on all weapons,"
Andropov turned to the INF negotiations. Here he said the
"Soviet Union is prepared to go very far." 50 Moscow offered
to reduce INF weapons in Europe to the level of French and
British forces: "We are prepared, among other things, to
agree that the Soviet Union should retain in Europe only as
48








inany missiles as are kept there by Britain and France — not
a single one more." 51 Andropov also offered to match any
reductions the British and French might make in their
forces, and urged that aircraft be included in an INF
accord.
In an interview with the Soviet press eight days
later, Andropov suggested the Soviet Union was prepared to
accept either an "absolute zero" option for INF systems in
Europe, or a two-thirds reduction (down to the Soviet count
of British and French forces). 2
Clearly Andropov's highest arms control priority was
INF, and not START.
The continuity in Soviet INF policy after the
Andropov succession probably indicated that Andropov had
personally been involved in, or at least approved of Soviet
INF policy planning prior to his appointment as General
Secretary. In fact, Yuli Kvitsinsky, the Soviet ambassador
to the INF talks confirmed this soon after Brezhnev's
death. 53 Many hoped in the West that "the changing of the
guard in the Kremlin offered an opportunity for progress,"




"Interview of Soviet General Secretary Andropov,
December 30, 1982," Documents on Disarmament, 1982 , p. 927.
53 Talbott, Deadly Gambits , p. 159.
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However, nothing in Andropov's pronouncements from
on high, or in his negotiators' statements in Geneva,
indicated that the Soviets were any more willing than
before to countenance new American missiles in Europe.
On the contrary, the conciliatory rhetoric seemed
primarily intended to encourage West European hopes that
an agreement might yet spare them having to go through
with deployment and to contend with the Soviet
countermeasures that would inevitably follow. In
effect, the softer words were in the service of the same
hard line, which was to block deployment — or, failing
that, to punish it. 4
In any case, Andropov had succeeded in projecting an
image of flexibility in the INF negotiations, one the U.S.
felt obliged to counteract. 55
In the aftermath of the November 198 3 collapse of the
INF talks, Western diplomats suggested that prospects for a
settlement may have been doomed by uncertainties in the
Kremlin leadership. An article in the New York Times noted
that:
Principal among the uncertainties is that Yuri V.
Andropov appears to be slipping in authority because of
illness. As a result, diplomats say they doubt there
has been any voice in the Politburo strong enough to
argue for more flexibility in Geneva. 56
Other sources noted the apparent paralysis in Soviet
foreign policy during the period of Andropov's decline:







, pp. 167, 192.
56 John F. Burns, "The Walkout By Moscow," New York
Times . 26 Nov. 1983.
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Moscow's part toward greater conciliation or greater
confrontation with the U.S." 5 This seemed true despite the
occurrence of several crises in U.S. -Soviet relations in the
Fall of 1983, including the shooting down of a South Korean
airliner by the Soviet Union, NATO INF deployments in
Europe, and hostilities in Lebanon.
By late fall, 1983, top Soviet policy-makers may have
become preoccupied with either propping up an image of
Andropov as a leader in control, or jockying for position in
the face of an imminent succession struggle. 8 Such
diversions could not have helped but limit the Soviet
Union's ability to dynamically interact with the United
States on issues of strategic nuclear arms reductions.
Some Western observer's detected a hardening of the
Soviet position toward the U.S. in the Fall of 1983. Many
attributed this to the KAL 007 incident and American
reactions in its aftermath.
In September 1983, Leslie Gelb of the New York Times
commented:
Mr. Andropov's statement seemed to say that Moscow had
written off the prospects of compromising and reaching
57
"The Kremlin Goes On Automatic Pilot," U.S. News &
World Report . 19 Dec. 1983, p. 26.
58 Dusko Doder, "Soviets Stress Andropov Still Wields
Power," Washington Post , 2 9 Dec. 198 3.
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arms limitation agreements with the Reagan
administration. 59
As of the Fall of 1983 Andropov was no longer in a
position to exert dynamic leadership, the kind of leadership
needed to rally support for conciliatory breakthroughs, even
had the Soviet leadership been so inclined. Strobe Talbott
reports of this period:
Andropov by now was obviously very ill, and his
incapacitation seemed to be affecting the workings of
the government. Instead of taking to the podium,
Andropov was issuing proclamations in the pages of
Pravda and on the tickers of TASS — or the collective
leadership was doing so in his name. 60
Seweryn Bialer corroborates:
The struggle for power did not end with Andropov's
ascendancy. Especially in the period from late summer
1983 until his death in February 1984, there were
attempts to circumvent the power potentially inherent in
his positions as general secretary. At the Politburo
meetings of November 4 and 5, 1983, there apparently
developed major differences among members over whether
to quit the INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces)
negotiations with the United States after the deployment
of American Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe.
The deadlock was allegedly broken in favor of quitting
by a forceful memo from the absent Andropov. 1
However, other indications were that Andropov, or his
coalition, were still in power as of Fall 1983. Note the
59 Leslie Gelb, "Soviet Signal To the U.S." New York
Times , 29 Sept. 1983.
60 Talbott, Deadly Gambits , p. 197.
61 The Soviet Paradox , p. 85.
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following evidence presented by Joseph L. Nogee and Robert
H. Donaldson:
The leadership changes in the Politburo and Secretariat
in late 1983 indicated to the outside world that
Andropov was still in charge. In late November Geidar
Liev, a former head of the KGB in Azerbaijan, was
brought into the Politburo and made First Deputy Prime
Minister. In December 1983 three of four new appointees
to the Party leadership had close ties with Andropov.
Vitaly I. Vorotnikov and Mikhail S. Solomentsev were
elevated from candidate to full Politburo membership.
KGB chairman V.M. Chebrikov was made a candidate member,
and Yegor Ligachev was added to the Secretariat. '
Seweryn Bialer also seeks to explain Andropov's grip
on power even after months of prolonged illness:
Among other factors that help to explain the paradox
of Andropov's resilience, one is particularly germane to
Soviet-American relations. External danger impels
Soviet leaders to preserve unity at all costs. They
were genuinely persuaded that President Reagan and his
policies presented a grave test of their will to
maintain and improve their international position. They
wanted the sort of strong leadership that Andropov was
able to deliver until August 1983 and that they hoped
could be renewed with his recovery. 63
Nevertheless, despite evidence that Andropov's
supporters continued to gain in strength even as illness
prevented his direct intervention in Soviet politics, the
Soviet leadership lacked the will or initiative to respond
to major U.S. offers in START. It was the paralysis in the
62 Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet
Foreign Policy Since World War II . 2nd ed., (New York:
Pergamon Press, 1984), pp. 317-18.
63 The Soviet Paradox , pp. 89-90.
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Soviet arms control position that made the decisive
contribution to stalemate in December 1983.
III. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has sought to establish two basic
themes. First, the time was not propitious for an equitable
U.S. -Soviet strategic arms reduction agreement because of
leadership changes in the Soviet Union. Second, even had
Andropov consolidated his authority and influence in an
unprecedentedly quick manner, he showed no disposition to
compromise with the West on a strategic arms reduction
agreement that would have benefited the security position of
the United States and NATO at the expense of Soviet
superiority in both strategic nuclear and INF systems.
Raymond Garthoff writes of the leadership
implications for achievement in arms control at this point
in time:
The conjunction of leadership changes in the United
States and the Soviet Union in the early 1980s combined
with an urgent need in both countries to redefine their
relationship after the collapse of the detente of the
1970s. The new president in January 1981 was vigorous
and ideological, had clear authority, believed in the
need for a more assertive stand, and had very little
awareness of international politics. The Soviet
leadership, by contrast, was old and weak (Kosygin and
Suslov died and Brezhnev was dying as the new leadership
came into office in Washington, and then Andropov lasted
barely a year and half before passing away, to be
replaced by Chernenko) and was bureaucratically
constrained, transitional, and ideologically ossified
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and set in its ways with respect to international
politics. 64
By way of conclusion, Andropov's highest arms control
policy was clearly INF, not START. Further, he showed no
real urgency concerning strategic arms reductions, and
preferred resorting to unilateral means of dealing with
nuclear forces in Europe, rather than pursue a negotiated
settlement.
Was Andropov in a position to rally the Soviet
leadership behind significant arms control compromises in
the Fall of 1983? The evidence suggests that Andropov was
certainly beyond the first stage of a typical succession
process, the stage where power is consolidated, and
furthermore had done so in record time. Had he so desired,
it is possible that the INF and START negotiations could
have proceeded past the deployment of Pershing II and cruise
missiles in Europe. Yet, as Seweryn Bialer observes,
Andropov's reign was "far too short to leave a major impact
on the Soviet system," 65 and nothing short of a major
impact was required for the Soviets to accede to substantial
strategic arms reductions along the lines of the apparent
compromises that began emerging in the talks during their
final rounds.
64 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation , pp. 1063-1064
65 The Soviet Paradox , p. 90.
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Genuine Soviet interest in a strategic arms reduction
agreement in terms desired by Washington would have required
a fundamental shift in Soviet policy. Such a fundamental
shift was unlikely in the near term, given the inertial
policy dynamics of Soviet succession processes. Even though
Andropov moved with surprising speed to consolidate his
power base, and made impressive progress toward that end
relative to the two previous Soviet successions, he still
did not acquire the potential authority needed to preside
over a fundamental shift in Soviet arms control objectives.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATION AND INTEREST IN A
STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENT
This chapter seeks to achieve several objectives.
First, it examines the proposition that the Soviets are more
likely to be interested in signing and observing disarmament
agreements during periods of detente. This may confirm the
idea that relaxation of political tensions must be a
prerequisite for successful arms negotiations. START is a
great example of the principle that detente must precede
substantive arms control outcomes. It demonstrates the near
total dependence of progress in East-West arms control on
the international political climate.
It is usually agreed by arms control theorists that
failure to achieve progress in this vital area generally
reflects the degree of tension between East and West at
any given time.
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The original intellectual forefathers of contemporary
arms control theory understood that there was an integral
relationship between East-West tensions and the prospects
for arms control. In his seminal book, The Control of the
Arms Race . Hedley Bull reminded the reader:
We cannot expect that a system of arms control will be
brought into operation, nor that, if it is, it will
persist, unless certain political conditions are
fulfilled. 2
Bull then listed those conditions:
Unless the powers concerned want a system of arms
control; unless there is a measure of political detente
among them sufficient to allow of such a system; unless
they are prepared to accept the military situation among
them which the arms control system legitimizes and
preserves, and can agree and remain agreed about what
this situation will be, there can be little place for
arms control. 3
This chapter will therefore explicitly seek to determine
whether these conditions existed during the time period
under discussion (1981 to 1983).
A second objective of this chapter will be to
summarize the Soviet view of detente. This will also
include an examination of the contribution of arms control
1 Otto Pick, "The Leadership of Reagan and Gorbachev:
The Soviet Perspective," in Walter Goldstein, ed. , Reagan's
Leadership and the Atlantic Alliance: Views from Europe and
America
.
(Washington: Pergamon-Brassey 's, 1986): 69.
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negotiations and/or agreements to detente in the Soviet
view. This chapter will attempt to show that the START
negotiations did not take place in an atmosphere of detente
and that therefore the Soviets were not motivated to seek an
arms agreement for the purpose of re-institutional!zing
detente.
I. THE HISTORICAL CORRELATION BETWEEN
PERIODS OF DETENTE AND
SOVIET INTERESTS IN DISARMAMENT
In 1979 Brezhnev gave the following Soviet definition
of detente:
What is detente, or a relaxation of tensions? What
meaning do we invest in this term? Detente means, first
and foremost, ending the 'cold war' and going over to
normal, stable relations among states. It means a
willingness to settle differences and disputes not by
force, not by threats and saber-rattling, but by
peaceful means, at a conference table. It means trust
among nations and the willingness to take each other's
legitimate interests into consideration. 4
As this quote suggests, there are several elements of
the Soviet view of detente. First, and above all, detente
in the Soviet view means a renunciation of the use of force
to achieve political ends. As Raymond Garthoff notes:
4
"From Speech upon Presenting the Gold Star Medal to
the Hero City of Tula," in Leonid Brezhnev, Peace, Detente &
Soviet-American Relations: A Collection of Public
Statements
. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich) , 1979, p.
150. This passage is also given in Raymond L. Garthoff,
Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations From
Nixon to Reagan
.
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985), p. 36.
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In the Soviet conception, detente and peaceful
coexistence would serve "to make the world safe for
historical change," so to speak, by depriving the
imperialist powers, above all the United States, of
resort to military force to curb the revolutionary
social-economic-political transformations that would
ultimately lead to world socialism and communism.
Garthoff contrasts this Soviet view of detente with
that of the United States:
For us, detente is a very broad concept. Primarily it
means a common inclination on the part of states and
their leaders not toward military preparations and
hostility toward other states but toward peaceful
cooperation with them. It means normal communication
between countries and peoples, conscientious observance
of the norms of international law, respect for each
country's sovereignty and noninterference in each
other's internal affairs. Finally it means a constant
desire to promote by practical deeds the curbing of the
arms race which has become the scourge of the world, and
an aspiration to strengthen security on the basis of
gradual intensification of mutual trust on the basis of
fair, reciprocal principles.
The Western powers accepted a renunciation of the use
of force because they were compelled to do so by the changed
correlation of forces. When Western "ruling circles"
recognize this changed correlation of forces and take
actions in accordance with this "new reality" the Soviets
call it "realism:"
5 Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation:
American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan , (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings, 1985), p. 49.
6 Boris Kotov, "International Review," Pravda , 3 Oct.
1982, p. 4, translated in Soviet Union Daily Report , FBIS, 6
Oct. 1982, p. CC1.
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Now the leaders of the bourgeois world can no longer
seriously count on resolving the historic conflict
between capitalism and socialism by force of arms. The
senselessness and extreme danger of further increasing
tension under conditions when both sides have at their
disposal weapons of colossal destructive power are
becoming ever more obvious.
The Soviet Union has made clear that this
renunciation of force does not apply to the ideological
conflict between communism and capitalism. Its meaning is
restricted to a cessation of the continuation of this
conflict by Western resort to armed forces. Upon assuming
the position of General Secretary of the CPSU, Yuri Andropov
stated: "The CPSU does not want the dispute [of] ideas to
grow into a confrontation between states and peoples, and it
does not want arms and readiness to use them to become a
game of the potentials of the social systems." 8
Second, detente means a relaxation of tensions. This
reguires some qualification. The source of tensions is
Western hostility to the Soviet program for socialist
construction. Therefore relaxation of tensions means
cessation of Western hostility to Soviet ideological
aggression and expansion.
7 From a 13 June 1975 speech by Brezhnev carried in
Pravda . 14 June 1975, cited in Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente
and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to
Reagan
. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985), p. 42.
8 Pravda . 25 Nov. 1982, translated in Soviet Union
Daily Report . FBIS, 26 Nov. 1982, p. AA1.
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Third, detente, in the Soviet view, is a way to
promote, through peaceful means, the worldwide construction
of socialism. In 1970 Leonid I. Brezhnev was quoted as
saying "detente, in fact, creates favorable conditions for
the struggle between the two systems and for altering the
correlation of forces in favor of socialism." 9
We make no secret of the fact that we see detente as
the way to create more favorable conditions for peaceful
socialist and communist construction. Detente does not
and cannot mean a freezing of the objective processes of
historical development. It is not a safeguard for
decaying regimes. It does not indulge the right to
suppress the peoples 'just struggle for their national
liberation. It does not remove the need for social
transformations. This is a matter for the people of
each individual country. It would also be erroneous to
suppose that lessening the tension should be paid for by
one-sided concessions by the socialist countries, that
in conditions of detente the reactionary imperialist
circles can achieve what they were unable to achieve
during the 'coldwar' period. °
Fourth, the relaxation of tensions characteristic of
detente does not apply to the "ideological struggle" being
waged between communism and capitalism, which, after all, is
the essence of international conflict in the Soviet view.
Note the correlation between the following quotes:
Detente and peaceful coexistence are not tantamount
to a political and social status quo. Detente provides
more favorable conditions for overcoming the crisis in a
9 Quoted in Albert L. Weeks and William C. Bodie, eds.,
War and Peace: Soviet Russia Speaks, (New York: National
Strategy Information Center, 1983), p. 6.
10 Pravda , 22 May 1976, cited in Raymond S. Sleeper,
ed., A Lexicon of Marxist-Leninist Semantics , (Alexandria,
VA: Western Goals, 1983), p. 83.
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democratic way and for remaking society along democratic
and socialist lines. 11
Detente in no way, however, means the freezing of the
objective processes of historical development. In no
way does it eliminate the existence of class antagonisms
within capitalist states, between the people's interests
and those of world imperialism, and between the two
social systems, nor does it reduce the ideological
confrontation. 12
Fifth, the achievement of detente is the result of
favorable changes in the world correlation of forces, and a
certain "realism" on the part of capitalist leaders when
they recognize and condone the inevitable advance of
socialism based on that changing correlation of forces.
While head of the KGB, Yuri Andropov is quoted as saying
"Imperialism accepted detente, not because it wished to but
because it was forced to. It was compelled to accept
detente because the correlation of forces in the world arena
changed in favor of socialism." 13
In the past few years, conviction in the possibility,
and moreover in the necessity, of peaceful coexistence
was confirmed in the consciousness both of the broad
popular masses and also in the ruling circles of the
majority of countries. International detente has become
11 B.N. Ponomarev, "The International Significance of
the Berlin Conference," Kommunist, No. 11 (1976), cited in
Raymond S. Sleeper, ed. , A Lexicon of Marxist-Leninist
Semantics
. (Alexandria, VA: Western Goals, 1983), p. 83.
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possible because a new correlation of forces has been
established in the world area. 14
A Central Committee resolution passed in 1980
stressed: "Detente is the natural result of the correlation
of forces in the world arena that has formed in recent
decades. The military strategic balance between the world
of socialism and the world of capitalism is an achievement
of truly historic significance." 15
According to this aspect of the Soviet view of
detente, the Soviet achievement of strategic nuclear parity
was the essential prerequisite for establishing normal
relations with the West. 16 Detente was "predicated on
parity." 17
Sixth, the Soviets believed that it was both possible
and essential that political detente lead to "military
detente." Military detente has three important aspects.
First, it extends agreements in the diplomatic and political
field to military issues in the form of arms control
agreements:
14 Brezhnev in a speech on 13 June 1975, cited in
Garthoff, p. 44.
15
"On the International Situation and Foreign Policy
of the Soviet Union: Resolution of the Plenum of the Central
Committee of the CPSU, June 23, 1980," Kommunist, No. 10
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Military detente is an intricate and multifaceted
process of transition in military and political
relations among states from confrontation to lower
tensions, to a reduction in the danger of wars and their
prevention, to a limitation of the role of armed force
in international affairs. The basic content of this
process must be a quantitative and qualitative restraint
of the arms race, a gradual cut-back in armed forces,
and eventual achievement of general and complete
disarmament. 18
Second, these agreements must be based on the
principle of equality and equal security. Third, the
regional focus of military detente is Europe, as
demonstrated by this passage:
The main thing now is to complement political
detente by military detente. One of the first priority
objectives in this context is to find ways of reducing
armed forces and armaments in Central Europe without
prejudicing the security of any one, on the contrary, to
the benefit of all. The most important demand of our
time is to work for the reduction, and for ending the
arms race, to proceed along the road leading to
universal and complete disarmament; to lessen the
military confrontation on European soil, and to work for
overcoming the division of Europe into opposed military
blocs. 19
It seems reasonable to speculate that the Soviets
felt that military detente had not been fully achieved
during the political detente of the 1970s, and that they
hoped to pursue its full establishment in the 1980s,
18 D. Proektor, "Military Detente: Primary Task,"
International Affairs (Moscow) , No. 6 (June 1976) , cited in
Sleeper, p. 86.
19 L.I. Brezhnev, "On the Results of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe," in In the Name of
Peace, Security, and Cooperation, (Moscow, 1975, pp. 8-9,
cited in Sleeper, p. 85.
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providing they were able to maintain a modicum of political
detente, or prevent political detente from collapsing
altogether. Prior to late 1983, the Soviets continued to
hold out hope that detente could be rescued and re-
established. Furthermore, it is clear that Soviet foreign
policy priorities in the early 1980s were focused regionally
on Europe, and that within that regional focus, they
emphasized reaching arms accords of the kind characterized
by military detente.
The Soviets have been relatively clear and straight-
forward about what detente means to them. They have been
equally forthcoming concerning what detente does not mean. 20
It is not a preservation of the status quo. It is not a
lessening of the Soviet commitment to the world communist
movement or to wars of national liberation. (It is
interesting to note that each time Soviet foreign policy
placed emphasis on 'peaceful coexistence' there has followed
the threat of secession in some East European country.) It
is not a means for bringing about the ideological
penetration of the socialist camp. It is not dependent on
resolution of other issues. (Thus the Soviets reject the
notion of 'linkage'.) It is not a Western concept adopted
by the Soviets. Rather it is a concept originated and
20 This paragraph draws on a discussion in Garthoff,
pp. 47-49.
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promoted by the Soviet Union, who has been its most faithful
and persistent champion.
With regard to the Soviet view of the relationship
between detente and arms control, the Soviets see important
diplomatic and political advantages which accrue from
participating in negotiations with the United States. 21
But it is under the rubric of military detente that Soviet
conceptions of the relationship between relaxation of
tensions and arms control become clear.
For example, it is clear that arms control agreements
follow and result from Western policies of "realism." That
is to say, the Soviet Union rewards the West with arms
control agreements after they have demonstrated a
willingness to recognize a change in the correlation of
forces favoring world socialism. Such arms control accords
may include confidence-building measures, crisis management
agreements, or arms limitation treaties. 22
II. THE SOVIET VIEW OF DETENTE
IN THE 1980S
A review of Soviet statements regarding East-West
relations indicates a high degree of satisfaction with
01
For a brief, but comprehensive treatment of Soviet
diplomatic goals in U.S. -Soviet arms negotiations, see Keith
B. Payne and Dan L. Stroude [Strode], "Arms Control: The
Soviet Approach and Its Implications," Soviet Union/Union
Sovietioue
. 10, pts. 2-3 (1983): 219-228.
22 Garthoff, p. 45.
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detente in the 1970s. In 1976, Leonid Brezhnev gave this
assessment:
Comrades, the turn for the better in our relations
with the United States of America, the biggest power of
the capitalist world, has, of course, been decisive in
reducing the danger of another world war and in
consolidating peace. This has beyond question
contributed to the improvement of the international
climate in general, and that of Europe in particular.
Acting in complete accord with the guidelines set by the
24th Congress, we have devoted very great attention to
the objective of improving relations with the United
States. 23
According to Brezhnev, one of the principal benefits of
detente was the achievement of the SALT I agreements.
The Soviets blamed the collapse of detente after
January 1980 on U.S. President Jimmy Carter. The Soviets
hoped to avoid passing on a legacy of deteriorated relations
to Reagan, and therefore made it clear that they were not
blaming him for the collapse of detente. Soviet objectives
toward the new American administration were at the maximum
to renew detente (on their own terms) , or at a minimum to
make sure that any Cold War that lingered beyond Carter's
term in office was blamed on the Reagan administration's
policies, and not on the Soviet Union.
23
"From Report to the 25th Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union," 24 Feb. 1976, in Leonid
Brezhnev, Peace, Detente & Soviet-American Relations: A
Collection of Public Statements . (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich) , 1979, p. 107.
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Reasons the Soviets gave for the assessment that
detente was failing by late 1970s included the following: 24
(1) the NATO decision to increase military spending over
a period of several years;
(2) the willingness of the United States and its allies
to consider economic and military aid to China;
(3) Brezhnev's failure to respond more vigorously to
China's invasion of Vietnam in 1979, thus
encouraging further Chinese probes in Asia;
(4) the West's rejection of Brezhnev's arms reduction
proposals in October 1979;
(5) NATO's decision to Pershing lis and cruise missiles
while pursuing arms control initiatives (Dec. 1979)
;
(6) the establishment of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force
(later renamed the U.S. Central Command) ; 25
(7) the U.S. Senate's decision to table the SALT II
Treaty, considered a key component of Brezhnev's
policy of detente. 26
Brezhnev did not hesitate to establish his views on
why detente collapsed, and who was responsible. Noting that
"as the 1970s end and the 1980s begin the international
24 This list is derived from Alfred L. Monks, The
Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan . (Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute, 1981), pp. 22-23. Andrei
Gromyko, in a lengthy review of Soviet foreign policy up to
1981, cites all of the above given factors. See, "Leninist
Foreign Policy in the Contemporary World," reprinted in
Soviet Press: Selected Translations , 81, 4 (April 1981):
118-132, especially p. 122.
25 Monks cites Krasnaya Zvezda , 6 June 1979, and 26
Dec. 1979.
26 The Soviets had probably written off the SALT II
Treaty before deciding to invade Afghanistan.
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situation has worsened appreciably," Brezhnev identifies the
reasons:
It has been clear for some time that the leading
circles of the US and certain other NATO countries have
embarked on a course hostile to the cause of detente, a
course aimed at an upward spiral in the arms race that
will increase the danger of war. This began back in
1978, at the May session of the NATO Council in
Washington, where the automatic growth of the member-
countries' military budgets through the end of the 2 0th
century was approved. Recently, militaristic tendencies
in US policy are also finding expression in the
acceleration of new long-term arms programs, in the
creation of new military bases far from the United
States, including bases in the Middle East and the
Indian Ocean area, and in the formation of the so-called
"quick-reaction corps" — an instrument of the policy of
military interference. 27
Brezhnev added the following to his list of events
leading to detente's collapse: (1) President Carter's
withdrawal of the SALT II Treaty from consideration for
Senate ratification; (2) the U.S. "imposing" on its NATO
allies a decision to deploy INF weapons in Europe; and, (3)
attempts by "opponents of peace and detente" to "capitalize
on the events in Afghanistan." 28
For the Soviet Union a turning point came in January
1980. 29 It was at this point that the Soviet Union
perceived American policy under President Carter as shifting
"L.I. Brezhnev Answers Questions From a Pravda
Correspondent," Pravda and Izvestia , 13 Jan. 1980, p. 1, in
Current Digest of the Soviet Press , 32, No. 2 (13 Feb.
1980) : 1.
28 Ibid .
29 Garthoff, p. 1009.
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toward a return to cold war and a revival of
interventionism. The Soviets then appear to have
temporarily abandoned hope of restoring detente to its
original status in U.S. -Soviet relations. At this point
Moscow appears to have placed its hopes on the prospect that
Reagan would, when confronted with the realities and
responsibilities of the most powerful office in the Western
world, demonstrate the realism that Nixon had, and would
appreciate the value of agreements on trade, credits, and
arms with the Soviet bloc.
The Soviet Union made clear that it was prepared to
blame Carter for the tensions in U.S. -Soviet relations and
not Reagan. This implied that the Soviets would give Reagan
a chance to start fresh and would not hold the mistakes of
the Carter administration against him. There was even
evidence that they perceived Reagan as a target of criticism
from the extreme 'right' in American politics, and therefore
a candidate that might represent some measure of
moderation. 30
Soviet criticisms of Carter make clear that they
welcomed the end of his administration, accusing him of
See for example Soviet commentary on Reagan
inaugural address, M. Sturua, "Ceremony at the Capitol,"
Izvestia
. 22 Jan. 1981, p. 5, translated in Current Digest
of the Soviet Press . 33, 3 (18 Feb. 1981), pp. 3-4.
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leaving a legacy "of chaos and confusion everywhere and a
record peacetime military budget." 31
The desperate flailing about of this petty
politician, who has tried in all things to be like the
other atomic maniac — Harry Truman — can only give one
the impression that he has, from all indications,
forgotten that Washington is not ancient Rome and that
all attempts to remake the world in America's own image
are simply chimerical. 32
A Christian Science Monitor article in June 1980,
written from Moscow during the presidential campaign, noted:
"The two most noticeable features of high-level reactions
here are the condemnation, even contempt, for Mr. Carter,
and the beginnings of a reluctant acceptance that Mr. Reagan
might be the next president." 33 According to the analysis
in this article, the Soviets accused Carter of deliberately
sabotaging U.S. -Soviet relations and playing election
politics with U.S. foreign policy.
The depth of anti-Carter sentiment is also seen in
the following passage:
We know the scope that anti-Soviet military hysteria
reached in the United States during the last months and
weeks of the Democratic administration's tenure in the
White House. J. Carter and those around him displayed
an enviable consistency they so often lacked in
31 See N. Artemov, "Difficult Legacy,"
Sotsialisticheskava Industria . 20 Jan. 1981, p. 3,





33 David K. Willis, "Moscow View: Carter No, Reagan
Yes," Christian Science Monitor , 4 June 1980, pp. 1, 10.
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conducting the country's foreign policy: They even used
their very last days in power to pour oil on the fire
and step up the pitch of the militaristic campaign. 34
The Soviet Union at this time (early 1980) was pre-
occupied with deflecting criticism of its invasion of
Afghanistan. It was particularly concerned with responding
to the criticism that it had ended detente by invading: "If
there were no Afghanistan, certain circles in the US and
NATO would surely have found another pretext to exacerbate
the world situation." 35
Other Soviet officials reiterated Brezhnev's
argumentation on this issue, including Yuri Andropov, then




34 Boris Orekhov, "International Survey: Changes in
Washington," Pravda . 25 Jan. 1981, p. 4, translated in
Current Digest of the Soviet Press . 33, 3 (18 Feb. 1981), p.
3.
35
"L.I. Brezhnev Answers Questions From a Pravda
Correspondent," Pravda and Izvestia . 13 Jan. 1980, in
Current Digest of the Soviet Press . 32, No. 2 (13 Feb.
1980): 3.
36 For Andropov's comments blaming the U.S. for the
decline of detente and supporting the Soviet decision to
invade Afghanistan, see "Election Meetings of Working
People: The People's Unity Is a Great Force — Voters Meet
with Yu. V. Andropov," Pravda and Izvestia . 12 Feb. 1980, in
Current Digest of the Soviet Press . 32, No. 6 (12 March
1980)): 4; Arbatov's remarks can be found in "On the
Threshold of a New Decade — US Foreign Policy," Pravda . 3
March 1980, p. 6, in Current Digest, of the Soviet Press . 32,
No. 9 (2 April 1980): pp. 1-11..
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Arbatov said "the greatest threat to world peace, at
least in the past 10 years, is posed by the US policy swing
toward cold war." Adding that "a second edition of the cold
war would undoubtedly be more dangerous than the first,"
Arbatov detailed several consequences of renewed political
tensions that reveal some insight into why the Soviets might
want to revive detente in the 1980s. Quoting Arbatov: 37
(1) "It would be more dangerous because a return to
unrestricted hostility and confrontation would take
place at a new level of the development of means of
destruction, which would make an armed conflict more
likely and its consequences still more disastrous.
(2) "Moreover, many more participants in international
relations would be dragged into the whirlpool of a
second cold war. Given the conflicts among them,
the risk would grow as the numbers increased,
especially if some of these participants were
inclined to play a very reckless and irresponsible
game in the world arena — the game China is
playing.
(3) "Another major danger posed by a return to the cold
war is that it would make the proliferation of
nuclear weapons virtually inevitable (the change in
US policy has already increased the probability that
Pakistan will become a nuclear power)
.
(4) "The coming decades will see the serious
exacerbation of global problems — natural
resources, energy, food, etc. Detente expands the
possibilities for their solution. In cold war
conditions, on the other hand, possibilities for
resolving these problems in the interests of the
peoples are drastically limited, and rivalry among
states grows and sharpens. . . .
(5) " . . . the security of America, and even its
existence, are threatened not by the Soviet Union
37
"On the Threshold of a New Decade — US Foreign
Policy," Pravda, 3 March 1980, p. 6, in Current Digest of
the Soviet Press . 32, No. 9 (2 April 1980): pp. 3-4.
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but by the continuing arms race, tension and
unsettled conflicts — everything that sooner or
later may get out of control and lead to a
thermonuclear catastrophe. The switch in American
policy only aggravates this genuine threat to the US
— and to all other countries."
It is important to note that as late as the 2 6th CPSU
Party Congress, which met February-March 1981, the Soviets
were placing the blame for detente 's failure on Carter, and
not on Reagan. 38
While the Soviet Union originally blamed the decline
of detente on the Carter administration, by the end of its
first year in office, Moscow was faulting the Reagan
administration for reviving the cold war. 9 U.S. "meddling"
in Poland, for example, was at this point a source of
irritation to the Soviets. 40 Other Soviet criticisms that
emerged in the first few months of 1982 included: Reagan's
decision to begin production of the neutron bomb; American
determination to "upset by all possible means the existing
strategic balance . . . whipping up tensions and
destabilizing the situation in the world," specifically the
Middle East, the Indian Ocean, South-East Asia, Africa, and
38 Garthoff, p. 1014.
39 See for example, Col. E. Asaturov, "USSR-USA:
Dialogue, Not Confrontation," Soviet Military Review , No. 2
(Feb. 1982) : 49-50.
40 See for example Pravda , 28 Jan. 1982, p. 4,
translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press , 34, No. 4
(24 Feb. 1982) : 10.
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the Caribbean; and, expanding existing military blocs and
ii- 41alliances. x
Georgiy Arbatov wrote an article in which he accused
the Reagan administration of being out of touch with
reality, for "wandering in a dreamland," and being
"completely divorced from the real situation." 42 That
reality in the Soviet view, was Soviet military parity with
the United States — fundamental and profound eguality at
the strategic nuclear level. An escalation of the "arms
race" and an exacerbation of international tensions on the
part of Washington failed to take into account the Soviet
ability to respond, to take countermeasures, or to retaliate
politically and militarily. This is what lurks beneath the
surface of Arbatov 's alarmed rhetoric.
While the Soviets may have held out some hope that
Reagan would eschew his conservative origins and duplicate
the achievements and policies of President Nixon, they were
doomed for disappointment. Dimitri Simes has written:
There was hope that Reagan, despite his rhetoric, would
turn out to be another Nixon. Soon, whoever believed in
this notion in Moscow was disabused. By the end of
1982, Soviet observers began to claim that the USSR was
confronted with an 'extremist administration' in
41 V. Shatrov, "International Affairs: Detente, Its
Friends and Enemies," Soviet Military Review , No. 3 (March
1982) : 46-47.
42
"American Policy in the Dreamland," Pravda , 16 July
1982, in Soviet Union: Daily Report , FBIS, 19 July 1982, pp,
A1-A5.
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Washington. No allowance was made for any possible good
intentions on the part of Reagan. 43
Reagan's ultimate sin in the Soviet view was his
apparent rejection of Soviet legitimacy, and his de facto
American retraction of recognition of the Soviet Union as an
equal superpower. 44 This recognition was a paramount
objective of Soviet foreign policy. As Richard Pipes has
clarified:
One of the highest priorities of the Soviet Union in
dealing with the United States has been to gain
recognition as an equal, that is, as one of two world
"superpowers," and hence a country with a legitimate
claim to have its say in the solution of all
international problems, even those without immediate
bearing on its national interests. Recognition of this
status is essential because only by establishing itself
in the eyes of the world as an alternate pole to that
represented by the United States can the Soviet Union
hope to set in motion the shift in the world balance of
power that is the long-term aim of its foreign policy. 45
The Soviets considered such recognition a major
result of detente. Not only was Reagan continuing the
decline of detente begun by Carter, but he appeared actively
intent on undoing this important Soviet achievement.
Dimitri K. Simes, "Are the Soviets Interested in
Arms Control?" Washington Quarterly . (Spring 1985) : 150.
Simes cites a Trofimenko Russian language piece in support
of this assertion.
44 Garthoff, pp. 1014-15.
45 Richard Pipes, "Detente: Moscow's View," in Richard
Pipes, ed., Soviet Strategy in Europe , (New York: Crane,
Russak, 1976), p. 21. (3-44.)
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In June 1982, the view emerged in the pages of
Krasnaya Zvezda that Reagan was determined to lead a
"crusade" against communism:
Washington's hegemonist ambitions were reflected in
recent comments of American leaders and especially in
the speech by President Reagan to the British Parliament
in which he resorted to coarse attacks against the
Soviet Union and other socialist countries and openly
appealed for a "crusade" against communism. 46
The Soviets accused Reagan of basing U.S. foreign
policy on the premise of "direct confrontation" with the
USSR. 47 Note the following Chernenko statement from October
1982:
The Soviet Union is opposed to a further growth of
tensions in Soviet-American relations. We stand for
their normalization and improvement and are prepared to
engage in businesslike and detailed negotiations which
must of necessity take account of the interests of both
sides. If, however, Washington proves unable to rise
above primitive anti-Communism, if it persists in its
policy of threats and diktat, well, then we are
sufficiently strong and we can wait. Neither sanctions
nor bellicose posturing frighten us. 48
46 A. Leont'yev, "Washington's 'Crusade': Betting on
World Hegemony," Krasnava Zvezda . 27 June 1982, p. 3,
translated in USSR Report: Military Affairs , JPRS, 11 Aug.
1982, p. 84.
47 See for example the themes presented in Soviet News
and Propaganda Analysis . Special Operations Division,
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.,
Vol. 3, No. 1 (Jan. 1983).
48 Chernenko is guoted in John F. Burns, "Moscow Says
It Is Still Committed to Improving Ties With the U.S.," New
York Times . 30 Oct. 1982. Chernenko's remarks are also
covered in Anthony Barbieri, Jr., "Soviet Still Wants
Detente, Aide Says," Baltimore Sun . 30 Oct. 1982, and Ned
Temko, "Why Soviets Toughen Anti-US Line Cautiously,"
Christian Science Monitor , 1 Nov. 1982. Other Western media
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III. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND
DETENTE. 1981-1984
Brezhnev's principal foreign policy legacy was a
Soviet Union that had benefited to a great extent from the
detente of the 1970s, and which was committed to maintaining
those benefits.
As the previous section has tried to stress, the
Soviets were prepared to absolve the Reagan administration
of any blame for the poor state of U.S. -Soviet relations at
the time Reagan entered office. They hoped he would adopt a
"realistic" policy (by recognizing the necessity of
peacefully coexisting with the Soviet state and its world
program for socialist construction) as had President Nixon
in the early 1970s. Just days before he died, Brezhnev
renewed his call for improvement of East-West relations on
the basis of detente. 49
Events soon dispelled any Soviet hopes for resuming
detente as if nothing had happened between 1975 (when
detente started becoming widely questioned in the United
States) and December 1979 (when the Soviets invaded
sources interpreted Chernenko's remarks differently. See,
"Soviets Say U.S. 'Has Failed Test of Detente'," Washington
Times . 1 Nov. 1982. This sources noted that Western
analysts interpreted Chernenko's remarks to mean the Soviet
Union was prepared to accept the poor state of U.S. -Soviet
relations up until 1984 when new presidential elections
would hopefully replace the Reagan administration.
49 John F. Burns, "Brezhnev Renews Call for Detente but
Warns West," New York Times , 8 Nov. 1982.
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Afghanistan and destroyed any lingering illusions about the
value of detente) . Reagan was not about to restore detente
on Soviet terms. However, it was left to Andropov to
finally abandon all Soviet efforts to entice the U.S. back
to a 1970s-type U.S. -Soviet relationship. Even as late as
April 1982, while Brezhnev was still in power, the Soviet
Union was suggesting a summit meeting with President Reagan
to take place on neutral territory in the fall of 1982 as a
gesture for resumption of detente. 50
However, the Soviet Union was loathe to abandon
detente altogether. When it did, it was determined to make
clear that the United States was to be blamed for detente 's
failure.
In many ways, Andropov's succession led to a
reaffirmation of Brezhnev's policies. 51 In other ways,
Andropov sharpened the U.S. -Soviet conflict. It seems clear
in retrospect that Andropov did not anticipate any near-term
improvement in U.S. -Soviet relations, and was therefore
prepared to a) take certain risks, and b) postpone any
50 Pravda, 18 April 1982, p. 1, translated in Current
Digest of the Soviet Press . 34, 16 (19 May 1982): 6.
51 See, for example, the editorial in Pravda , 1 Dec.
1982, translated in Soviet Union: Daily Report . FBIS, 1 Dec
1982, p. CC1. This editorial stresses the continuity among
the 24th, 25th, and 26th party congresses regarding foreign
policy objectives, namely the "Peace Program." Those
objectives were characteristically portrayed as firmly
committed to detente and peaceful coexistence.
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effort to revive detente until the U.S. showed a greater
willingness to accommodate Soviet interests.
One of the ways in which Andropov reaffirmed
Brezhnev's general foreign policy line was by stressing a
continuing Soviet commitment to detente. At least, this
appears to have been the message Andropov gave Vice
President Bush when they met at Brezhnev's funeral. 52 In
his speech to the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee,
Andropov made clear that the Soviet Union was committed to
detente, but there was a limit to this commitment:
All are equally interested in preserving peace and
detente, therefore statements in which the readiness to
normalize relations is linked with the demand that the
Soviet Union pay for this with some kind of preliminary
concessions in the most varied fields sound lacking in
seriousness to say the least. We will not go along with
this. ... We are for equality, for considerations of
the interests of both sides and for honest agreement, we
are ready for this. 3
Upon assuming the post of General Secretary, Andropov
quickly set out to assure the world public that the Soviet
Union remained committed to detente. In his address of 22
November 1982, Andropov declared that " [e]nsuring a lasting
peace and defending the right of peoples to independence and
social progress are the invariable goals of our foreign
52 Dusko Doder, "Andropov Tells Bush Soviets Are Ready
to Build U.S. Relations," Washington Post , 16 November 1982.
53 Pravda . 25 Nov. 1982, p. 6, translated in Soviet
Union: Daily Report . FBIS, 26 Nov. 1982, p. AA1.
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policy." 54 A week later, Georgi Korniyenko, first deputy
foreign minister of the Soviet Union, declared in an
American periodical:
The new Soviet leadership attaches great importance
to the development of Soviet-American relations, to
which the Soviet Union contributed so greatly in the
past. That was not a time-serving policy. It was an
inalienable part of the strategic line in the foreign
policy that the newly elected general secretary of the
CPSU Central Committee, said our country is determined
to continue. 55
A noted U.S. sovietologist has asserted that Andropov
was an ardent supporter of the policy of detente since at
least 1975, and that "Andropov has been much more urgent in
his support for detente than any of the other major
contenders [to succeed Brezhnev]." 56 While adherence to the
Soviet leadership's "Peace Program," announced at the 24th
CPSU Party Congress in 1971, was obviously a prerequisite
for political advancement under Brezhnev, Andropov's alleged
enthusiasm for detente poses an interesting question: Why
would the head of the Soviet KGB take such an interest in
East-West detente? Several reasons come to mind.
54
"Address by Soviet General Secretary Andropov
[Extract], November 22, 1982," in Documents on Disarmament
1983
. p. 83 3. Evidence that both Andropov and Chernenko
carried on this declaratory Soviet commitment to detente can
be found in Garthoff, pp. 15, 37.
55 Georgi Korniyenko, "A Plea for 'Good Relations',"
Newsweek , 29 Nov. 1982, p. 38.
56 Jerry F. Hough, "Soviet Succession: Issues and
Personalities," Problems of Communism , 31, 5 (Sept. -Oct.
1982) : 33.
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First, detente in the Soviet view is intended to
constrain only the West. It leaves the Soviet Union free to
pursue its political and ideological agenda relative to
global socialist construction. In the Soviet view, it is
also designed to retard the growth of Western (specifically
U.S.) military power. In this regard, Charles M. Kupperman
has suggested that detente requires the U.S. to accept
certain conditions, including recognizing "the state of
U.S. -Soviet military parity while the Soviet Union continues
to seek strategic superiority," and "recognition of the
Soviet political sphere of influence." 57
Second, Andropov may have vigorously backed detente
because it made the job of the KGB easier. It opened the
flow of trade. It sanctioned wider diplomatic contacts,
thus providing expanded opportunities for infiltrating KGB
agents under diplomatic guises, a Soviet tradition dating
back to the origins of the Bolshevik regime. 58
Third, it eased the Soviet defense burden by
foreclosing, through arms control arrangements, American
strategic nuclear responses to the Soviet threat in the
57 Charles M. Kupperman, "The Soviet World View,"
Policy Review . 7 (Winter 1979): 65.
58 See Kerry M. Kartchner, "'A Mask to Cover Shady
Deeds': Soviet Diplomatic Deception, 1917-1939," in Brian D.
Dailey and Patrick J. Parker, eds., Soviet Strategic
Deception
.
(Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 147-169.
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field of ABM systems. 59 In an environment of deliberate
restraint on the part of the West, the Soviets could hope to
forestall any significant U.S. reaction to their broad post-
SALT strategic modernization program. As Kupperman notes:
"The Soviets do not want to provoke a strong U.S. counter-
response that could delay or deny the Soviet drive for
global dominance." 60
Perhaps even more importantly, it facilitated Soviet
security objectives in Central Europe. For example, NATO
initiatives to modernize its tactical and theater nuclear
forces did not materialize until 1983. Throughout the 1970s
European members of NATO were inhibited from acquiescing in
American efforts to increase defense expenditures for fear
of offending the Soviets and damaging detente. When NATO
finally did decide to modernize its nuclear forces and
increase its defense expenditures, the Soviets decried these
actions as undermining detente, proving that the absence of
these initiatives was, in the Soviet view, a primary benefit
of detente. For these reasons, and others, Andropov must
have been keenly aware of the many advantages detente
provided the Soviet Union throughout the 197 0s. This could
also explain why Andropov appeared anxious to revive detente
59 See Brian D. Dailey, "Deception, Perceptions
Management, and Self-Deception in Arms Control: An
Examination of the ABM Treaty," in Dailey and Parker, Soviet
Strategic Deception , pp. 225-259.
60 Kupperman, p. 64.
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(on Soviet terms) once he assumed the General Secretary
position.
Gromyko vouched for Andropov's commitment to detente
in the following manner:
[Soviet foreign policy is] reflected in our statesmen's
speeches on concrete issues of policy, on concrete
proposals — above all in the speeches of Yuri
Valdimirovich Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU
Central Committee. . . . This is a peaceful policy, a
policy of friendship among peoples. It is a policy of
noninterference in other states' internal affairs. It
is a policy aimed at relaxing tension in the world and
eliminating the tension from the international
situation. It is aimed at reversing the mindless arms
race, and above all, arriving at ways to reduce and
limit armaments, which is a good formula, and
subsequently, ways to eliminate armaments. 61
The fact that a consistent propaganda line was put forth by
the Soviets before and after Andropov's succession indicates
a broad consensus on presenting such an image.
In keeping with his apparent tradition of espousing
detente on Soviet terms, Andropov was among those who echoed
Brezhnev's criticisms of U.S. policy in the early days of
1980, following the onset of a chill in U.S. -Soviet
relations in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. Andropov cited "political nostalgia" 62 as the
"Statement by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko:
Soviet Disarmament Policy in General and Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Force Negotiations [Extracts], April 2, 1983,"
Documents on Disarmament 198 3 . p. 253.
In an attempt to compare Reagan's foreign policy in
the 1980s with U.S. cold war policy in the late 1940s and
1950s, some Soviet authors even took to quoting from
official American documents of the cold war era. For
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motivation for "certain circles" in the United States who
were seeking a return to the Cold War:
The reason for the complication of the international
situation is well known. It is Washington's
irresponsible and dangerous policy. From all
indications, the tune is being set there now by the most
reactionary forces, allied with the military-industrial
complex — forces that would like to bring back the old
days, when the imperialist powers imposed whatever
systems they liked on other countries and peoples.
The sources of this "political nostalgia" lie in the
inability of certain circles in the US to soberly
interpret the social and political changes taking place
in the world and to understand the objective essence of
these changes. . . . The real reasons for the current
switch in Washington's course should be sought neither
in the events of Afghanistan nor in the actions of the
Soviet Union. They lie in the US ruling circles' fear
of the wave of social changes and in their desire to
return the world to the "blessed days" of imperialist
domination. . . . The real danger is the fact that
Washington, seeking to capitalize on the events in
Afghanistan, is in fact moving toward the undermining of
detente and the undermining of agreements already
reached. 63
This statement demonstrates Andropov's early
inclination to place the blame for detente's failure
squarely on the United States. Elements of this blame were
example, see references to NSC-7 ("The Position of the
United States with Respect to Soviet-Directed World
Communism," 30 March 1948) in N.D. Turkatenko, "A Conspiracy
Against the Entire World," SShA: Ekonomika. Politika.
Ideoloqiva . No. 4 (April 1983): 3-6, translated in USSR
Report , JPRS, 6 July 1983, pp. 1-5. Turkatenko argues that
the U.S. was reviving a global anti-communist movement under
the Reagan administration.
63
"Election Meetings of Working People: The People's
Unity Is a Great Force — Voters Meet with Yu. V. Andropov,"
Pravda and Izvestia, 12 Feb. 1980, p. 2, in Current Digest
of the Soviet Press , 32, No. 6 (12 March 1980)): 4.
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articulated from time to time throughout the course of the
START negotiations by Soviet commentators. There were four
common themes regarding U.S. policy as anti-detente.
According to these views the U.S. was guilty of: (1) an
ideological and economic offensive against the USSR; (2)
attempting to rearrange the world into spheres of influence
(including undoing the Yalta accord) ; (3) desiring to
achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union; and,
(4) pursuing a propaganda offensive intended to portray
Soviet Union as evil and untrustworthy. 64 One Soviet author
summarized these four points in the following manner:
The arms limitation and reduction process should
also be viewed against the backdrop of current U.S.
policy toward the Soviet Union, which may be
characterized by four major elements. First, there is
an all-out effort to pressure the Soviet Union, to try
to interfere in its internal affairs, even to question
the legitimacy of its system, to initiate all sorts of
sanctions. Second, there is an attempt to rearrange
the world arbitrarily into various spheres of interest;
to proclaim certain regions to be of vital interest to
the United States with no regard for the vital interest
of those regions' people. Third is a clear desire to
achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union,
although this is sometimes called a margin of safety.
Fourth is, of course, a heavy offensive propaganda
campaign against the Soviet Union, portraying it as the
embodiment of evil in the world, and as a county not to
be trusted to comply with its obligations under
agreements — hence, all the innuendos and accusations,
such as the alleged Soviet use of chemical weapons, and
so on. 5
64 Dusko Doder, "Soviets Say U.S. Tries to Destabilize
Europe, Washington Post , 17 Jan. 1982.
65 Yevgeniy N. Kochetkov, "The Positions of the USSR on
Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control," Annals (of the American
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Based on talks in the Soviet Union between senior
Soviet officials and U.S. diplomats, a Senate Foreign
Relations Committee report concluded that: "Virtually all
the Soviets we met with complained bitterly that the
belligerent, crusading tone of the administration was
raising the danger of superpower confrontation and an
escalating arms race." 66
Perhaps the most disturbing finding of the trip is the
extent to which the current arms control impasse has led
to a deterioration in the bilateral relationship. The
Soviets describe the overall state of bilateral
relations using terms such as "a critical situation,"
"pushing us to the brink." "a highly dangerous path,"
and "extreme pessimism." 67
Soviets interviewed for this report indicated
strongly that they "want it understood that they consider
all the moves to be on the American side of the board." The
report continues:
The Soviets argue that they have taken every
possible opportunity to normalize and regularize
relations with the United States but have received no
indication that real improvements are possible. . . .
The Soviets suggest that their actions in Poland,
Afghanistan and Cuba pose no threat to the interests of
the United States. Their security requirements are
simply different from those of the United States, they
Association of Political and Social Sciences) , 469 (Sept.
1983) ) : 139.
66 See media coverage of the report in Roy Gutman,
"U.S. -Soviet Arms Agreements Not Likely, Senate Report
Says," Long Island Newsday . 5 June 1983, p. 5.
67 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The
United States and the Soviet Union: Prospects for the
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maintain. Soviet forces are not all directed at the
United States; therefore, the military balance should be
understood on a worldwide basis, not simply a United
States-Soviet comparison. . . . Soviet officials say
they have the impression that the United States now
considers detente to have been a mistake or an "accident
of history," while to them it seems that there is no
reasonable alternative. 68
Soviet views of U.S. foreign policy reflected a great
deal of dissatisfaction with American efforts to correct
what the U.S. perceived as problems with detente as
practiced in the 1970s. This was a major aspect of Soviet
calculations regarding the political conditions for a
strategic arms reduction agreement. There were dimensions
to Soviet foreign policy other than a hostile and critical
stance toward the United States. According to Lawrence
Caldwell and G. William Benz , there were four central
elements of Andropov's foreign policy, including: a
limited and conditional support for on-going negotiations
with the United States, the launching of a "peace offensive"
aimed at exploiting the European peace movement and the
American nuclear freeze sentiment, promoting and isolating
regional detente in Europe from the fallout of U.S. -Soviet
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The first three of these four were obviously designed
to salvage whatever could be retrieved of detente on Soviet
terms. Soviet objectives were "to support continued
discussion in major arms control forums (INF and START)
while displaying public skepticism and charging the U.S.
with using the talks to cover its own military buildup." °
Soviet support for continuing discussions in INF, START, and
MBFR forums should be understood in this context. It should
also be noted that this support only went so far — it
stopped short of endorsing an agreement on terms that would
have represented a reasonable compromise with the U.S.
positions on reducing strategic weapons.
Unveiled at a conference of Warsaw Pact nations in
the capital of Czechoslovakia, Andropov's foreign policy
debut was to launch a "peace offensive," calling for NATO to
sign a treaty renouncing the first use of nuclear and
conventional weapons. 71 The objective was to press a public
69 Lawrence T. Caldwell and G. William Benz, "Soviet-
American Diplomacy at the End of an Era," Current History .
May 1983, p. 207.
70 Ibid .
71 See John Kohan, "Playing to a Western Audience,"
Time , 17 Jan. 1983; and Steven Strasser and Robert B.
Cullen, "Andropov's Double Game," Newsweek , 17 Jan. 1983, p,
7. A stepped up "peace offensive" was predicted when
Andropov assumed power. See Sallie Wise, "Soviet Foreign
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campaign intended to bring pressure to bear against NATO's
INF modernization plans while threatening to place the
United States in an "analogous position." 2 Some observers
in the West noted the proximity of the March 6 parliamentary
elections in West Germany, implying that Andropov's
principal intended audience was Western Europe. 73
Salvaging regional detente in Europe through a policy
of "differentiated detente" was another major Soviet foreign
policy objective under Andropov. This involved the adoption
of policies
. . . whereby the Soviet Union would accept the
deterioration in Soviet-American relations but would
attempt to offset the damage to Soviet interests caused
by the decline in superpower relations by improving its
relations with America's allies, thereby weakening the
United States' global position." 74
Again, the Eurocentric orientation of Soviet foreign policy
is demonstrated in this element of regional detente:
The central thrust of Soviet diplomacy has been in
Europe, in particular with regard to the INF
negotiations and NATO's plans to deploy Pershing 2's and
GLCMs. 75
Policy After Brezhnev: Unfinished Business," Radio Liberty
Research . RL 458/82 (16 Nov. 1982), esp. p. 2.
72 Caldwell and Benz, p. 207.
73 Robert E. Hunter, "Andropov — A Fine Sense of
Timing," Los Angeles Times , 17 Jan. 1983.
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Another major foreign policy objective was to launch
several "geopolitical initiatives:"
Exploring a series of geopolitical initiatives — with
China, Japan, Afghanistan and Europe — which, while not
surrendering any fundamental positions, would reinforce
the peace movement in the West, would give impetus to
differentiated detente with those allies of the United
States who could be impressed with Moscow's
'reasonableness' in the global competition, and would
include an implicit threat to the Americans that the
Soviet Union retained options for advancing its own
interests in the global competition. 76
• • 77There was also an important Chinese connection. One
of Andropov's important foreign policy initiatives appears
to have been an opening of sorts to China. This began at
Brezhnev's funeral where Andropov singled out Chinese
Foreign Minister Huang Hua, shaking his hand several
7 fitimes. Brezhnev's funeral was also the occasion of a
meeting between Mr. Hua and Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet





For a general treatment of the issue of Sino-Soviet
relations and their arms control impact, see Helmut
Sonnenfeldt, "The Chinese Factor in Soviet Disarmament
Policy," in Morton H. Halperin, ed. , Sino-Soviet Relations
and Arms Control , (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967)
, pp. 117-
143; and for a more contemporary analysis, see Dan L.
Strode, "Arms Control and Sino-Soviet Relations," Orbis, 28,
1 (Spring 1984): 163-188.
78 Doder, "Andropov Tells Bush Soviets Are Ready to
Build U.S. Relations."
79 Dusko Doder, "Chinese, Soviet Officials Hold
Highest-Level Talks Since 1969," Washington Post , 17 Nov.
1982.
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passing, the Chinese ambassador had attended the annual
military parade down Red Square to commemorate the
anniversary of the October Revolution. 80
In his address shortly after becoming General
Secretary, Andropov stated:
The CPSU and the Soviet state sincerely want the
development and improvement of relations with all
socialist countries. Mutual goodwill, respect for one
another's legitimate interests and common concern for
the interests of socialism and peace should prompt
correct solutions even where, for various reasons, the
proper trust and mutual understanding are still lacking.
This also refers to our great neighbor, the Chinese
People's Republic. . . . We are paying great attention
to every positive response from the Chinese side. 1
The Soviet approach to China during this period,
however, mirrored that of the Soviet approach to the West.
While increasing trade, diplomatic, and educational
contacts, the Soviet Union increased its military forces
with the potential of striking China, as well as those along
the actual Soviet-Chinese border. 82 This reflected the
'carrot-and-stick' approach characteristic of Andropov's
foreign policy toward the West.
80 Burns, "Brezhnev Renews Call for Detente But Warns
West."
"Address by Soviet General Secretary Andropov,"
,
pp. 833-34.
2 These two dimensions of Sino-Soviet relations are
treated in Harry Gelman, "The Present Stage in Sino-Soviet
Relations," Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies,
Occasional Paper . No. 181, March 1984.
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Ironically, by breaking off the talks on START and
INF, the Soviet Union guaranteed a lingering cold war
environment . 8 3
IV. THE DETERIORATION OF U.S. -SOVIET
RELATIONS IN THE FALL OF 1983
In the Summer of 1983 many in the West began to see
fruits of Andropov's "peace offensive." Several Soviet
gestures were by then adding up to make real inroads on
Western opinion. Observers pointed to the following
evidence that U.S. -Soviet relations might improve that
summer included: a tentative agreement under discussion to
open new U.S. and Soviet consulates in Kiev and New York;
movement in the Warsaw Pact position at the MBFR
negotiations; the Soviets' release of 15 Pentacostalists,
five of whom had been living at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow
for five years; rumors that Andropov had signaled Soviet
flexibility on arms control to West German Chancellor Helmut
Kohl; and Soviet easing of opposition to Western proposals
for human rights provisions to be included in a 35 nation
83 Ted Agres, "Trashing SALT on the Road to a Tense
Cold War Revival," Washington Times , 9 Dec. 1983. Mr. Agres
makes the point that the Soviet walk-out of START and INF,
as well as violations of SALT I and II, means that "the
Soviets have concluded they no longer stand to make
political or military gains through maintaining a facade of
abiding by SALT II and other accords," or by seeking further
arms limitation or reduction agreements with the United
States.
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review of the 1975 Helsinki Accords on Security and
Cooperation in Europe. 84
In late September 1983, following nearly a month of
tense superpower exchanges over the shooting down of flight
KAL-007 , Andropov released an extremely critical message on
U.S. -Soviet relations intended primarily to counter the
adverse reaction of Western public opinion and to disclaim
responsibility for the tragedy. 85
Accusing the United States of an "unprecedented
build-up" of military potential, of expanding its global
military presence, of involving other NATO countries
increasingly in its dangerous plans, of reviving Japanese
militarism, and of being morally responsible for the Korean
airliner tragedy, 86 Andropov's statement displayed a
bitter, disillusioned tone. The United States had refused
to renew detente on terms acceptable to the Soviet Union.
In the West, journalists called it the first public
84 Daniel Southerland, "Signs of Thaw Appear in US-
Soviet Relations," Christian Science Monitor . 11 July 1983.
85 The text of Andropov's statement can be found in
"Statement by Soviet President Andropov: Relations With the
United States, September 28, 1983," Documents on Disarmament
1983 . pp. 811-816. The military dimensions and implications
of Andropov's remarks are examined in Krasnaya Zvezda , 4
Oct. 1983, translated in Soviet Union: Daily Report , FBIS,
11 Oct. 1983, pp. AA12-AA14.
86 Ibid . . pp. 811-812.
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dismissal of hopes for improved U.S. -Soviet relations. 87
Andropov's statement read in part:
Even if someone had any illusions as to the
possibility of a turn for the better in the policy of
the present American Administration, the latest
developments have finally dispelled them. For the sake
of its imperial ambitions, it goes so far that one
begins to doubt whether Washington has any brakes at all
preventing it from crossing the mark before which any
sober-minded person must stop. 88
Andropov's statement reveals a genuine Soviet concern
that recent events had seriously increased the danger of
war. This theme is repeatedly implied in his message. He
warns against a "trial of strength," saying:
No one will ever be able to reverse the course of
history. The USSR and the other socialist countries
will live and develop according to their laws — the
laws of the most advanced social system.
The Soviet State has successfully overcome many
trials, including severe ones, during the six and a half
decades of its existence. Those who encroached on the
integrity of our State, its independence and our system
found themselves on the scrap-heap of history. It is
high time that everybody to whom this applies understood
that we shall be able to ensure the security of our
country and the security of our friends and allies under
any circumstances. 89
87 Ned Temko, "Andropov's Cold Blast Puts Geneva on
Ice," Christian Science Monitor . 30 Sept. 1983.
88
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Accusing the United States of being possessed of an
"outrageous militarist psychosis" and "blinded by anti-
communism," Andropov notes:
We do not see that the American side is truly
willing to consider and solve the problem of limiting
and reducing strategic armaments. In the American
capital they are now busy launching the production of
ever new systems of these armaments as well. They are
to be followed shortly by types of weapons which may
radically alter the notions of strategic stability and
the very possibility of effective limitation and
reduction of nuclear arms. °
Andropov's statement may further be interpreted as an
attempt to deflect attention from the Korean Airliner
tragedy to other outstanding issues in U.S. -Soviet
relations. 91
The hypocrisy in Andropov's statement lies in the
fact that the Reagan administration took great pains to
insulate U.S. -Soviet arms negotiations from the tensions
following the Soviet massacre of KAL flight 007. As noted
in Chapter Three, the Reagan administration's response was
regarded by many in the West as remarkably restrained, and
as irrefutable evidence that the administration was sincere
about improving U.S. -Soviet relations and making progress in
strategic arms reduction talks. Following Andropov's
on
Ibid . . p. 815. Note Andropov's veiled reference to
SDI.
91 Michael Dobbs , "Andropov Trying to Broaden the Focus
of Superpower Dispute," Washington Post , 2 Oct. 1983.
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outburst, hopes faded for an INF agreement in the near
future. 92
Raymond Garthoff believes there were several
important sources of Soviet pessimism in the Fall of 1983:
From the Soviet perspective, in the first half of
the 1980s the United States had turned to a broad policy
of more active use of counterrevolutionary insurgent
forces in its attempt to roll back history. Thus,
beginning in 1981 the Reagan administration stepped up
U.S. assistance to insurgents in Afghanistan, stimulated
a new insurgency in Nicaragua, and indirectly supported
other reactionary powers in aiding the insurgencies in
Kampuchea, Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. In short,
virtually all the gains by revolutionary forces in the
latter half of the 1970s were being subjected to a
vigorous counterattack in the first half of the 1980s. 3
Also according to Garthoff, a major source of Soviet
pessimism at this time was American use of force in Grenada:
The American invasion of Grenada . . . was seen as
evidence of a continuing U.S. readiness, even eagerness,
to use military power to roll back progressive




Garthoff's implication seems to be that Reagan's decision to
use force in Grenada was one factor leading to the Soviet
decision refrain from compromising in START and INF, and to
dismiss the impact of walking out of these negotiations on
overall East-West relations.
92 William Beecher, "Tense Ties for US, Soviet," Boston




94 Garthoff, p. 1063.
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There was a general deterioration in several of the
indices the Soviets use to calculate the correlation of
forces during the early 1980s. 5 These factors included a
failure of the Soviet economy to meet expected growth rates,
an alleged disillusionment with the ideological appeal of
Marxism-Leninism in the Third World, resurgent American
patriotism and military assertiveness, growing domestic
support for Reagan's leadership in the United States, and
Reagan's apparent determination to lead a renewed global
drive for democracy. 96
Soviet propaganda organs accused the United States of
exploiting the KAL-007 tragedy for the purposes of whipping
up anti-Soviet hysteria:
As is known, the Reagan administration has used the
incident involving the South Korean aircraft, which it
itself arranged, to seriously worsen the international
situation. Having created an atmosphere of hysteria
with the aid of this provocation, the White House has
endeavored to resolve a number of political tasks. It
has pushed through Congress the huge new U.S. military
budget, which until then was creaking along. It has
exerted considerable pressure on the allies of the
United States with the aim of ensuring the right
atmosphere for the deployment in weeks to come of the
new U.S. missiles in Western Europe.
It is clear that by exacerbating international
tension the White House was also pursuing election aims,
since, as you already know, the campaign to prepare for
OR
.See Chapter 4 for a fuller discussion of the Soviet
view of the correlation of forces in the 1980s.
96 Several of these factors are treated in Edward N.
Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union , (New York:
St. Martin's, 1983), pp. 28-39.
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the next presidential election in the U.S. has already
begun. And since Reagan has no achievements to his
political credit, be they in domestic or foreign policy,
everything indicates that the calculation was to improve
the Republican Party's chances by creating a wave of
chauvinism and military hysteria. Everything points to
the fact that that this is the way Washington planned
it, in any case.
In October 1983, Izvestiya published an article which
decried the "messianic idea of world rule . . . inherent in
the U.S. social system," and repeated the Soviet line
regarding the deteriorated state of U.S. -Soviet relations
characteristic of Soviet propaganda following the KAL-007
incident, accusing the U.S. of returning to "brinkmanship"
in its foreign policy actions:
If you chart the U.S. Administration's practical
actions, what clearly emerges is a structure of a long-
term policy which is not only bringing back the cold
war, but also promoting the idea of reviving the
messianic hope of world domination by developing
militarism and by the possible launching of nuclear
war. 98
None of this was new. What distinguishes this
article from other Soviet commentaries of this period is the
extreme bitterness with which President Reagan is personally
attacked. Reagan's political and personal philosophy is
attributed by this article to nearly every evil Communists
see in the capitalist system:
97 Valentin Zorin, Moscow Domestic Television Service,
8 Oct. 1983, translated in Soviet Union: Daily Report , FBIS,
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R. Reagan was pushed to the top by a group of the
"powerful of this world," who found in him a cynical
demagogue, an obedient apostle of "big business," and a
chauvinist. ... It is said that in his youth Reagan
hesitated for a while over the choice of political views
that would most benefit him. But his hesitations ceased
in the dark days of McCarthyism. He immediately sized
up the reliability, stability, and long-term prospects
of right-wing reactionary views in the United States.
Without delay he headed a crusade against the "communist
spirit" in Hollywood. It was then, too, that he was
noticed by the bosses of "big business" and the special
services as a man of promise."
Another incident the Soviets took as evidence that
the U.S. was determined to raise the level of tension in the
Fall of 1983 was the U.S. denial to allow Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko permission to land at Kennedy
International Airport to attend a General Assembly session
of the United Nations. 100
In Soviet commentaries of this period the "cult of
strength" theme was played up: "the cult of strength now
dominates not to a lesser but possibly to an even greater
extent." 101 Soviet commentators stressed that there was a
fundamental difference between these American efforts to
99 A. Yakovlev, "With the Bit Between Their Teeth,"
Izvestiva . 7 Oct. 1983, translated in Soviet Union: Daily
Report
. FBIS, 12 Oct. 1983, p. A2
.
Valentin Zorin, Moscow Broadcast in English to
North America, 15 Oct. 1983, in Soviet Union: Daily Report .
FBIS, 17 Oct. 1983, pp. A6-A7
.
101 Vitality Kobysh, "Observer's Opinion: Crossroads,"
Literaturnaya Gazeta , 19 Oct. 1983,' p. 9, translated in
Soviet Union: Daily Report . FBIS, 19 Oct. 1983, p. A5.
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negotiate from strength and undermine detente, and previous
U.S. actions to promote East-West tensions:
First, in contrast to the forties and fifties the
present heightening of war hysteria is taking place in
an epoch of a cardinally different correlation of forces
in the world, at an immeasurably more dangerous level of
military confrontation than before. Second, the United
States is now conducting a line of truly global
confrontation with socialism. Third, the extreme danger
of "Reaganism" lies in the fact that Washington tries to
talk with the rest of the world in such a way as if
nothing has changed since the Second World War. WA
A fourth item might be added to this list. Another
factor distinguishing U.S. efforts to undermine East-West
relations at this time was the fact that Washington had
undertaken international obligations to secure and promote
detente — obligations the U.S. was guilty of violating:
What is standing in the way of normalizing relations
between the two countries? Above all, it is
Washington's failure to comply with the agreements
already reached, and among them the agreement on
preventing a nuclear war signed at summit level. 103
V. CONCLUSIONS
Much of the foregoing material has concentrated on
Soviet rhetoric that is obviously dogmatic in character, but
it illustrates the degree to which the Soviet Union is
102 i>ASS, report of an article in Mirovava Ekonomika I
Mezhdunarodnaya Otnosheniya . 13 Oct. 1983, translated in
Soviet Union: Daily Report . FBIS, 14 Oct. 1983, p. A4
.
103 Commentary by Vladlen Kuznetsov, Moscow Broadcast
in English to North America, in Soviet Union: Daily Report
,
FBIS, 14 Oct. 1983, p. A6
.
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prepared to put pressure on the United States to acquiesce
in Soviet conceptions of stable East-West relations. The
Soviet propaganda cited above is also an indication of
Soviet assessments of the world situation. Clearly the
authors of this propaganda were responsive in their writings
to the attitudes and policies of officials in the upper
hierarchy of the Soviet Communist Party leadership.
This chapter has pursued a fairly simple line of
reasoning, based on a few key assumptions. First, it has
assumed that the Soviets are more likely to be interested in
disarmament agreements during periods of detente. It is
widely accepted that progress in arms control is dependent
on improvements in East-West political tensions, rather than
vice-versa. A second assumption has been implicitly
substantiated by the evidence examined in this chapter. It
is that the Soviet approach to arms control negotiations and
agreements is designed to contribute to a political end
(detente) rather than a strictly military end (first-strike
stability) . An examination of Soviet views and attitudes
toward detente during the 1981 to 198 3 time frame indicates
that, from the Soviet perspective, the START negotiations
did not take place in an atmosphere of detente.
The Soviet Union enjoyed a detente that was based
largely on their own terms throughout the 1970s. Under
Andropov Moscow was determined to revive this detente. The
Soviets gave many indications that they were interested in
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improving U.S. -Soviet relations and resuscitating detente
during the time frame under discussion in this report.
However, Soviet interests in this respect must be qualified,
First, the Soviets wanted to revive detente on their
own terms. A general idea of these terms can be deduced
from Soviet criticisms of U.S. actions. Soviet terms for
reviving detente included U.S. renunciation of the use of
force for any and all foreign policy objectives. The U.S.
was also expected to renounce interfering in the internal
affairs of other states, which in essence meant abandoning
support for democracy in Third World countries where it was
either under siege or trying to reestablish itself.
Soviet terms for renewing detente also included
American abandonment of its strategic nuclear modernization
program and conventional military build-up.
Second, Soviet wishes for a relaxation of tensions
and restoration of U.S. -Soviet detente consisted mainly of
numerous declarations of principle and espousal of several
abstract disarmament proposals, including a nuclear freeze,
a no-first-use pledge, and token signs of flexibility in
START and INF. Soviet statements calling for renewed
detente were not accompanied by any substantive actions,
despite the frequent call for a show of positive American
deeds, not words.
The Soviets were unwilling to show substantive
interest in signing a START agreement for the sake of
- 315 -
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATION
improving U.S. -Soviet relations. As far as Soviet foreign
policy objectives were concerned, it was sufficient to
merely participate in on-going negotiations with the United
States on strategic arms. This demonstrated a superficial
Soviet sincerity about improving relations without
necessitating substantial risks in terms of foreign or
domestic political support.
Again here, it is important to stress that the
breakdown in arms control negotiations was a symptom, and
not a cause of U.S. -Soviet political tension. The United
States deliberately avoided allowing the shooting down of
KAL-007 to impinge on START, INF, or MBFR arms control
negotiations. Certainly the Kremlin recognized this clear
signal of U.S. sincerity. Even the Los Angeles Times
recognized the culpability of the Soviet Union in pursuing a
cold war climate during the first years of the 1980s:
Whether in response to domestic political
considerations or not, the President has made important
concessions in arms-control negotiations dealing both
with strategic nuclear weapons (START) and with the
prospective deployment of U.S. -made missiles in Western
Europe to offset the Soviet SS-20s that are already in
place.
The Administration signed a new grain agreement with
Moscow. It removed restrictions on the exporting of
pipeline-laying equipment to the Soviet Union. And,
except for his condemnation of the Soviet destruction of
a Korean Air Lines jet, the President's rhetoric has
been notably moderated.
Even in the aftermath of the airline incident,
Reagan made fundamental new concessions in the START
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negotiations. He expressed again his conditional
interest in a summit meeting with Soviet leader Yuri V.
Andropov. And he resisted right-wing pressures for new
economic sanctions against Moscow. 10 '*
Two factors worked against the re-emergence of
detente in the 1981 to 1983 time period. 105 First was
American determination to restore its ideological,
political, and military power, which had all been seriously
eroded during the detente of the 1970s. This included both
an increase in military expenditures along with a new
propensity to apply American force in certain situations, as
well as initiatives to counter Soviet-backed terrorism and
insurgency in key regions around the world. Second was "the
attempt by the Soviet Union to maintain the advantages it
had achieved and to demand respect for its superpower status
from the United States." 106 In essence, this was the effort
to restore detente on Soviet terms, something the Reagan
administration was clearly not prepared to do.
Short of a complete renewal of detente on its own
terms, such as it enjoyed in the 1970s, the Soviet Union was
interested only in appearing interested in detente so as to
focus world public opinion on Washington as the source of
104 Editorial, Los Angeles Times , 12 Oct. 1983.
105 Richard W. Stevenson, The Rise and Fall of Detente
Relaxations of Tension in US-Soviet Relations, 1953-1984 ,
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world tensions. The objective of appearing interested in
detente, while avoiding establishing a detente relationship
of real substance, was served admirably by a concomitant
policy of being interested only in negotiating arms
agreements while avoiding taking steps leading to
substantive compromises that might have produced an




I. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
AND OBJECTIVES
Volume I of this report reviewed the evolution of
Western views of Soviet interests in arms control. This
review highlighted several points of interest. First, prior
to the late 1950s, Western analysts generally assumed that
the Soviet Union was disinterested in substantive arms
control, and that Soviet arms control policy aimed solely at
seizing the moral high ground for propaganda purposes.
Second, during the period 1958-1962, Western scholars
(primarily American scientists and academics) elaborated
theories of mutual deterrence and arms control that assumed
a cooperative negotiating partner. These theories involved
specific assumptions about Soviet interest in partial
- 319 -
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
disarmament, or limited steps toward general and complete
disarmament. Among them were the following:
— the Soviets had embraced an appreciation for the
necessity of peaceful coexistence, and shared with the
West a paramount desire to avoid nuclear war;
— Soviet interest in substantive arms control would be
facilitated by overall East-West nuclear parity;
— the Soviets were interested in arms control for much
the same reasons as the West (i.e. fear of nuclear war,
desire to promote domestic economic growth by relief
from heavy defense expenditures, etc.)
— Soviet desires to enter agreements on arms limitation
would reflect genuine national interests, and those
national interests would ensure continued Soviet
compliance with the agreements.
It was further argued in Volume I that these
assumptions were operative in U.S. SALT policy prior to the
advent of the Reagan administration, and that the Soviet
record of noncompliance with SALT is an indictment of the
traditional view of Soviet interests in arms control.
Several deficiencies in this view were identified, among
them a profound mirror-imaging and a failure to account for
possible Soviet disinterest, or asymmetries of interest, in
seeking settlements on questions of war and peace with the
West. Of particular importance was the frequent failure to
distinguish between several discernible levels of Soviet
interest in arms control.
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Volume I also contained a proposed framework for
analyzing Soviet interests in arms control that attempts to
remedy these problems. It suggested that Soviet arms
control motives may be broken down into four levels; (1)
Soviet interests in proposing arms control initiatives, (2)
Soviet interests in negotiating arms control initiatives,
(3) Soviet interests in agreeing to arms control
initiatives, and (4) Soviet interests in complying with arms
control initiatives once signed.
Soviet interests in proposing arms control
initiatives are best understood in a historical context.
There was a radical change in the Bolshevik stance toward
disarmament proposals in 1921. To repeat a quote from
Chapter Two:
Beginning in mid-1921 the Soviet government adopted the
posture it has assumed until the present day, claiming
to be the leading and probably the only sincere
supporter (excepting the Soviet bloc) of disarmament.
Prior to that time, the official Bolshevik view could be
summarized with the following statement by Lenin:
Let the hypocritical or sentimental bourgeoisie dream of
disarmament. So long as there are oppressed and
exploited people in the world, we must strive, not for
1 Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "Lenin on Disarmament,"
Slavic Review , 23, 3 (Sept. 1964), p. 508.
- 321 -
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
disarmament, but for the universal arming of the
people. 2
As mentioned in Volume I, there were several reasons
for Lenin's "volte face." They revolved around a decision
to alter the ostensible attitude of the new Soviet state
toward the outside world by promoting an early version of
peaceful coexistence. The Bolshevik leaders determined that
their chances for survival would be improved by taking a
more conciliatory posture in world politics. This tactical
change of policy was necessitated by perceptions of a
hostile foreign threat and the severity of domestic economic
deprivation. The three most important elements in this
decision to be noted here are: (1) the Bolsheviks believed
that the relative balance of forces (later termed
"correlation of forces") was extremely adverse to their
interests; (2) there were important internal, or domestic
reasons for seeking a conciliation with the outside world;
and, (3) it probably would not have been possible without
the leadership authority commanded by Lenin.
There were important propaganda benefits the
Bolshevik leaders hoped to gain from their espousal of
2 V.I. Lenin, "The Army and the Revolution," (1905),
Selected Works
.
(New York: International Publishers, 1937)
,
Vol. 3, p. 339; cited in A Lexicon of Marxist-Leninist









disarmament. Again repeating a quote from Walter Clemens
given in Volume I:
By attending international conferences and championing
disarmament, the Soviet regime hoped to enhance its
prestige, divide its enemies, and win friends among the
opponents of war and (for example, in Turkey) of
European imperialism.
Richard Pipes was cited as pointing out that Soviet
detente policy and peace proposals permit the U.S.S.R. to
disallow criticisms and to "avoid questions touching on the
nature of the peace that is to result from detente." 4
Soviet interests in negotiating arms control
initiatives also involve strong elements of propaganda, but
there are other reasons for the Soviets to engage an
adversary in negotiations. There are important benefits to
the Soviets deriving from a 'process' of negotiating. For
one, such a process has an asymmetrical inhibiting effect on
the West, Among these are the following as noted by Colin
Gray: 5
— Encourage the popular Western fallacy that there is a
'happy ending' to East-West rivalry;
3 Clemens, p. 520.
4 Richard Pipes, "Detente: Moscow's View," in Richard
Pipes, ed. , Soviet Strategy in Europe . (New York: Crane,
Russak, 1976), p. 28-29.
5 Colin S. Gray, "Arms Control in Soviet Policy," Air
Force Magazine , March 1980, p. 69.
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— Persuade Western politicians and publics that
restraint and reasonableness today will be rewarded
tomorrow'
— Exploit the Western emotional investment in the
process itself, so as to influence Western behavior in
other policy areas; and,
— Perpetuate the Western belief that arms control can
be a panacea for security concerns.
Zdzislaw M. Ruraz noted the value of negotiations for
intelligence gathering. 6 Such intelligence may include not
only information about the adversary's actual capabilities
and programs, but also his intentions and willpower — both
dimensions are critical to Soviet assessments of the
correlation of forces. Note that negotiations, with their
high visibility quotient in the Western media, also serve as
ideal conduits for disseminating disinformation and other
forms of deception.
Soviet interest in agreeing to be bound by a treaty,
whether an arms control agreement or some other diplomatic
accord, retains many of the motives mentioned above,
including seizing the propaganda high ground, but also
includes a narrower range of objectives. Peter Vigor has
suggested that there are only two reasons the Soviets would
6 See Zdzislaw M. Ruraz, "Analysis of Soviet Risk
Assessment in Arms Control Treaty Violations," in Joseph D,
Douglass, Jr., Why the Soviets Violate Arms Control





ever agree to a treaty obligation: to stall for time; or to
register some condition in their favor that they want to
preserve, or against them and which they want to prevent
from deteriorating further.
This last objective (to prevent a bad situation from
worsening) is interesting because it essentially means
stalling for time, suggesting that, ultimately, the sole
purpose for agreements (in the Soviet view) is gaining time
for the eventual triumph of socialism over capitalism. In
fact, this is precisely what is suggested by Nathan Leites'
analysis of the Bolshevik "operational code:"
In certain circumstances any kind of agreement, with
any kind of enemy, may be just as required as all-out
violence against an enemy is in others. The aim of both
methods is the same: to decrease the chances of the
Party being annihilated, to increase the chances of its
annihilating its enemies. . . . When the Party and a
certain enemy have failed in their attempts to advance
against each other, the conditions for an effective
agreement between them have come into existence.
Leites has also noted that "there is no essential difference
between coming to an ostensibly amicable arrangement with an
outside group or using violence against it; they are both
tactics in an over-all strategy of attack."
7 Nathan Leites, A Study of Bolshevism , (Glencoe, 111
The Free Press, 1953), p. 60. See also idem., The
Operational Code of the Politburo , (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1951)
.
8 The Operational Code of the Politburo , p. 88.
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Soviet interests in complying with arms control
agreements pose a fascinating subject of study, one that,
unfortunately, exceeds the bounds of this report, but which
must nevertheless be made clear here. The West originally
assumed that a Soviet signature on an agreement meant that
the Soviets had assessed that agreement as being in the
national interest, and equated that as also meaning
compliance with the agreement would be in the national
interest. The record of Soviet noncompliance with regard to
the SALT I and II agreements suggests otherwise. What
incentives do the Soviets have for complying with an
agreement? The following might be suggested:
— seizing the propaganda high ground (can be
accomplished merely by sustaining the impression of
complying)
— compliance requirements are compatible with defense
programs and national interests (they are so loose as to
allow for these) , there is no compelling security need
to violate agreements
— maintaining incentives for the other side to continue
complying (again this could conceivably be accomplished
merely by the impression of compliance on the part of
the Soviet Union)
— compliance with one arm control agreement is seen as
a necessary precondition to some other desired arms
control outcome (for example, providing the Soviets
genuinely sought a SALT II agreement following the
signing of SALT I — as I believe they did — they would
have had a certain incentive for conveying the
impression of complying with SALT I)
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— noncompliance would result in sanctions that involved
higher costs for the Soviet military (i.e. U.S.
responses required increased Soviet defense outlays) Of
course, the record of U.S. -Soviet arms control shows
very little likelihood of U.S. responses of this nature.
II. CONCLUSIONS
A.Soviet Disinterest in a Strategic Arms
Reduction Agreement
The principal conclusion of this report is that,
during the period 1981 to 1983, the Soviet Union was more
interested in negotiating strategic arms reductions than in
reaching agreement on strategic arms reductions.
Negotiations alone (with little more than apparent movement
toward some form of accommodation) served Soviet foreign and
military objectives. The Soviet Union had no pressing
domestic, foreign, or military need for an agreement to
reduce strategic nuclear weapons along the lines proposed by
the United States (i.e. emphasis on reducing land-based
ICBMs to equal limits for both sides)
.
There are five areas of evidence on which this
conclusion is based. For one, it is clear that the Soviet
Union saw propaganda interests in coming to the negotiating
table with the United States. There was a multitude of
Soviet statements professing interest in strategic arms
reductions. This demonstrates at least a high degree of




SUMMARY OF SOVIET ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES
1. IN PROPOSING ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES
seize the propaganda high ground
deflect criticism of the Soviet Union as a threat
to peace
— distract attention from the nature of the peace
the Soviets would impose
— promote the appearance of ideological moderation
2. IN NEGOTIATING ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS
seize the propaganda high ground
seek superiority over a potential opponent by
lulling his sense of alarm, etc. (this is a
variation on the "buying time" objective)
gather intelligence or other information on a
potential adversaries capabilities and intentions
establish a channel for disseminating
disinformation and deception
3. IN AGREEING TO ARMS CONTROL TREATIES
seize the propaganda high ground
codify some existing situation, either to retain
some Soviet advantage, to buy time while
undermining some opponent's advantage, or
forestall the opponent gaining an advantage not
already held
buy time
4. IN COMPLYING WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
seize the propaganda high ground
— induce reciprocal compliance
alleviate the possibility of sanctions or other
responses to Soviet noncompliance
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policy subordinated START to agreement on issues in another
negotiating forum (INF) . That is, the Soviet Union imposed
preconditions for reducing strategic nuclear weapons that
had little to do with the substance of the START
negotiations.
Third, a review of the publicly available START
negotiating record indicates little or no movement in the
fundamental Soviet position, despite major concessions to
Soviet objections on the part of the U.S. delegation. Had
the Soviets placed a higher priority on reaching agreement
to reduce intercontinental nuclear weapons there would have
been greater flexibility in the Soviet START position.
Fourth, an evaluation of the leadership and foreign
policy context of Soviet START policy, as well as the
relative U.S. and Soviet bargaining positions in START,
suggests that there were significant internal obstacles to
Soviet movement toward the U.S. negotiating position, even
had the Soviet Union been more interested in a START
agreement.
Fifth, the Soviet Union was adequately successful (at
least until late 1983) in achieving its foreign and military
policy objectives through negotiations, and did not need a
START agreement, certainly not a START agreement such as
proposed by the United States.
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B. Sources of Soviet Interests in
Proposing and Negotiating Strategic Arms
Reductions
Soviet interests in negotiating START were derived
from the following sources: 1) NATO INF modernization plans;
2) the potential maturation of Reagan's strategic
modernization program; 3) the desire to salvage the SALT
framework with its asymmetrical impact on U.S. nuclear
weapons modernization efforts; and, 4) the propaganda
benefits of promoting an image of the Soviet Union as peace-
loving and exploiting the Western peace movement on issues
of no-first-use and a nuclear freeze. None of these had any
direct connection with reducing strategic nuclear weapon
arsenals for the sake of stability or international
security. All of them could be achieved to a substantial
degree without formal agreement.
C. Sources of Soviet Disinterest in a
Strategic Arms Reduction Agreement
There were were three principal sources of Soviet
disinterest in agreeing to strategic arms reductions as
suggested by President Reagan: 1) the lack of U.S.
bargaining leverage; 2) Soviet leadership instability due to
a series of successions; and, 3) Soviet unwillingness to
revive detente through arms control and Soviet assessments
that the U.S. was similarly disinclined.
This conclusion suggests an interesting point. It
will always be a simple matter to achieve nuclear arms
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control agreements with the Soviets — providing one is
willing to accept without reservation the terms dictated by
Soviet negotiators. Achieving agreements that promote U.S.
interests are an entirely different matter. There may in
fact be little the U.S. can do to secure Soviet agreement to
reasonable arms control accords.
This report has concluded that the failure to reach a
strategic arms reduction agreement in the 1981 to 1983 time
frame had little to do with U.S. policy. This is an
explicit refutation of the criticism by many Americans to
the effect that the Reagan administration's START policy was
insincere, non-negotiable, or otherwise responsible for the
breakdown in talks in November and December 198 3. Internal
Soviet conditions may have had a greater impact on
preventing Soviet compromises in the START negotiations.
This suggests that during certain eras the U.S. may not be
able to constructively engage the Soviet Union in arms
control talks. In such times there may be little the U.S.
can do to promote Soviet interests in arms control
agreements. Of course, this assumes the United States wants
an agreement. Note the following adamant advice from French
General Pierre Gallois:
You Americans must get over the idea that you can
ever have a real arms-control negotiation with the
Soviets. They are impressed by power, only power, not
talk. You have always lost when you have tried to
influence them through negotiation. You give up
something real, they give up nothing that they want, and
your president announces a success. But do you really
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get a quid pro quo? Never: rien, rien, jamais rien.
The Soviets act in a completely different style: Did
they ask your permission to deploy the SS-20? Was it
even offered as a subject of negotiation? Or their
invasion of Afghanistan? Of course not. They do what
they want and negotiate about what you're going to do.
No, you must give up hope of achieving anything with
them by negotiation. You must simply resolve to take
the steps required for your security. That, and that
alone, they will respect. 9
P. Preconditions for Soviet Interest in
a Strategic Arms Reduction Agreement
This report has proposed that Soviet interests in
arms control in general, and strategic arms reductions in
particular, are conditioned by three basic sets of factors:
Soviet perceptions of the correlation of forces (including
perceptions of relative bargaining leverage) ; the status of
Soviet leadership and its desires to achieve Soviet
objectives through arms control; and, the general
orientation of Soviet foreign policy.
Those eras when the Soviet Union appeared most
interested in arms control outcomes (early 1920s, early
1930s, and late 1960s) were characterized by Soviet
perceptions of an adverse correlation of forces, strong
leadership (and post-succession crisis stability) , and a
foreign policy oriented toward peaceful coexistence. None
9 Quoted in John Train, "The Soviet Wedge in Geneva,"
Wall Street Journal , 28 Sept. 1983.
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of these 'preconditions' existed in the 1981 to 1983 period
when START was first being negotiated. 10
The thrust of this report has been to explore the
conditions or factors necessary for Soviet interest in a
strategic arms reduction agreement. It cannot be over-
emphasized, however, that these factors do not, by
themselves, indicate whether the United States would benefit
from arms reduction negotiations or agreements with the
Soviet Union. They merely indicate whether the conditions
for such a treaty outcome exist. The advisability of an
arms control treaty must ultimately be based on whether its
specific terms promote or impede the achievement of primary
national security interests. As Thomas C. Schelling and
Morton Halperin asserted in 1961: "the evaluation of any
arms proposal will depend on its specific content." 11
10 It is possible that those conditions may have come
into existence in the latter half of the 1980s. This
suggests that a strategic arms reduction agreement is much
more likely at the present time than during the 1981 to 1983
period.
11 See Strategy and Arms Control . (New York: The
Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), p. 43. Twelve criteria
relating to the evaluation of SALT, but with general
applicability to any prospective strategic arms agreement,
are developed in William R. Van Cleave, "Implications of
Success or Failure of SALT," in William R. Kintner and
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., SALT: Implications for
Arms Control in the 1970s , (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1973), pp. 313-336, esp. pp. 328-329.
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